COMPARATIVE LITERATURE

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THE AUERBACHS KELLER SCENE AND *SHE STOOPS TO CONQUER*

JOHN HENNIG

STUDIES on Goldsmith's influence on Goethe have been confined to *The Vicar of Wakefield* and *The Deserted Village*.[1] In one of the many investigations of the dependence, acknowledged by Goethe, of *Erwin und Elmire* upon "die liebenswürdige Romanze" of Edwin and Angelica in the *Vicar*, Chapter VIII, Borcherdt remarks that it is strange that, while this influence must have taken place in the autumn of 1773, there is no "Erwähnung des Landpredigers in den Briefen aus den Jahren 1773-1775."[2] However, in March 1773 Goethe wrote to Johanna Fahlmer, sending her "als Morgengruß Wackefield und Wörterbuch," in order that she might "Bedeutung und Aussprache nach selbst beliebigem Gefallen erforschen und finden." A few pages later in his article, Borcherdt himself refers to Goethe's letter of September 10 to Johanna Fahlmer. In conjunction with the fact that Goethe three and a half years later obtained a copy of the English edition of the *Vicar* for Frau von Stein,[3] his letter of March 1773 shows that, unlike his male friends, Goethe did not confine himself to reading Goldsmith in German translations and that he tried—as he had done already at Sesenheim—to introduce his female friends to the English text of the *Vicar*.

Borcherdt rightly remarked that Goethe's letters in the years 1773-75 do not fully reflect the position occupied by Goldsmith in his thoughts. *The Vicar* was by then so well known to his friends that there was

[1] L. M. Price, *English-German Literary Influences* (1919), nos. 203 ff., and *The Reception of English Literature in Germany* (1932), pp. 248 ff. and nos. 277 ff.
[2] *Goethe-Jahrbuch*, XXXXII (1911), 75.
[3] Letters of Sept. 10, 16, and 20, 1776.

little need to refer to it, and, in general, our sources of this period of Goethe's life are less detailed than those of his later years.

In his summary of *Goethe's Knowledge of English Literature*, Professor Boyd concludes a paragraph on Goldsmith with the words: "There is no indication of Goethe's having read *She Stoops to Conquer*. It is probable, however, that he was present at the performance of a German adaptation of the play by F. L. Schröder, at Weimar, in 1801."[4] The index to Goethe's *Tagebücher* states that when on February 25, 1801, Goethe was in the Comödie, *Irrthum in allen Ecken* was performed.

This version, published at Vienna in 1784,[5] was not the first German translation; for in 1773 there had appeared *Sie läßt sich herab, um zu siegen; oder, Die Irrthümer einer Nacht. Ein Lustspiel in fünf Aufzügen, von Doctor Goldsmith, aus dem Englischen übersetzt von Wittenberg, Lt.*[6] After searching in vain for a copy of the 1773 translation in the public libraries of Ireland, Great Britain, Western Germany, and Berlin, I received from the Hamburg Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek the following communication:

> Die gesuchte Übersetzung der Goldsmith'schen Komödie befand sich in einem Sammelband deutscher Bühnenstücke aus dem Besitz Friedrich Ludwig Schroeders. Dieser Sammelband wurde zusammen mit anderen Kostbarkeiten unserer Bibliothek während des Krieges ausgelagert und geriet in fremde Hände. Die Nachforschungen nach einem anderen Exemplar des Goldsmith'schen Lustspiels waren ohne Erfolg.

The fact that this copy was originally in the possession of Schroeder and that the subtitle bears some resemblance to that of Schroeder's adaptation suggests that the latter was influenced by the 1773 translation.[7]

Although "it is the privilege of tale-tellers to open their story in an inn, the free rendez-vous of all travellers and where the humour of each displays itself without ceremony and restraint" (beginning of Scott's *Kenilworth*)—and indeed inn scenes belong to the stock of eighteenth-century English comedy—I suggest that there was a direct influence of the alehouse scene in *She Stoops to Conquer* on the Auerbachs Keller scene in *Urfaust*. This suggestion is based on circumstantial evidence only. The first German translation of *She Stoops*

[4] *Goethe's Knowledge of English Literature* (Oxford, 1932), p. 102.

[5] This adaptation was not mentioned in Litzmann's article on Schroeder in *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, XXXII, 506 f.

[6] Hamburg and Güstrow. Buchenröder & Ritter, 1773. A. Dobson's bibliography of Goldsmith (London, 1888) does not list translations, and the Goldsmith bibliographies by I. A. Williams (1924) and T. Scott (1928) are confined to first editions of the originals. The German translation of 1773 is mentioned in *Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature*, III, 643.

[7] I am indebted to the Library of Congress for drawing my attention to the copy of the 1773 translation in the Yale University Library and to that library for supplying me with a photostat of the pages required for this paper.

to Conquer had just become available when Goethe wrote the Auerbachs Keller scene. The wording of the Auerbachs Keller scene shows similarities with that of the alehouse scene in the 1773 German translation of *She Stoops to Conquer* which are too numerous and striking to be dismissed as accidental. There is a similarity not only in the setting but also in the composition of these two scenes. The similarities between the alehouse scene in *She Stoops to Conquer* in the German translation of 1773 (ASG) and the Auerbachs Keller scene in *Urfaust* (AKU) become still more obvious when we compare the latter with the Fragment 1790 version (AKF). In my discussion I am assuming that the reader has available (1) the English original of *She Stoops to Conquer* and (2) an edition of *Urfaust* and the Fragment 1790.

The derivation of AKU from ASG seems to account for the curious fact that in *Urfaust* the first eight lines of the Auerbachs Keller scene are in verse, while the remaining scene is in prose. The parallelism between AKU and ASG starts with the prose part of AKU.

While at the beginning the parallelism between AGS and AKU is largely literal, at the end it is mainly structural. After Hastings has innocently answered two of Tony's questions, at Tony's cheeky information that they have lost their way, Marlow breaks in, overcoming his natural shyness. After Faust has tartly answered two of Frosch's questions, at Frosch's joke about the ferry crossing at the Saale Mephistopheles breaks in giving Frosch tit for tat, thus preventing Faust from descending to the level of the "lustige Gesellen." In the 1790 version Faust in this instance was reduced to a silent part. It is not impossible that the association between *She Stoops to Conquer* and the Faust tradition was established in Goethe's mind through the name of Marlow (I, 4: "And his name—is Marlow").[8]

Both the literal and the structural parallels between AKU and AGS suggest that Goethe did not systematically copy ASG. The parallels are memories from the reading of the German translation or from listening to a performance based on it.

There is no need to repeat here the evidence which is the basis of Witkowski's statement: "So vereinigt sich alles, um das Jahr 1773 als den Beginn von Goethes Schaffen am *Faust* festzustellen."[9] In his plan for his autobiography (1801),[10] Goethe himself assigned *Urfaust* to 1775; indeed it is only from that year that we have definite information of his writing specific scenes. Among the earliest references is "Aufm Zürchersee," June 15, 1775, opening the first volume of *Tage-*

[8] In Goethe and Marlowe see Witkowski, *Goethe's Faust; mit Kommentar* (Leipzig, 1929), pp. 41 ff. and O. Heller, *Faust and Faustus* (St. Louis, 1931).

[9] Witkowski, *op. cit.*, p. 64, and Robertson, "The Oldest Scenes of Goethe's *Faust*," *MLN*, XV (1900), 278 f.; also Zeitler in *Goethe-Handbuch*, II (1924), 124.

[10] *WE*, I, xxvi, 357.

bücher, which is usually read in conjunction with the letter of September 17 to Auguste von Stolberg from Offenbach: "Ich machte eine Scene an meinem Faust ... Mir wars in all dem wie einer Ratte, die Gift gefressen hat, sie läuft in alle Löcher." If my suggestion regarding the influence of ASG on AKU is adopted, it is more probable that, while AKU was written at Frankfurt, under the fresh impression of ASG (received at home rather than on the journey),[11] only on September 17 was a suitable substitute found for the song "Let schoolmasters puzzle their brains" which in ASG occupies a place similar to that held by the "Rattenlied" in AKU.

It is suggested that *She Stoops to Conquer* exercised some influence on other scenes of *Urfaust*. In III, 4 Tony procures "by the rule of the thumb" a casket with Miss Neville's jewels. Compare Mephistopheles' words:

> Hier ist ein Kästgen leidlich schwer
> Ich habs wo anderswo genommen.
> (*Urfaust*, 583 f.)

In III, 5 Mrs. Hardcastle upbraids Miss Neville for her vanity in wanting her jewels: "Consult your glass, my dear, and then see if with such a pair of eyes you want any better sparklers." Compare in the Nachbarinn Haus scene:

> MARTHE: ... leg den Schmuck hier heimlich an;
> Spazier ein Stündgen lang dem Spiegelglas vorüber ...
> MEPHISTOPHELES: Ach, es ist nicht der Schmuck allein
> Sie hat ein Wesen, einen Blick so scharf ...
> [*Urfaust*, 742-765]

Miss Neville desires her jewels "but for a day. Just to be permitted to show them as a relick, and then they may be locked up again." Like Gretchen she could say:

> Darf mich ach leider auf den Gassen
> Nicht in der Kirch mit sehn lassen.
> (*Urfaust*, 739 f.)

In the conversation between Hastings and Mrs. Hardcastle in II, 7 we may trace some resemblance to the conversations between

[11] *She Stoops to Conquer* was written in 1772. That its performance, far too long delayed for poor Goldsmith, was a success was chiefly due to Dr. Johnson, as Goldsmith acknowledged in his dedication (see the chapters on *She Stoops to Conquer* in the Goldsmith biographies by Forster and Moore and P. Kavanagh, *Irish Theatre*, 1947). Within the year of this performance, two London and one Dublin editions were published. J. N. Bean, "Die ersten deutschen Übersetzungen englischer Lustspiele im 18. Jahrhundert," *Theatergeschichtliche Forschungen*, XX (Hamburg, 1906) does not refer to the translation of *She Stoops to Conquer*, although he specially lists translations of English comedies published in northern Germany. The 1773 translation shows how readily English literature and Goldsmith in particular were then absorbed in Germany; the first French translation appeared as late as 1822.

Mephistopheles and Marthe. Both Mrs. Hardcastle and Marthe admire how widely traveled their interlocutors are, who politely acknowledge the compliment.

The resemblance between ASG and AKU concerns merely details of wording and external construction. Internally the comparative passages are diametrically opposed. Hastings and Marlow have really lost their way, and Tony gets the better of them by making them believe that Mr. Hardcastle's house is an inn, the mistake on which the whole comedy plot depends. The casket of jewelry procured by Tony is Miss Neville's property, and she wants it not from vanity but to defray the expenses of her flight. Mrs. Hardcastle has no designs on her interlocutor and her interest in his accounts of foreign countries is objective.

Yet, I feel, apart from the *Volksbuch*, ASG is the most palpable influence in AKU. This influence is principally confined to the initial parts of the scene, which were not found in the *Volksbuch*. The influence of ASG seems to account for the change from Faust's descending with his students to his joining "die lustigen Gesellen" in the middle of their bout. Through tracing these influences, we shall more fully realize the superiority of *Faust* over its sources. In *She Stoops to Conquer* and particularly in the alehouse scene there is little that is above ordinary eighteenth-century English comedy.[12] What Goethe made of this scene, in using some of its external details in his vision of "die kleine Welt," has so fascinated his readers that the parallelism between the two scenes has so far escaped attention.

The Royal Irish Academy, Dublin

[12] Kavanagh, *op. cit.*, p. 311.

PARALLEL PASSAGES

Alehouse Scene in German Translation of *She Stoops to Conquer*[13]	Auerbachs Keller Scene in *Urfaust*	Auerbachs Keller Scene in *Faust* Fragment 1790
Ein Bierhaus. Verschiedne lumpichte Kerl mit Punsch und Tobak. Tony sitzt oben am Tische, etwas höher als die andern, mit einem Hammer in der Hand.	*Auerbachs Keller in Leipzig. Zeche lustiger Gesellen.*	552: *Auerbachs Keller in Leipzig. Zeche lustiger Gesellen*
	16 Brander: ... Wir wollen einen Papst wählen.	577: Brander: ... Wir wollen einen Papst erwählen.
Alle. Huzzah! Huzzah! Huzzah! Bravo!	1: Siebel: ... Holla he! Auf! He da!	560: Siebel: ... Runda! ... Auf! holla! ho!
Der erste Bursch. Nun, meine Herren, ein Lied; seyd stille! Der Squire will selbst den Takt zum Liede schlagen.	29: Frosch (*den Krug auf den Tisch stossend*): Ruh iezt!—Ein neu Lied Kameraden ...	603: Brander: *auf den Tisch schlagend*: ... Gebt Acht! Ein Lied vom neu'sten Schnitt ... *Er singt.*
Alle. Ja, ein Lied, ein Lied!	116: Frosch: Nun Herrn ein Liedgen.	682: Altmayer: Gebt uns ein Lied.
Tony. Nun, meine Herren, so will ich euch ein Lied vorsingen, da ich auf dieß Bierhaus, die drey Tauben, gemacht habe.		Siebel: Nur auch ein nagelneues Stück.
Laßt Thoren sich den Kopf zerbrechen Mit Unsinn und Latein. Wir, Freunde, wollen tapfer zechen, Und uns des Lebens freun:		517: Mephistopheles: Grau, theurer Freund, ist alle Theorie, Und grün des Lebens goldner Baum.

[13] ASG has been described as "very Irish" (better "stage-Irish," F. F. Moore, *Life of Goldsmith*, 1910, p. 395), and in the first biography of Goldsmith (J. Prior, 1837, I, 45, repeated by Forster and Irving) it is associated with an experience of young Goldsmith in an inn at Ardagh. There is now only a miserable "modern pub" at Ardagh, but "The Three Pigeons," an inn ten miles from Athlone, claims to be the scene of the alehouse scene in *She Stoops to Conquer*.

Alehouse Scene in German Translation of *She Stoops to Conquer*	Auerbachs Keller Scene in *Urfaust*	Auerbachs Keller Scene in *Faust* Fragment 1790
Sie mögen nach heydnischen Göttern Bestäubte Bücher durchblättern,	163: Wir knicken und ersticken Doch gleich wenn einer sticht	*77: Er schlägt das Buch auf und erblickt das Zeichen des Makrokosmus.* 716: Wir knicken und ersticken Doch gleich wenn einer sticht.
Wir wollens den Gecken erlauben Und zechen hier in den drey Tauben, Hey didel dum, didel dum, didel dey...	30: ...und den Rundreim mitgesungen 40: *Chorus jauchzend.*	604: Und singt den Rundreim kräftig mit 612: *Chorus jauchzend.*
Mein Mädchen, ihr Herren soll leben! Stimmt ein, ihren Reiz zu erheben,	18: Schwing' dich auf Frau Nachtigall, Grüs' mein Liebgen zehntausendmal.	580: Schwing' dich auf, Frau Nachtigall, Grüß' mir mein Liebchen zehntausendmal.
Alle. Bravo, Bravo!	169: Alle: *durcheinander.* Bravo! Bravo!	720: Frosch. Bravo! Bravo!
Erster Bursch. Der Squire hat Zunder in der Brust.	70: Mephistopheles: Nun schau wie sie's hier treiben! Wenn dirs gefällt, dergleichen Sozietät schaff ich der Nacht nächtlich.	637: Mephistopheles: Ich muß dich nun vor allen Dingen In lustige Gesellschaft bringen.
Zweyter Bursch. Ich mag ihn gern hören thun, weilen er uns niehmals nichts vorsingt, das gemein ist.		650: Frosch: Wahrhaftig du hast Recht! Mein Leipzig lob' ich mir! Es ist ein klein Paris, und bildet seine Leute.
Vierter Bursch... Dieß soll mir zu Gift werden (*er trinkt*) wenn mein Bär anders, als nach den artigsten Melodien tanzt. Potz wie geschieht mir, oder nach der Menuet in Harlekins Hochzeits-Schmause.	36: Die Köchin hätt ihr Gift gestellt Da wards so eng ihr in der Welt, Als hett sie Lieb im Leibe!	609: Die Köchinn hatt' ihr Gift gestellt, Da ward's so eng' ihr in der Welt, Als hätte sie Lieb' im Leibe.
Zweyter Bursch. Ewig Schade, daß der Squire noch nicht Herr über sein Vermögen ist. Es würde für alle öffentlichen Häuser zehn Meilen in der Runde gut seyn...		645: Mephistopheles: So lang der Wirth nur weiter borgt, Sind sie vergnügt und unbesorgt.

Alehouse Scene in German Translation of *She Stoops to Conquer*	Auerbachs Keller Scene in *Urfaust*	Auerbachs Keller Scene in *Faust* Fragment 1790
Zweyter Bursch. O darin artet er seinem Vater nach. Wahrhaftig, der alte Squire Lumpkin war der feinste Herr, den ich je mit meinen Augen gesehen habe. Das Hifthorn zu blasen, einen Hasen, oder ein Mensch in einem Gebüsch aufzutreiben,[14] darinn hatte er nie seines gleichen. Es war die gemeine Sage, daß er die besten Pferde, Hunde und Mädchen in der ganzen Grafschaft halte.	20: Siebel: Wetter und Todt. Grüs mein Liebgen!—Eine Hammelmauspastete mit gestopften dürren Eichenblättern vom Blocksberg, durch einen geschundnen Haasen mit dem Hahnenkopf überschickt, und keinen Grus von der Nachtigall. Hatt sie mich nicht —Meinen Stutzbart und alle Appartinenzien hinter die Thüre geworfen wie einen stumpfen Besen, und das um—Drey Teufel! Keinen Grus sag ich als die Fenster eingeschmissen.	
Tony. Und, bey meiner Sechs, wenn ich erst mündig bin, will ich meines Vaters ächter Sohn seyn, das versprech' ich euch...		597: Brander *auf den Tisch schlagend*:... Ihr Herrn gesteht, ich weiß zu leben
Aber auf, Jungens, trinkt herum, und seyd lustig, denn ihr zahlt nichts.	445: Frosch: Will keiner sauffen keiner lachen! Ich werd euch lehren Gesichter machen! 3: Siebel:... drein gesoffen drein gekrischen.	552: Frosch: Will keiner trinken? keiner lachen? Ich will euch lehren Gesichter machen! 561: Siebel:... sauft und schreyt!
Achter Auftritt. Die vorigen, der Wirth. Tony. Was giebt's, Stingo?	77: Siebel: Wer ist der Storcher da!	
Der Wirth. Es sind zween Herren in einer Postchaise vor der Thüre. Sie haben sich im Walde verirrt, und reden so was von Herrn Hardcastle. Tony. Es kann nicht fehlen, einer von ihnen	Brander: Still! das ist was vornehmes inkognito, sie haben so was unzufriednes böses im Gesicht.	562: Siebel:... Für was siehst du die Fremden an? 657: Frosch: Sie scheinen mir aus einem edlen Haus, Sie sehen stolz und unzufrieden aus.

[14] In the original a quibble, "to beat a thicket for a wench"— as young Tom Jones (V, x) or young Goethe (*Tagebuch*, Aug. 7, 1776)— or "to beat a wench." AKU adopts the latter interpretation in contrast to ASG, the only point where we may possibly suggest that Goethe knew the original.

Alehouse Scene in German Translation of *She Stoops to Conquer*	Auerbachs Keller Scene in *Urfaust*	Auerbachs Keller Scene in *Faust* Fragment 1790
muß gewiß der Herr seyn, der unterwegs ist, um meine Schwester anzuwerben. Sehen sie wie Londoner aus?	Siebel. Pah! Comödianten wenns hoch kommt. 110: Siebel (*leise*): Sie kommen aus dem Reiche man sieht 'en an.	Brander: Marktschreier sind's gewiß, ich wette! 735: Altmayer (*leise*): Sie sind vom Rheine, wie ich spüre.
Der Wirth. Ich glaube, sie könntens wohl seyn. Sie sehn Franzmännern verteufelt ähnlich.	84: Mephistopheles (*leise*): Merks! den Teufel vermuthen die Kerls nie so nah er ihnen immer ist.	660: Mephistophele: *zu Faust.* Den Teufel spürt das Völkchen nie, Und wenn er sie bey'm Kragen hätte.
Tony. Nun so bitte sie, daß sie herein kommen, ich will sie im Augenblicke zurecht weisen. (*Der Wirth geht ab*) ... ich will so geschwind', als man ein Ey kocht, wieder bei euch seyn.[15]	Frosch: Ich will 'en die Würme schon aus der Nase ziehn, wo sie herkommen!	653: Frosch: Laß mich nur gehn; bey eine vollen Glase, Zieh' ich, wie einen Kinderzahn, Den Burschen leicht die Würmer aus der Nase. 659: Gib Acht, ich schraube sie.
Zehnter Auftritt. Tony, der Wirth, der Marlow und Hastings hereinführt.	68: *Faust, Mephistopheles*	637: *Faust und Mephistopheles.*
Tony. Um Verzeyhung, meine Herren. Aber man hat mir gesagt, daß Sie nach einem gewissen Herrn Hardcastle in hiesiger Gegend gefragt haben. Wissen Sie wohl, in welched Gegend des Landes Sie sich befinden? Hastings. Ganz und gar nicht, Sie würden uns aber verbinden, wenn Sie uns Nachricht davon geben wollten. Tony. Auch den Weg nicht, den Sie gekommen sind?	88: Frosch: ... Ist der Weeg von Rippach herüber so schlimm, daß ihr so tief in der Nacht habt reisen müssen. Faust: Wir kommen den Weeg nit. Frosch: Ich meinte etwa ihr hättet bey dem berühmten Hans drüben zu Mittag gespeisst. Faust: Ich kenn ihn nicht (*die andern lachen*).	663: Faust: Seyd uns gegrüßt, ihr Herrn! Siebel: Viel Dank zum Gegengruß ... Meph.: Ist es erlaubt uns auch zu euch zu setzen? Frosch: Ihr seyd wohl spät von Rippach aufgebrochen? Habt ihr mit Herren Hans noch erst zu Nacht gespeis't? Meph.: Heut sind wir ihn vorbey gereis't! Wir haben ihn das letztemal gesprochen.

[15] In the original: "I'll be with you in the squeezing of a lemon," a figure of speech to be paralleled with the introduction of the words "wie einen Kinderzahn" in Fragment 1790, v. 654.

Alehouse Scene in German Translation of *She Stoops to Conquer*	Auerbachs Keller Scene in *Urfaust*	Auerbachs Keller Scene in *Faust* Fragment 1790
Hastings. Nein, mein Herr; aber, wenn Sie uns Nachricht geben können— Tony. So, meine Herren, wenn Sie weder den Weg wissen, wohin Sie wollen, noch, wo Sie sind, noch woher Sie gekommen sind, so ist das erste, wovon ich Ihnen Nachricht geben muß, daß—Sie sich verirret haben.	Frosch: O er ist von altem Geschlecht. Hat eine weitläufige Familie.	Von seinen Vattern wußt' er viel zu sagen. Viel Grüße hat er uns an jeden aufgetragen. (*Er neigt sich gegen Frosch*).
Marlow: Wir hatten keinen Wahrsager nöthig, uns dieß zu sagen. Tony. Um Verzeihung, meine Herren, darf ich so frey seyn, Sie zu fragen, von welchem Orte Sie kommen. Marlow: Das ist nicht nothwendig, um uns den Weg zu zeigen, wohin wir wollen. Tony. Halten Sie mirs zu gute. Aber Frage und Gegenfrage ist erlaubt, wie Sie wissen.	Meph.: Ihr seyd wohl seiner Vettern einer. Brander (*leise zu Frosch*): Steck's ein! der versteht den Rummel. Frosch: Bei Wurzen ists fatal, da muß man so lang auf die Fähre manchmal warten. Faust: So! Siebel: ... Seyd ihr Freunde von einem herzhafter Schluck! Herbey mit euch.	Altmayer *leise*: Da hast du's! Der versteht's! Siebel: Ein pfiffiger Patron! Frosch: Nun, warte nur, ich krieg' ihn schon!

THE "ODE ON A GRECIAN URN," OR CONTENT VS. METAGRAMMAR

LEO SPITZER

Auream quisquis mediocritatem
Diligit, tutus caret obsoleti
Sordibus tecti, caret invidenda
Sobrius aula.
[Horace, *Carmina*, 2, x, 5]

PROFESSOR Earl R. Wasserman in his recent volume, *The Finer Tone* (1953), dedicates fifty pages to Keats's famous ode—a memorable example of painstaking research, of meditative searching into the meaning and form of an outstanding poem, of a never-abating will to understand every word and thought, of pertinent observations probably never made before, and of relevant questions asked. Mr. Wasserman's is a sturdy, hard-working, hard-thinking mind, undaunted by difficulties (even by those he himself may create), unwilling to rest before finding a solution which fully satisfies *him* (this severest of judges sits in judgment only upon himself—other scholarly opinions are not considered).

It is as though of the two alternatives proposed in the verses of Keats's *Endymion*,

> ... There are seats unscalable
> But by a patient wing, a constant spell,
> Or by ethereal things that, unconfin'd,
> Can make a ladder of the eternal wind ...

Mr. Wasserman had chosen the first as his motto: the patient wing, the constant spell. In addition there is noticeable in Mr. Wasserman a deep desire to transcend in his interpretation of poetry the academic drabness of the so-called historical school and to bridge the gap between the "new critics" and the "scholars" by adopting the by no means novel tenet of the former (that a poem is first not a historical document, but an organism in its own right which must be recreated by the critic) without abandoning the traditional methods of explanation (recourse to biography, to passages parallel to those of the poem under study drawn from other writings of the author or his contemporaries, etc.). To a European-born scholar, nurtured in a centuries-old tradition of both scholarly and aesthetic interpretation, especially in the classical and the French fields (who can only deplore the internecine war being waged within every department of English in this country between the "scholars" and the "critics"—as though a scholar in literature should not be conversant with both approaches), it is a

source of great delight and relief that Mr. Wasserman, a scholar thoroughly trained in the history of ideas and in philological method, has developed far beyond his original background and has come to use devices of aesthetic criticism identifiable with those of the critics. Thus combining both approaches, he has surely succeeded in his purpose of showing that Keats is not a poet indulging in "luxurious sensuous experiences," but an artist of the word who in his poems "used both his head and his heart"—in other words, that intellectual structures exist behind the assumed warblings of that poetic nightingale.

If despite all these assets Mr. Wasserman has not always succeeded in carrying conviction in his interpretations, the fault seems to me to lie in a perhaps too eager acceptance of certain questionable habits of contemporary criticism—for instance, the tendency to make the poetic text appear more difficult, intricate, paradoxical than it truly is. This in turn involves on the part of the critic a verbal-metaphysical play that outmetaphysicizes the poem. What is fit for Donne may not always be fit for Keats, as Mr. Wasserman himself remarks, but does not always seem to remember. In general the critic should heed the witty advice of Croce, parodying the Nazis: "Mitsingen ist verboten." Furthermore, Mr. Wasserman makes extensive use of poetic phrases, which for the poet were creations of inspired moments, as technical terms, recurrent, ever-ready pegs on which to hang more prosaic critical comment (e.g., "at heaven's bourne," "sphery sessions"); he overemphasizes "imagery" to the detriment of the subject matter and even the ideological content of the poem; he appeals to certain sophisticated terms such as "imagistic syntax" (or "metagrammar"), "mystic oxymoron,"[1] etc., which perhaps contribute less to our descriptive techniques than they seem to promise.

Being no Keats scholar but only a practitioner of French *explication de texte*, I may be allowed to offer my own relatively simple explanation of the "Ode on a Grecian Urn" with the hope that the difference of method and perhaps the traditionalism of my approach may not be without value (even if my interpretation should have been proposed by other scholars in the past). In any case, I believe that *discussion* of a given theory of a particular critic by fellow critics, detailed criticism of a specific piece of work—a habit that in our days of anarchy, spiritual isolation, and private language tends more and more to disappear from our scholarly journals—can still give as valuable results as in strictly linguistic matters. The *consensus omnium* is as much

[1] Mr. Wasserman even coins a derivative from this classical term of rhetoric: *oxymoronic*—a barbarous formation offending not only the classical but also the American ear; in a sentence such as "[Pan's] is the oxymoronic nature at heaven's bourne" the mixture of neologism and solecism is painful. The Latin ear is again wounded by the coinage *coextential* (p. 36); is this intended to be a portmanteau word (*coexistent* + *coextensive*)?

an ideal for the explanation of poetry as it is for etymological investigation. An essay written with the mental energy of Mr. Wasserman not only invites but deserves the careful weighing of its results by as many students in literature as possible.

I

Thou still unravish'd bride of quietness,
  Thou foster-child of silence and slow time,
Sylvan historian, who canst thus express
  A flowery tale more sweetly than our rhyme:
What leaf-fring'd legend haunts about thy shape
  Of deities or mortals, or of both,
    In Tempe or the dales of Arcady?
What men or gods are these? What maidens loth?
  What mad pursuit? What struggle to escape?
    What pipes and timbrels? What wild ecstasy?

II

Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard
  Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on;
Not to the sensual ear, but, more endear'd,
  Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone:
Fair youth, beneath the trees, thou canst not leave
  Thy song, nor ever can those trees be bare;
    Bold Lover, never, never, canst thou kiss,
Though winning near the goal—yet, do not grieve;
  She cannot fade, though thou hast not thy bliss,
    For ever wilt thou love, and she be fair!

III

Ah happy, happy boughs! that cannot shed
  Your leaves, nor ever bid the Spring adieu;
And, happy melodist, unwearied,
  For ever piping songs for ever new;
More happy love! more happy, happy love!
  For ever warm and still to be enjoy'd,
    For ever panting, and for ever young;
All breathing human passion far above,
  That leaves a heart high-sorrowful and cloy'd,
    A burning forehead, and a parching tongue.

IV

Who are these coming to the sacrifice?
  To what green altar, O mysterious priest,
Lead'st thou that heifer lowing at the skies,
  And all her silken flanks with garlands drest?
What little town by river or sea shore,
  Or mountain-built with peaceful citadel,
    Is emptied of this folk, this pious morn?
And, little town, thy streets for evermore
  Will silent be; and not a soul to tell
    Why thou art desolate, can e'er return.

V

O Attic shape! Fair attitude! with brede
  Of marble men and maidens overwrought,
With forest branches and the trodden weed;
  Thou, silent form, dost tease us out of thought
As doth eternity: Cold Pastoral!
  When old age shall this generation waste,
    Thou shalt remain, in midst of other woe
Than ours, a friend to man, to whom thou say'st,
  Beauty is truth, truth beauty,—that is all
    Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.

Mr. Wasserman starts with the metaphysical framework of the poem as ostensibly reflected in the first line and with the "mystic oxymoron" or "mystic interfusion" supposedly contained in the description of the urn as a "still unravish'd bride":

> Although the ode is a symbolic action in terms of an urn, its intrinsic theme is that region where earth and the ethereal, time and no-time become one... "Bride," suggesting the first phase of the process of generation, has reference to the human and mutable, and consequently has the same paradoxical relation to "unravish'd" that tomorrow has to midnight...[2] Like the humanity and/or[3] divinity of the figures, like the marriage-chastity of the urn and the virginity-ravishment of the maidens, the immortality of the urn and the temporality of the figures are delicately poised on each side of heaven's bourne, yearning towards that area of mystic interfusion...[4]

Instead of beginning as Mr. Wasserman does, I would first ask myself, in the down-to-earth, factual "French" manner: *What is the whole poem about*, in the simplest, most obvious terms? It is first of all a description of an urn—that is, it belongs to the genre, known to

[2] While opposed to what Mr. Wasserman calls rightly the "self-flagellating" habit of certain extremists among the critics to exclude by principle from *explication de texte* all elements outside of the poem, I believe that the timing of allusions to extraneous elements should be carefully devised. For instance, in the case of our ode, it would seem to me better critical strategy, instead of quoting from the start passages from other poems ("There is a budding morrow in midnight," "at heaven's bourne," etc.) or general ideas of Keats's, to reconstruct the poem for the reader by means of words and concepts borrowed as much as possible from the poem under study. The reader must be led to feel the poem as self-explanatory and self-sufficient (for so it is meant in most cases by the poet), as unfolding itself organically before the reader without any commentator being needed. Help from outside introduced too early, and as if it were necessary, is apt to destroy the impression of the specific uniqueness and wholeness of the work of art. Only when the reader has fully understood the poem, helped perhaps more than he realizes by the invisible direction of the critic, may the latter come out from the wings and proclaim: "That is *not* all ye need to know. This poem must also be seen in connection with Keats's whole production and ideology."

[3] Why this legal-commercial device "at heaven's bourne"?

[4] Passages such as these, which present to us as already realized by the poet from the beginning what is generally only the final reward of long meditation, the *unio mystica*, provoke in the unprepared reader first a slight sense of vertigo, then a feeling of frustration at the premature solution of all problems, ostensibly reached so easily, so painlessly.

Occidental literature from Homer and Theocritus to the Parnassians and Rilke, of the *ekphrasis*, the poetic description of a pictorial or sculptural work of art, which description implies, in the words of Théophile Gautier, "une transposition d'art," the reproduction through the medium of words of sensuously perceptible *objets d'art (ut pictura poesis)*. I feel that I am justified in beginning with such an obvious, "generic" statement by the title of the poem, "Ode on a Grecian Urn," which though located outside of the poem proper still belongs to it and contains the orientation intended for us by the poet, who, as is always the case, speaks in his title to his public as a critic.

Since, then, the ode is a verbal transposition of the sensuous appearance of a Greek urn, my next question must be: What exactly has Keats seen (or chosen to show us) depicted on the urn he is describing? The answer to this question will furnish us with a firm contour, not only of the object of his description but of this description itself, which may later allow us to distinguish the symbolic or metaphysical inferences drawn by the poet from the visual elements he has apperceived. In addition, this answer will in our case point to several uncertainties of vision experienced by the poet while deciphering his sensuous subject matter, uncertainties that may help us ultimately to discern *which particular message* Keats wishes us to see embodied in the urn and which to exclude.

The poet describes an urn (obviously consecrated to the ashes of a dead person) bearing in typically Greek fashion a circular "leaf-fring'd" frieze (and it is, I submit, mainly for that reason that the poem is circular or "perfectly symmetrical," as Mr. Wasserman has said, in outward and inward form, thereby reproducing symbolically the form of the *objet d'art* which is its model).[5] The frieze represents inside of the fringe of leaves three Greek "pastoral" scenes (just as the frieze of the cup described in Theocritus' first idyll represents three pastoral scenes framed by a garland of ivy): (1) Stanza I: the wild pursuit of maidens by love-crazed beings; (2) Stanzas II-III: the tender wooing of a maiden by a youth; (3) Stanza IV: the solemn ceremony of sacrifice enacted by a priest before a town community at an altar. The circular form of the frieze makes it necessary for the main elements of the first scene to reappear in Stanza V ("with brede of marble men and maidens," "forest branches and the trodden weed").

Our next question will be: What has Keats *failed* to discern clearly on the frieze? In two passages he manifests indeed uncertainty, a wavering which becomes most conspicuous through the repeated con-

[5] Since already in antiquity the poetic *ekphrasis* was often devoted to circular objects (shields, cups, etc.), it was tempting for poets to imitate verbally this constructive principle in their *ekphraseis*. Mörike's poem on an ancient lamp shows the same formal circularity motivated by the form of the model as does Keats's ode on the urn; cf. my article in *Trivium*, IX (1951), 134-147.

junction "or": (1) "What leaf-fring'd legend . . . / Of deities *or* mortals *or* of both, / In Tempe *or* the dales of Arcady? / What men *or* gods are these?" (St. I); (2) "What little town by river *or* sea shore, / *Or* mountain-built with peaceful citadel . . . ?" (St. IV).

In both cases, that is in Scenes 1 and 3, as distinguished from Scene 2 in which no such uncertainty is suggested, we have to do with identification of certain details which could not be discerned by the beholder of the urn. It cannot be chance that Scenes 1 and 3 are also those in which the elements of the frieze enumerated are introduced by questions ("What?" repeated seven times in St. I, "who?" "to what?" and "what" in St. IV) whereas in Scene 2 no such questions as to identity are asked. I infer that this uncertainty about identity, circularly repeated, is one of the main problems of the poem, and I further submit that this uncertainty is centered about *historical identity*. Keats simply does not know who precisely the Greek protagonists are in the scene of the pursuit and of the sacrifice; this question seems not to arise in Scene 2 which, obviously because it deals with the eternal feeling of love, elicits no wish for specific historical identification. In other and very prosaic words, for Scenes 1 and 3, but not for 2, Keats would be in need of a specialized archaeologist or historian of Greek civilization to explain to him the possible implied "factual" mythological or theological allusions.

In the light of these considerations, the first line of the poem, "Thou still unravish'd bride of quietness," becomes clear; not so in Mr. Wasserman's metaphysical or allegorical interpretation, which leaves the precise literal sense of the words "bride" and "unravish'd" in doubt: "Like the marriage-chastity of the urn and the virginity-chastity of the maidens, the immortality of the urn and the temporality of the figures are delicately poised on each side of heaven's bourne"; " 'bride,' suggesting the first phase of the process of generation, has reference to the human and mutable, and consequently has the same paradoxical relation to 'unravish'd' that morrow has to midnight: the urn belongs to both becoming and immutability." I would interpret the words "still unravish'd bride of quietness" as an allusion to the quietness of the work of art represented by the urn which has not yet been violated by *archaeological or historical scholarship*, by rationalized explanation. We should believe then that the poet, having come upon a newly discovered Greek urn, describes its direct impact on himself before the professionals of history and philology have violated ("ravish'd") its secret, as they will infallibly do in course of time ("*still* unravish'd").

The first desire of the poet must then have been for the urn (that had so long been the "foster-child of silence and slow time") *now* to *speak* to him, to reveal to him the true history of which it must have been a witness. That is why the poet addresses the urn as "sylvan

historian"; the term "historian" is in paradoxical contrast to "unravish'd bride of quietness," since the one must reveal, the other withhold. The urn, still unmolested by antiquarians, is itself a "historian"; yet this is a "*sylvan* historian" who expresses "a flowery tale more sweetly than our rhyme" in its "leaf-fring'd legend," not a professional historian who would furnish us with factual detail, with the who and what of man's past history. The urn's historical, "sylvan" account reveals to us history in the form of the never-changing beauty of nature, of forests, leaves, flowers, as Greek vases usually do.[6]

Thus the first stanza contains a series of unresolved paradoxical oppositions as the bewildered, restless, nearly anguished and breathless seven questions of the poet show. His own quest at this stage for historical identity to be wrested from the silent urn still prevents him from taking in the whole beauty of the work of art, and he suggests, without any attempt at fusion, the manifold contradictions that anguish him at this first moment of contact with the ancient work of art: (1) "slow time"—*now*, the dramatic moment of the discovery of the urn and of its ultimate decipherment; (2) the urn's inviolate secret—the desire of the poet to learn it (his historical curiosity, which he may share with the professional historians); (3) history of which the urn is a witness—the beauty of eternal nature which is represented on the frieze; (4) the silence of the work of art—its expressive quality which "speaks" to the beholder; (5) the silence of the urn—the sound and fury suggested by the first scene depicted on the frieze.[7] It is these

[6] I am not sure whether Mr. Wasserman has not overcategorized "sylvan history" by playing it off against "pageant history" (to which Keats is known to have been adverse); while "pageant history" according to Wasserman "particularizes and hence confines deeds to the mortal world," "sylvan history seizes human passions and makes them 'almost ethereal by the power of the poet'... Human history chronicles mutable becoming; but the urn is the essential historian and chronicles the essence of becoming..." But Keats has created the term "sylvan historian" (not "sylvan history"!) only as a nonce word, valid only for the context of our ode, to be immediately forgotten, the perfect crystal of a snowflake which melts the moment after. One has here the uneasy feeling that an overconscientious analyst has mapped out all the possible categories of history; in addition to the well-known genres of cultural history, social history, economic history, there now is created a new branch henceforth to be known as "sylvan history." And we must remember that the urn is called a historian by Keats only by the figure of speech called *lucus a non lucendo*, since the failure of the work of art as a "historian" will be demonstrated in the poem itself (in St. IV).

[7] One would expect the urn that holds the ashes of the dead to represent foremost the silence and quietness of *death*—but Keats in this truly Grecian (Pythagorean-Platonic) poem has carefully avoided any direct allusion to death that would bring the poem close to eighteenth-century poetry about graveyards. Keats's urn is from the beginning allowed to be only a Greek monument of beauty —conforming, that is, to that practice of the ancients, which Lessing in his treatise, *Wie die Alten den Tod gebildet*, had first formulated and which Goethe found consonant to his own philosophy of life: the practice of representing death in terms of life and beauty. See the *Venetianische Epigramme* (1890), No. 1:

"Sarkophagen und Urnen verzierte der Heide mit Leben:
Faunen tanzen umher...

last two contrasts, the paradox of a speaking silence and of sounds rendered silently by the work of art, that will be expanded in St. II:

> Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard
> Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on;
> Not to the sensual ear, but, more endear'd,
> Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone ...

I would say that Mr. Wasserman does not emphasize enough the strong contrast between "*wild* ecstacy" at the end of St. I and "*soft* pipes" in II, when he suggests (p. 29) that the theme of "ecstasy" forms a gradual transition between I and II:

> ... in the sense of "the most exquisite passion," the word ["ecstasy"] tends ... to draw together the mortal and immortal symbols toward a point of fusion so that in the next stanza the poet may move into an empathy with them ... But in the sense of "the passage of the soul out of the self" (ἐκ + ἱστάναι [read ἱστάναι] = to make stand outside) it describes the consummation of the symbols' empathic act [Question: Can the symbols themselves consummate an emphatic act?] ... The poet's own empathic advance is externalized, in part, by the contraction of his attention as it moves from the total urn ... to the frieze on the urn, to the intense activity in the frieze.

In my opinion there is a total break after the first stanza; the wild chase and struggle sweeps past us, past the poet and us, making no bid for the latter's "empathy" (only perhaps for his attention); and the "ecstasy" here displayed, taking place only in the persons depicted, not in the poet and even less in the "symbols," is as ununderstandable as it is anguishing to the poet, who marks his reaction by the verbless staccato questions: "What maidens loth? What mad pursuit?" (the climate here is entirely "Dionysian"). In St. II we have a new beginning. The poet is seeing another scene which has in common with the first only the presence of musical instruments; now there will be expressed soft feelings of love and the pipes will be played softly.

At this point Keats has realized that, just as it is impossible in this case actually to hear the sounds (wild or soft) of the instruments depicted on the frieze, so it may be true that the silent urn itself may contain, as it were, congealed sound, may *be* music and melody audible only to the "spirit." He has indeed remembered, most fittingly for the Grecian environment, the Pythagorean teachings about world harmony: "Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard are sweeter," that is, since we earthly beings with our gross ears are unable to hear the subtle harmony (based on numbers and proportions) of the music of the spheres, what we sense as silence may be nothing but that very ce-

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> Cymbeln, Trommeln erklingen; wir sehen und hören den Marmor ...
> So überwältiget Fülle den Tod; und die Asche da drinnen
> Scheint, im stillen Bezirk, noch sich des Lebens zu freun."

We may incidentally note Goethe's emphasis in this epigram on the audible quality of the animated scenes portrayed on the silent ancient monument of art.

lestial harmony. I feel entitled to bring this Greek concept (which after all is familiar to any cultured reader) to bear on our poem, since it is a *topos* with Keats, as I infer from four Keatsian passages quoted by Mr. Wasserman which reflect Pythagorean thought. The motto of Wasserman's book is taken from a letter of Keats's: "We shall enjoy ourselves here after by having what we called happiness on Earth repeated in *a finer tone* and so repeated." On p. 50 appear two passages from *Endymion*: "Silence was music from the holy spheres" and

> Aye, 'bove the withering old-lipp'd Fate
> A thousand Powers keep religious state,
> In water, fiery realm, and airy bourne;
> And, silent as a consecrated urn,
> Hold sphery sessions for a season due.
> Yet few of these far majesties, ah, few!
> Have bared their operations to this globe.[8]

On p. 61 a line is quoted from "Bards of Passion and of Mirth"; the nightingale sings "divine melodious truth; / Philosophic numbers smooth." (Reference to a *topos* of Keats is at least as permissible as reference to parallel passages from Keats which are all informed by that *topos*.)

By the Pythagorean equation of silence and celestial harmony inaudible to man Keats is able to resolve the paradox of the silent but "speaking" urn and also to find the transition from things seen (with

[8] The unearthly Powers embodied in all elements except that of earth hold "sphery sessions"; they enact, that is, the concert of the harmony of the spheres which remains unheard by earthly ears—a speaking silence which may be compared to that of an urn consecrated to death (although Keats again avoids mentioning this concept, it is to death that the allusions to fate and "a season due" point). For us it is important to understand the close association in Keats's mind between the silent urn and the Pythagorean musical world harmony. Keats is not the first to have identified the silence of a historical monument, which by its transmundane melody overcomes death, with the music of the spheres. The seventeenth-century Spanish baroque poet Quevedo heard melodious harmony in old books. Here are the quatrains of a sonnet addressed to his editor:

> "Retirado en la paz de estos desiertos
> con pocos, pero doctos libros juntos,
> vivo en conversación con los difuntos
> y escucho con mis ojos a los muertos;
>
> Sino siempre entendidos, siempre abiertos.
> o enmiendan o secundan mis asuntos;
> y en músicos callados contrapuntos
> al sueño de la vida hablan despiertos."

Here then the silence of the "learned book" is a Pythagorean contrapuntal music of the spheres that "seconds" the thought of the poet; but the baroque poet does not fear to mention death; on the contrary he is convinced that the dead are "awake" and possessed of living truth, whereas life is a dream and an illusion. His Christian paradoxical thought ("life" = "a dream"), which is expressed in verbal paradoxes and metaphysical puns ("I *listen* with my eyes," "*awake* the dead speak," "the books *second* the thought of the poet"), is at variance with the Platonic paradox of Keats; with Quevedo this world appears shrouded in *desengaño*, with Keats as reflecting (in its works of art) the heavenly light of the Idea.

the eyes) to things heard (with the "spirit"). The sentence "Heard melodies are sweet . . ." is meditative and philosophical in content, and its syntax is that of quiet philosophical predication (a complete declarative sentence in opposition to the verbless, breathless question of St. I and to the empathic exclamations which follow in II). Only with the exclamation, "ye soft pipes, play on," does there begin the "emphatic act" of the poet, the identification of the poet with a picture seen on the frieze—an identification limited exclusively to Scene 2 (the scene of sweet love which is expanded over two stanzas).

It is also true that with the exclamation "play *on*" another theme suggested in the beginning has come to the foreground—that of time. The urn perpetuates a particular transient moment of the past, the warm love of a youth for a beautiful maiden manifesting itself in song and the playing of pipes in the midst of nature, the moment before consummation, the troubadour moment of love, as it were. Love, song, tree have been, as Wasserman shows, withdrawn from the burden of time and have become "happy," i.e., happy in themselves, self-sufficient, timeless, as are all things beautiful (any German would remember Mörike's line: "aber das Schöne, selig scheint es in ihm selbst"[9]). The empathic identification with what the poet sees on the urn reaches its climax[10] in St. III, as is shown by the repetition of the word "happy" (six times) and "(for) ever" (five times)—a high point which can only be followed by painful disillusion when the thought of the non-artistic earthly reality of love assails the poet (end of St. III).[11]

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[9] Cf. Schiller's words, "In sich selbst ruht und wohnt die ganze Gestalt, eine völlig geschlossene Schöpfung . . . da ist keine Kraft, die mit Kräften kämpfte, keine Blöße, wo die Zeitlichkeit einbrechen könnte," and other passages from Schiller quoted by Ilse A. Graham, "Zu Mörikes Gedicht 'Auf eine Lampe,'" *MLN*, LXVIII, 331.

[10] Mr. Wasserman believes (p. 37) that, "if the statement that beauty is truth is the total intention of the poem, then it is here [at the place of the climax in St. III] that it belongs, and no where else. For this is what the poem has been saying up to this point." In my opinion the aphorism can come only after St. IV, in which the poet has made the discovery of the impossibility of "historical empathy," coming then as relief and consolation.

[11] I find somewhat arbitrary Mr. Wasserman's suggestion (p. 30) that in the syntactical moods used in St. I-III there is to be found an increase in "empathy"; according to him the "least empathic" is the interrogative mood (in St. I), the two next more empathic moods (which appear mingled in St. II) are indicatives and imperatives, the climax of empathy being reached in the exclamatory sentences (St. III). This is devoid of general validity for the language and of pertinence for our stanzas; surely the interrogative mood can be highly empathic in questions such as "Ah, did you once see Shelley plain / And did he stop and speak to you . . . ?" As to our St. I, the questions are interrogative in form alone; they have in reality the emotional value of exclamations ("What wild ecstasy?" could be printed "What wild ecstasy!" Surely the exclamation as such does not "assure that the subject is engaging in the life of the predicative—has mingled—'and so become part of it' "). Furthermore, the indicative as such is neither empathic nor the contrary; "Heard melodies are sweet" is not empathic, but, as we have said, philosophically meditative, while "thou canst not leave Thy song" is indeed empathic. Finally, exclamations such as "Ah, happy, happy boughs!" are empathic, but only thanks to the particular adjective "happy."

The description of the sacrificial scene in St. IV offers us, as Mr. Wasserman has felt, a climate totally at variance with that of the second scene,[12] one of unassimilable mystery and strangeness, of bleak desolation, of what I would call "the silence of history," without possibility of communication. The pattern of bewildered questions as to identity recurs, the questions becoming more troubled; and the poet's tentative filling in of the missing historical detail (in disjunctive questions of the type "what . . . or . . . ?") takes up much more space than in St. I. Indeed, as Mr. Wasserman remarks, the "little town" with its lonely streets exists, not on the frieze, but only in the imagination of the poet; it owes its appearance only to the poet's inference from the scene on the frieze. If the whole population of the Greek *polis* attends the ceremony of the sacrifice, the town must have been left "emptied" and "desolate," and this (inferred) emptiness and desolation coalesces in the poet's mind with the same feeling generally produced in us by historical sites abandoned by man, ruined cities, excavations,[13] etc. At this moment the poet comes to feel the chasm of history implied in a monument of a dead civilization of which no survivors remain. Not even the artistic monument of the urn before him can bridge that abyss. However close he may have felt to the old civilization in Scene 2 (both because of the high place sweet love enjoys in Keats's system of values and because this feeling transcends all ages), Scene 3 has shown him the failure of the urn as a "historian." The hermetic closedness, the incommunicative coldness of the religion of the ancient civilization which this scene purports to reveal to his eye becomes clear to his mind (and his capacity of empathy comes even less to fruition than in Scene 1, which was only suspected to imply a strange myth-

[12] It is regrettable that Mr. Wasserman's metaphysical terminology tends here as in other passages to blot out all concreteness even when he is proceeding in the right direction: "Keats now asks three questions. The first, like those of the first stanza, asks for identity: 'Who are these coming to the sacrifice?' But of course there can be no answer, *for at heaven's bourne there is only selflessness.* The next two questions . . . ask for directions . . . these are spatial questions and can no more be answered than those of identity, *for heaven's bourne is essential space.* The *result of fellowship with essence is that we become* 'Full alchemiz'd, and free of space'" (p. 41). For me such statements as those in italics have the ring of pronouncements of a kind of phantasmic bureaucracy "at heaven's bourne," answering questions with the peremptory self-assurance evidently characteristic of celestial traffic cops. Again, what should one think of such allegorizations as: "The sacrificial altar towards which the procession goes is . . . *dedicated to heaven, a realm of pure spirit:* the immortal without the mortal, truth without beauty. And the town that the souls leave is *the town all souls leave in their human progress towards the heaven-altar*" (p. 42). No, the altar and the town are simply a nondescript Greek altar and a nondescript Greek town, and let us forget about "the realm of pure spirit" and the "heaven-altar" in order to concentrate on the one unchanging problem of the poem: What can a Greek urn teach us?

[13] The association established here between the detail of the dead town and the feeling of the deathlike quality of history is symmetrically parallel to the association in St. I-II between the detail of the pipes and timbrels represented on the frieze and the poet's belief in the Pythagorean music of silence.

ology but did not portray strange religious rites as does Scene 3). Even the sacrificial heifer "lowing at the skies" seems to revolt against the ceremony to which it must contribute and to interrupt the harmony of the spheres that prevailed before.

At this lowest point of "historical understanding"—lower than in Scene 1, where the wild ecstasy of the Dionysian chase had at least succeeded in carrying the imagination of the poet with it, for all his failure to identify the participants—at this moment when the religion of a past civilization awakes no response in the poet and no historical message is audible, spiritual relief comes to him when, turning away from the detail of the three scenes, he looks at the beauty of the whole urn and of the whole frieze,

O Attic shape! Fair attitude!

the first vocative referring to the urn, the second to the persons represented on the frieze. The *archaeological* message of the urn is dead, its *aesthetic* message is alive "for ever" (indeed the desolate third scene was not devoid of its own beauty: "green altar," "all her silken flanks with garlands drest," "peaceful citadel," "pious morn"). Mr. Wasserman seems not to have felt the sudden rise of the poet's voice in happy exaltation, the powerful upsurge of feeling marked by that magic line, "O Attic shape! . . . ," in which the urn, after having been as it were fragmented into various divisions under the microscopic scrutiny of the curious poet, now suddenly reassumes its unbroken flawless totality, rising again before his eyes, reborn as a perfect whole! And this vision of organic artistic beauty comes to the poet in the moment of his deepest depression as an enlightening consolation—in a formula of invocation directed as it were to a deity whose entity of "edle Einfalt und stille Größe" he has clearly apperceived. One will notice that, while the poem opens as if Keats were not beginning but rather continuing a conversation with a "thou" to which he attached descriptive epithets such as "still unravish'd bride," "foster-child . . . ," "sylvan historian," now the final definition ("O Attic shape . . .") amounts to an evocation of a presence, of a *numen* (one will note the "O" of invocation, unique in the poem); and here the "thou" follows the predication of being. The beginning and the end of the poem thus form a chiastic pattern which adds to its cyclic effect.

But even after the revelation of the aesthetic message of the urn, the breath of mortality rising out of the sealed chambers of history—what Goethe called the "Leichengeruch der Geschichte"—which chilled the poet's empathy does not entirely subside; for he sees in the "silent form" of the urn "*marble* men and maidens," a "*Cold* Pastoral," as cold and monotonous as the idea of eternity (". . . dost tease us out of thought"). The phrase "Cold Pastoral," corresponds to "sylvan historian" (of St. I) in reverse; the urn commemorates sylvan (i.e.,

pastoral) scenes and, even though it occasionally perpetuates warm human love, it is yet ultimately cold as history (or time or eternity). Thus the work of art that survives death would breathe something of the air of death. This idea—who of us gazing at the Venus de Milo has not felt something of the presence of the majesty of death!—is not expressed, although we may feel it latent under the actual words of the poet. Systematically avoiding the word "death," he prefers to cling to consoling Apollonian messages such as that of the imperishable work of art as a "friend of man"—and, of course, that expressed in the last two lines:

> Beauty is truth, truth beauty,—that is all
> Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.

—a controversial passage which, I trust, will become clearer in the light of the interpretation already suggested. Mr. Wasserman comments thus on these lines:

> Although the urn is able to reveal to man a oneness of beauty and truth, it is not able to inform him that this is the sum total of his knowledge on earth and that it is sufficient for his earthly existence ("all ye need to know"); for obviously he knows other things on earth, such as the fact that in the world beauty is not truth, and this should be even more valuable within the world than the knowledge that the two are one at heaven's bourne. But more important, the symbolic action of the drama at no point justifies the urn's limiting its message; nowhere has the urn acted out the fact that man knows no more on earth than this identity of beauty and truth, and that this knowledge is sufficient.
>
> Now, it is significant that this is an ode *on* a Grecian urn. Had Keats meant *to*, he would have said so, as he did in the "Ode to a Nightingale." There the meaning of the poem arises out of the dramatic relations of the poet and the symbol; but *on* implies a commentary, and it is Keats who must make the commentary on the drama that he has been observing and experiencing within the urn. It is the poet, therefore, who speaks the words, "that is all / Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know," and he is addressing himself to man, the reader. Hence the shift of reference from "thou" (urn) to "ye" (man). I do not feel the objection frequently raised that if the last line and a half belong to the poet and are addressed to the reader, they are not dramatically prepared for. The poet has gradually been obtruding himself upon the reader's consciousness in the last two stanzas by withdrawing from his empathic experience and taking on identity. He has become distinctly present in the last stanza as a speaker addressing the urn, and proportionately the urn has shrunk from the center of dramatic interest; it is now but a short step for him to turn his address from urn to reader. Moreover, the reader has also been subtly introduced into the stanza, for the poet vividly marks his complete severance from the urn's essence by pluralizing himself ("tease us," "other woe / Than ours") and thus putting himself into a category wholly distinct from the urn; and by this act Keats has now involved the reader as a third member of the drama. Finally, when the reader has been filtered out of the plural "us" and "ours" by the reference to "man" (48), the poet may now address to him his final observations on the drama.
>
> But the poet is no more justified than the urn would be in concluding that the sum of necessary earthly wisdom is the identity of beauty and truth. Certainly when he returned to the dimensional world in stanza four he found the two to be antithetical, not identical. Something of the difficulty Keats encountered in trying

to orient his meaning is to be seen in the three versions of the final lines that have manuscript or textual authority. Keats' manuscript and the transcripts made by his friends read,

Beauty is truth, truth beauty,—that is all . . .

In the *Annals of the Fine Arts* for 1820, where the poem was first published, the line appears as

Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty.—That is all . . .

And the 1820 volume of Keats' poems reads,

"Beauty is truth, truth beauty,"—that is all . . .

No one of these solves the problem, although each hints at the difficulty. Clearly each one strives to separate the aphorism from the following assertion by the poet; and at the same time each attempts to preserve a relation between the pronoun "that" and *something* that has gone before. Then, since we have seen that the antecedent of "that" cannot reasonably be the aphorism—since neither urn nor poet can be saying that all man knows and needs to know on earth is that beauty is truth—its antecedent must be the entire preceding sentence.

All that man knows on earth, and all he needs to know is that

> When old age shall this generation waste,
> Thou [the urn] shalt remain, in midst of other woe
> Than ours, a friend to man, to whom thou say'st,
> Beauty is truth, truth beauty.

Only this meaning can be consistent with the dramatic action of the poem, for it not only does not deny that in the world beauty is not truth, but also assimilates that fact into a greater verity. The sum of earthly wisdom is that in this world of pain and decay, where love cannot be forever warm and where even the highest pleasures necessarily leave a burning forehead and a parching tongue, art remains, immutable in its essence because that essence is captured in a "Cold Pastoral" . . . This art is forever available as "a friend to man," a power willing to admit man to its "sphery sessions" . . . The great end of poetry, Keats wrote, is "that it should be a friend / To sooth the cares, and lift the thoughts of man," for art . . . eases this burden by holding out to man the promise that somewhere—at heaven's bourne, where the woes of this world will be resolved—songs are forever new, love is forever young, human passion is "human passion far above," beauty is truth; that, although beauty is not truth in this world, what the imagination seizes as beauty must be truth—whether it existed before or not [pp. 58-61].

Because the assertion that beauty is truth has the illusory appearance of being the most explicit and most meaningful statement in the "Ode on a Grecian Urn," nearly all examinations of the poem have concentrated on the concluding lines, only to discover that the apparently clear abstractions are an *ignis fatuus*, beckoning to a morass of quasi-philosophy . . . The aphorism is all the more beguiling because it appears near the end of the poem, for its apparently climactic position has generally led to the assumption that it is the abstract summation of the poem, detachable from the first forty-eight lines and equal to them.

But the ode is not an abstract statement or an excursion into philosophy. It is a poem about things: an urn, pipes, trees, lovers, a priest, a town; and poetic images have a grammar of their own that is contained in their dramatic actions . . . only a reading of the total imagistic grammar of the poem can unfold its intent, as the final lines alone cannot. Indeed, through such a total reading, the aphorism proves not to be a summation of the poem, nor even the high point of its intent, but only a subordinate functional part of the grammar of images [pp. 13-14].

Believing as I do that the entire two last lines are intended as words spoken by the urn, I shall attempt to refute in detail the first passage quoted from Mr. Wasserman. The first argument (the urn cannot tell man that the identity of beauty and truth is the only knowledge needed on earth because "obviously [!] he knows other things on earth," etc.) is slightly reminiscent of the caustic comment I heard at the Hopkins in reference to our poem: "Beauty ain't truth and truth ain't beauty and you've got to know a helluva lot more than that on earth." Mr. Wasserman's argument seems to be an unnecessary endorsement, by a critic so deeply devoted to the spiritual, of that so-called "hard-boiled realism" or that radically unpoetic view of the world which takes for granted that poetry is "just illusion," an aberration from "normal" truth. This view of Paradise irretrievably lost in this world, questionable as a basis for understanding of poetry in general, is still less conducive to the particular understanding of a poet for whom Paradise was still close to our earth, and who, ordained in the Platonic faith,[14] could very well have postulated the absolute sufficiency "on earth" of his aesthetic religion. Keats in the nineteenth century believed that the beauty and truth of the transcendental idea is revealed "on earth" just as firmly as Du Bellay in the sixteenth had professed his faith in "l'Idée de la Beauté qu'en ce monde j'adore."

The second argument (the urn has not "acted out the fact that man knows no more on earth . . .") must fall if I am right in assuming that the urn has "acted out," on the one hand, the insufficiency of historical truth (in Scenes 1 and 3 historical identity was blurred, in Scene 2 what was reached was only the metahistorical, and the whole frieze reproduces basically not history but nature), and on the other, the absolute self-sufficiency of the aesthetic message—the Platonic equation "beauty=truth" alone is precious knowledge, in contrast to historical erudition (or, perhaps, any kind of rational learning that tends to "ravish" the virginal secret of beauty). The questions as to historic identity, with their tone of bewilderment and anguish (in St. I and IV),

[14] Mr. Wasserman has pertinently quoted, without identifying it with Platonism, a passage from a letter in which Keats defines the *summum bonum* Platonically: "What the imagination seizes as Beauty must be true—whether it existed or not." I may point out the similar identification of beauty and truth in Schiller's poem, "Die Künstler" (1789); cf. passages such as:

"Nur durch das Morgenthor des Schönen
Drangst du in der Erkenntnis Land . . .
Was wir als Schönheit hier empfunden,
Wird einst als Wahrheit uns entgegengehn . . .
Der freisten Mutter freie Söhne,
Schwingt euch mit festem Angesicht
Zum Strahlensitz der höchsten Schöne!
Um andre Kronen buhlet nicht!
Die Schwester, die euch hier verschwunden,
Holt ihr im Schoß der Mutter ein;
Was schöne Seelen schön empfunden,
Muß trefflich und vollkommen sein."

in the final stanza give way to a polemic tone directed against the quest for historical knowledge—for such an exclusion is implied in the words "and this is *all* ye need to know."[15]

Mr. Wasserman's inference, from the correct observation that ours is an ode *on*, not *to* a Grecian urn, that it is the poet who must make the remark "that is all ye need to know . . ." is an obvious *non sequitur*. Note that in spite of writing *on* an urn the poet has all through the poem spoken *to* the urn ("thou") and that he may very well suggest his own conclusion by words lent to the urn. Indeed, agreeing with Mr. Brooks's interpretation, I think it in line with previous passages about the "silence" of the urn that the latter is finally allowed to *speak*, allowed, that is, to formulate the true message which according to Keats is embodied in it and of which he himself has finally became aware. The *ekphrasis*, the description of an *objet d'art* by the medium of the word, has here developed into an account of an *exemplary* experience felt by the poet confronted with an ancient work of art, an experience shown in the poem in its development as Keats's purely aesthetic aspirations come to free themselves from all nonessential admixtures. It was Keats's achievement to have presented the "ode on" in the form of an "ode to," that is, in a manner that was consonant with the lofty emotion traditionally required for the genre of the ode and that would have satisfied even a Lessing—to have turned a lengthy enumeration of factual detail, difficult to visualize, into one continuous, emotion-laden address to the urn[16] and into a dramatic search for the message contained therein.

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[15] A similar antiarchaeological approach is to be found in "Kore," a less ambitious, short poem of Goethe's, written approximately at the same time (1819 or 1821) as Keats's ode: (the virgin is Proserpina, some ancient representations of whom Goethe had seen). By giving the poem the subtitle "Nicht gedeutet" (not explained) Goethe has chosen to proclaim, in contradiction to contemporary interpretations of ancient works of art such as Creuzer's and Welcker's, the right of the ancient work of art to "inviolateness." The first stanza of the poem scoffs at all attempts at factual identification by archaeologists:

> "Oh Mutter? Tochter? Schwester? Enkelin?
> Von Helios gezengt? Von wem geboren?
> Wohin gewandert? Wo versteckt? Verloren?
> Gefunden?—Rätsel ist's dem Künstlersinn."

The factual "riddle" will then remain unsolved; what is all-important for the "artistic sense" is, as the second stanza proclaims, the "divine nature" of the Kore, that is the message of ever-self-transcending beauty embodied in Proserpina (and, supposedly, in her representations):

> "Die Gott-Natur enthüllt sich zum Gewinn:
> *Nach höchster Schönheit muß die Jungfrau streben,*
> Sizilien verleiht ihr Götterleben."

[16] Only once, in the address to the "little town" which Keats has imagined only by inference, is the hymnic "thou" predication not limited to the urn and the things to be seen thereon. In this case the poet has allowed himself to range beyond the work of art into "history"—a sin of his imagination, as it were, which is symbolized by the misuse of "thou" and from which the poet will be called back by the whole form of the urn as it rises before his eye: "O Attic shape! . . ."

As to Mr. Wasserman's contention that in the last stanzas the poet has gradually been obtruding himself upon the reader's consciousness and that proportionately the urn has shrunk from the center of interest —we have already said that the urn, far from having "shrunk," has been reborn and re-formed in the last stanza—how could the poet in that supreme moment have lost sight of it? Furthermore, the assumed "short step" by which the poet is supposed to turn his address "from urn to reader" is utterly impossible. It would surely be most awkward and didactic for the poet to end his conversation with the urn and then to turn to us and say: "and now I come to you, my fellow men, to tell you"—but with such a transition the shift suggested by Wasserman would be at least *possible*. Here, however, there has been no such transition, and a sudden "ye" following upon a series of "thou's" cannot belong to the same speaker; "ye" always needs an antecedent (the reference a few lines earlier to 'man" serves in no way as preparation for such a shift); no substantive except a vocative can be the antecedent of a second-person pronoun.

Moreover, Wasserman assumes that in the last line and a half the poet is preaching a lesson to his fellow men, whereas in reality Keats himself, who had "sinned" before against the work of art (by his historical curiosity), has only now learned the lesson (about its purely aesthetic message that endures whether the urn depicts "for ever" warm human love or a civilization from which "not a soul . . . can e'er return"). It must be the urn which formulates for Keats the lesson which he as well as mankind needs, and which both will be grateful to hear. The urn, which has in the last stanza grown in power of presence and has come to speak, must have the last word and this last word must be one of friendship and consolation for the community of man. Keats's own "numinous" experience with the urn had been a suprapersonal one and its exemplary value can be communicated to mankind only by the friendly *numen* itself to which he owes his experience and which, in a kind of reversed Ovidian metamorphosis, finds a human voice to speak warm human words from the marble of art and the silence of history. If the urn spoke only the short intellectual aphorism "Beauty is truth, truth beauty" without the personal address to humanity, as Mr. Wasserman suggests, it would not be humane. And how can one imagine that, having at the end endowed the urn of stone with speech, Keats should then undo the miracle he has wrought, interrupt (after five words!) the direct, suprapersonal flow of communication between work of art and mankind which he had helped create (through the delicate passage from "thou" to "us" of line 44 to "ours" and "man" of line 48), and take the limelight for himself just before the curtain falls, dismissing his audience with the complacent statement: "I the poet am telling you that what I have just said is all you need to know"? All of this would represent, in my opinion, an inadmissible lack of

taste on Keats's part. In order to understand the final development of our poem the critic must have experienced religiously, even as Keats did, the numinous quality of the work of art.

There is also another reason for attributing the entire two last lines to the urn, a reason which suggests itself to anyone familiar with ancient art. A Greek urn generally bears an inscription or legend in epigrammatic form. As Paul Friedländer in his book, *Epigrammata* (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1948), tells us: "The Greeks, while following the Orient in erecting and inscribing monuments, delighted in giving to a sepulchral inscription or a dedication to a god the meter and the style of Homer or of the elegiac or the iambic poets," the main form of inscriptional epigrams being the elegiac distych. These poetic inscriptions, the eloquent part of mute statues or tombstones, were supposed to address the passer-by:

> Tell them in Lacedaemon, passer-by,
> that here obedient to their law we lie.
> Stay, passenger, why goest thou by so fast?

—and to be read by the latter, so that monument and traveler become engaged in a dialogue, "for ancient reading meant always reading aloud." To put it in the words of a Latin epitaph:

> quodque meam retinet vocem data littera saxo,
> voce tua vivet quisque leges titulos.
> (and since the letters on the stone contain my voice,
> they will come to life through the voice of you
> whoever shall read these lines.)

Up to the end of the ode it had been Keats alone who spoke to the urn, that is, thought aloud inquiring into its meaning. Why should he not have thought, in a poem that deals with the coming alive of an ancient work of art, of a dialogue between that work of art and its beholders, in which the urn would, in a Grecian miracle or metamorphosis, come to *speak* to them (in the form "ye" which includes the poet) *its inscription*, answering thereby the poet's quest for meaning as "a friend of man"—just as Greek sepulchral inscriptions would reward the passer-by, who after glancing at the monument (urn, stele, etc.) had reverently read the name of the deceased, with consoling words and friendly wishes ("but you farewell, o passer-by!" "godspeed, o stranger!"—Friedländer, no. 168) or even with moral admonishment ("gnome" or "paraenesis") meant for his lasting spiritual good. Note that the emphasis on the beauty of the sepulchral monument (which, in the intention of the artist and the sponsors, corresponds to the beauty of the person commemorated) is frequent in Greek inscriptions.

Thus the idea that the beauty of the work of art will survive that of the models which it portrays is given in the very Greek literary genre

to which Keats conforms—combining with that idea the Platonic idea of the Idea which was his own poetic creed. And not only in content but also in form Keats's final distych seems to be connected with the Greek genre of the sepulchral epigram;[17] his distych appears in the exact metrical form (the verse of five feet) in which Simonides' epitaph of the three hundred Spartans at Thermopylae is known in English; and the address to the passer-by ("ye") is found with Keats in the last of the two lines, that is, precisely in the part of the distych that corresponds to the Greek pentameter in which the good wishes for the traveler are usually expressed. We must take into consideration the basic *topos* quality of the "ye" of the inscription and of the dialogue between monument and traveler inherent in an inscribed Greek urn; while in Greek inscriptions questions as to historical identity are asked and answered, Keats, who has asked the urn questions of a historical nature, receives an answer, in the Greek form of the historical epigram, but containing a message of nonhistorical (aesthetic) content. While the ancient sepulchral epigram was dedicated to the commemoration of a particular dead person, the epigram of Keats's making contains a general message addressed to the living exclusively. Contrary to Mr. Wasserman's assertion, it is the poet who in the last stanza of our ode has "shrunk" from the picture and it is the urn that will "for ever" converse with the passers-by—all readers of Keats's ode ought to become passers-by, pausing before the immortal urn and listening to its consoling message.[18]

To return to more philological questions, the three different punctu-

[17] It must be borne in mind that, in addition to true sepulchral inscriptions, the Greek developed the literary genre of pseudo inscriptions, destined for the reader, in which the work of art would be described. Hellmuth Rosenfeld, who in his book, *Das deutsche Bildgedicht* (Leipzig, 1935), is mainly concerned with the survival of that genre in German poetry, distinguishes the following ancient types of the "Bildgedicht," that "aesthetically challenging hybrid form in which the work of art in its repose and poetry that consists in movement are brought to perfect union"; it may consist in (1) an objective address to the reader by the person who has donated the work of art as an *ex-voto*; (2) a fictional device by which the work of art itself is supposed to speak, to introduce itself, or to answer questions of the reader; (3) the further development in which the poet takes over the part of the reader in the dialogue with the work of art (the dialogue may become then a monologue of the poet); (4) finally, the variant in which the poet (who points at the work of art: "behold . . . behold . . . !") describes it for an ideal spectator or re-enacts, as if personally moved, the scene represented in the work of art as dramatic action. Rosenfeld calls this type, in reminiscence of the Homeric scene, "teichoscopic." It seems obvious that Keats's ode contains the elements (2), (3), and (4), arranged in such a way that (2) (the answer of the work of art) and (3) (the address of an ideal spectator) grow organically out of (4) (the "teichoscopic" presentation of the urn). I may add that I have found in Rosenfeld's collection of German "Bildgedichte" no parallel to the "aesthetic apperception developed in time" which is so characteristic of Keats's ode.

[18] Now that we have seen the correspondence between the final lines of the ode and the Greek practice of inscribing sepulchral monuments, we may go further and ask ourselves whether even earlier in this poem there may not be another such parallel. The repeated "questions as to historical identity" in St. I and IV, which

ations in the next to last line do not serve, as our critic concedes, to clarify the precise reference of the demonstrative pronoun *that*. They only show, I believe, the hesitations of the poet in regard to the relationship of the aphorism to the rest of the legend. He was uncertain whether or not to present the intellectual epigram as a self-sufficing unit. It is most outspokenly a self-sufficing unit in the version of the volume of 1820; *"Beauty is truth, truth beauty,"—that is all . . .* ; while in the version of the manuscript, generally and, as I believe, correctly reproduced in our current editions; *Beauty is truth, truth beauty,—that is all . . .* [without quotation-marks], the flow of speech within the distych is least interrupted and the sharp intellectualism of the—anti-intellectual—maxim is allowed to be counteracted by the tone of the heart with which the work of art shows—by the pronoun "ye"—its concern for "man."

As to Mr. Wasserman's own proposed solution, that the antecedent of the pronoun *that* is the entire preceding sentence:

> When old age shall this generation waste,
> Thou shalt remain, in midst of other woe
> Than ours, a friend to man, to whom thou say'st,
> Beauty is truth, truth beauty . . .

—by which interpretation it is possible for Wasserman to hold that it is not the urn but the poet who states the sufficiency for man of the knowledge about the identity of beauty and truth "at heaven's bourne" —against this hypothesis I would contend first that, for *that* to refer to the whole sentence from "When old age" to "truth beauty," the content of this sentence is not sufficiently general to be called "all ye know on earth" (the *particular* experience made by the poet with *this* particular urn would then be termed to be *"all* ye know on earth") ; second, the idea that for Keats "beauty is truth, truth beauty" *at heaven's bourne* is known to Mr. Wasserman from his wide readings of Keats, but is obviously unexpressed in our poem; if on the one hand

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appear fraught with so much personal emotion on the part of the poet, may have their antecedents in similar questions inscribed on Greek monuments and ostensibly addressed by the passer-by to the monument. Cf. Friedländer's description of a column surmounted by a Sphinx and bearing the inscription: "O Sphinx, dog of Hades, whom do you watch over as you sit on guard over the dead?" This is followed by the name of the particular dead person, as answer. But Keats's questions, addressed as they are to the Sphinx of History, admit of no answer from History. The dialogue inherent in the sepulchral inscription was made explicit by the Neo-Latin poet Pontanus, who in his *Tumuli* (1518), often imitated by the French poets of the Pléiade, had a *Viator* repeatedly ask questions (as to historical identity) which were answered by the *Genius* or the *umbra* of the deceased. In Remy Belleau's *Bergeries* (1572) we find prose descriptions of sumptuous Renaissance tombstones followed by epitaphs in verse form which read like poetic answers to the silent inquiry of the beholder. I do not, of course, claim that Keats had actually seen or studied any of the particular Greek inscriptions mentioned above (or their Renaissance derivations) ; but the poem was evidently written by one who had been immersed in that particular atmosphere that any museum of classic art creates.

readers of the poem are told that the fact that the urn will "for ever" remain to them as a friend is the only knowledge they need *on earth*, and on the other hand the urn proclaims "Beauty is truth . . . ," how could the readers deduce that the aphorism "Beauty is truth . . ." is only valid *at heaven's bourne*? Such "help from without" provided by the critic destroys the poetic organism.[19]

If on the contrary one accepts my interpretation that historical learning is the one thing that is excluded from what "ye need to know" and that the aesthetic experience with the urn has led the poet to express (through the final distych) his Platonic religion of art, I believe that the unity of the poem remains intact and that the final lines are indeed the quite naturally developed abstract formulation of the actual experience of the work of art by the poet dramatically portrayed in this ode of *ekphrasis*.

As to the second passage extracted above from Mr. Wasserman's comments, I will limit myself to saying that I am unable to recognize the cogency, at least for romantic poetry, of any "imagistic grammar" (or metagrammar or syntax). The use of these metaphors for a sequence of images is obviously meant to imply a rigor traditionally associated with those grammatical terms; for any particular statement in a given language "grammar" requires the use of certain forms, a use generally and automatically followed by all the practitioners of the language:

> La grammaire qui sait régenter jusqu'aux rois
> Et les fait, la main haute, obéir à ses lois . . .

Surely the coiners of the terms "imagistic grammar (or syntax)" did not intend to convey to us the idea that the images of a given poem have been prescribed to the poet (by poetry or taste?) in the same way as the mood, indicative or subjunctive, in a given sentence is dictated by the rules of the grammar of his language. Since Wasserman speaks of the "imagistic grammar *of a particular poem*," he must mean nothing more ambitious than "coherent or consistent evolution of the images within the economy of the particular poem." Now I think that "imagery" (a technical term nonexistent in other languages) has always been somewhat overrated by English literary critics, who delight overmuch in that sensuous element which for them makes a poem a poem (an attitude for which there are historical reasons—see E. L. Stahl's article on Coleridge's theory of poetry in *Weltliteratur, Festgabe für Fritz Strich*, Bern, 1952); and Wasserman's idea of the "imagistic grammar" goes even further in this direction in proclaiming implicitly an autonomy of the images—his claim being that only out of the "total imagistic grammar of the poem" could one deduce content (or "intent"). According to Wasserman, the aphorism "Beauty is truth . . ."

[19] See note 2 above.

cannot be the culmination of the poem because its imagery has supposedly not "acted out" the final maxim. But how is the critic entitled to disregard the intellectual thread of thought marked by the sequence of phrases (even if in part imagistic), "sylvan historian," "O Attic shape!," "silent form" "Cold Pastoral," which culminates in the aphorism "Beauty is truth . . ."? I would rather hold that no imagistic sequence could be established as valid unless it is confirmed by the final aphorism.

No mythologema in the world such as "imagistic grammar" will convince us that in European poetry prior to symbolism and surrealism images have a life of their own, untutored by ideas. It is indeed because of the idea of the poem ("the aesthetic, not historic message of the work of art") that Keats offered to our view the three different scenes (or sets of images) on the frieze in which his historical and his aesthetic sense were not equally satisfied (reaching equilibrium only in 2, not in 1 and 3)—whether these three scenes once existed on a Greek vase he actually happened to see or whether he himself invented (or modified) the three scenes as to suit his general thesis about the work of art. Thus, in my opinion, the critics, after having indicated the material detail and the clear contours of the sculpture described in our poem, should have established its firm ideological architecture (the particular step or nuance it represents among poems dealing with art, or philosophies of art) before analyzing the (in our poem surely subordinate) imagery. The images of our poem do not have the power to reduce the final aphorism to a subordinate position; on the contrary, the final aphorism, which stands out so clearly for any unbiassed reader and must necessarily be connected with ideas previously suggested in the poem, cannot but reduce the images to subordinate position —to the position of embodying the idea.[20] It is ironical that Mr. Wasserman, a disciple of the author of *The Great Chain of Being*, when explaining a rather simple poem of ideas should abandon his vantage point, history of ideas (which includes the history of ancient ideas).[21]

To establish an imagistic metagrammar which would ignore the all-controlling "intellectual grammar" of a poem would be to set in motion a dangerous "sorcerer's apprentice." Let us have, in our explanations of the classical poems of English literature, less of imagistic magic or alchemy that smells of the lamp, and more of that open air of crystal-

[20] In other words: the images of our poem are not of an associative nature (as are for instance those of Rimbaud's "Bateau ivre"); only if they were could the predominantly imagistic approach be justified.

[21] It is paradoxical to see at work in Mr. Wasserman two tendencies which would seem to be mutually exclusive, on the one hand an all too eager metaphysical allegorization, on the other subservience to imagistic metagrammar; in both cases there is in evidence an excess of the "meta," an estrangement from that *aurea mediocritas* which avoids the extremes of literary criticism. (But these "excesses" stem, of course, from one virtue for which no praise is adequate—Wasserman's passionate desire *fully* to understand the poem.)

line lucidity around the work of art—as this is present in Keats's ode, in which thought and image have become naturally one because image has not encroached on thought, because thought has found its appropriate embodiment. The beautiful line "O Attic shape! Fair attitude! . . ." is in itself the perfect incarnation of image serving thought.

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WARBURTON AND THE *ENCYCLOPÉDIE*

CLIFTON CHERPACK

ONE of the most vexing aspects of the systematic investigation of the *Encyclopédie* is the question of ultimate sources. Allusions to the problem abound; and, although much has been done in this vein since le P. Berthier had the pleasure of pointing out the eclectic redaction embodied in the first volume, the sources of many important articles, and, consequently, their function in the publication, are still a mystery to us.[1]

Students of the *Encyclopédie* will have observed that, while a few scholarly articles have dealt directly with lists of works used by the editors,[2] their borrowings are usually brought to light in the course of synthesizing studies of specific subjects or individuals as treated in scattered sections of the bulky work. The present article, however, will follow a different tack. I propose to start with a fecund source, the translations of part of the writings of William Warburton, and to describe the adaptations and modification of this material by Diderot and his colleagues according to their editorial needs and philosophic interests.

The basic fact that Warburton was an indirect contributor to the *Encyclopédie* is, of course, not unknown. Hubert,[3] Godin,[4] Thielemann,[5] and Doolittle[6] have mentioned his name in connection with those articles in which specific attribution is made by the editors. What is not known is that Warburton was utilized without acknowledgement in many other articles, and that numerous ideas in them, which have been considered by scholarly analysts of the work as of capital importance in the search of the *philosophes* for an enlightened theory of man, were actually taken from a massive defense of orthodoxy by this Anglican divine.

Warburton came to literary prominence in England with his vindi-

[1] For a discussion of the problem of source material in the *E.*, see Lois S. Gaudin, *Les Lettres anglaises dans l'Encyclopédie* (New York, 1942), pp. i-ix; and Joseph E. Barker, *Diderot's Treatment of the Christian Religion in the Encyclopédie* (New York, 1941), pp. 13-23.

[2] E.g., Henri Berr and Louis P. May, "Documents nouveaux sur l'*Encyclopédie*," *Revue de Synthèse*, XV (1938), 5-110; and René Hubert, "Introduction bibliographique à l'étude de la science ethnographique dans l'*Encyclopédie*," *Revue d'Histoire de la Philosophie*, I (1933), 160-172, 331-155.

[3] *Les Sciences sociales dans l'Encyclopédie* (Paris, 1923), pp. 55, 332-333, 342.

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 193.

[5] "Thomas Hobbes dans l'Encyclopédie," *RHL*, LI (1951), 335.

[6] "Jaucourt's Use of Source Material in the *Encyclopédie*," *MLN*, LXV (1950), 387-392.

cation of Pope, published in 1738 and 1739 in answer to Crousaz' attack on the heterodox aspects of the *Essay on Man*. This defense had for the author the double result of arousing a good deal of discussion in England, and of securing Pope's firm friendship and lasting support.[7] These boons were of considerable help to a man whose position as "the dictator and tyrant of literature" in the middle of the eighteenth century, to use Gibbon's words, seems to have been due more to the force of his personality and to literary politics than to the recognized merit of his writings. For, although Warburton's meaty and paradoxical *Divine Legation of Moses* touched off a frenzy of pamphleteering and debate, the theories adduced therein were so savagely ripped from context and pulled to pieces by critics that their full force and value were dissipated and their influence slight in the country of their origin.[8]

It was not to be so in France. Although, as in England, Warburton's name became known on the continent by virtue of the quarrel over Pope, his more important theories found favor in France thanks to three factors—the privileged position of English erudition at the time, the existence of a *société de gens de lettres* whose role it was to collect interesting ideas and to effect their circulation, and, of course, the zeal of translators, the invaluable middlemen in this literary and philosophical traffic.

It was Étienne de Silhouette, a young student of English political economy and author of the translation of the *Essay on Man* which was used by Crousaz, who introduced Warburton to French readers in 1742 with a translation of his vindication of Pope. Convinced of Warburton's genius, he followed this the same year with the *Dissertations sur l'union de la religion, de la morale, et de la politique*,[9] closely adapted from parts of the first three books of the *Divine Legation* and the *Alliance between Church and State*. Two years later, Léonard de Malpeines translated much of the fourth book of the *Divine Legation* as an *Essai sur les hiéroglyphes des Egyptiens*.[10] That the theories contained in these works were widely read and well thought of in France is shown by the fact that at least twenty-three articles in the *Encyclopédie*, written by such persons as Diderot, D'Alembert, Jaucourt, Beauzée, Formey, Romilly *fils*, and Abbé Yvon, are drawn from these two translations.

The thesis of the *Divine Legation* is that the divinity of the Mosaic dispensation, so insistently attacked by freethinkers, is proved by the

[7] The whole affair is treated in detail by E. Audra in his *L'Influence française dans l'œuvre de Pope* (Paris, 1931).

[8] For Warburton's life and influence in England, see A. W. Evans, *Warburton and the Warburtonians* (London, 1932).

[9] London, 1742, 2 vols.

[10] Paris, 1744, 2 vols. The second volume is a compilation by the translator of various remarks on chronology and Chinese writing, most of which substantiate Warburton's theories.

fact that, although in all societies from the earliest the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments has been held essential to the well-being of society, the Jewish religion and society, ruled by Mosaic law which contains no such doctrine, subsisted. It must, therefore, have been divinely supported, and the dispensation must have been divinely inspired. Thus, it was incumbent upon Warburton to adduce, from his vast reading, proofs of the universality and antiquity of the doctrine of punishments and rewards. This naturally led to a history of religious thought *ab origine*, to investigation of the beginning of society, and to a consideration of the ways in which religion and the state have been and should be allied. All these matters, of great interest to the *philosophes*, are treated at length in the sixteen *Dissertations* as translated by Silhouette.

One of the articles in the *Encyclopédie* which draws most heavily from this translation is "Ame," edited by Abbé Yvon. Many sources have been mentioned for this widely studied article. Gaudin,[11] for example, mentions the thirteenth *Lettre philosophique*, and remarks that the *Encyclopédie* itself acknowledges its debt to a treatise by Jaquelot. Vernière asserts that Yvon copied seven pages from the anonymous *Sentiments des philosophes sur la nature de l'âme* which appeared in the rare collection, *Nouvelles libertés de penser*, in 1743.[12] Warburton has never been mentioned as a source, but a confrontation of texts makes it obvious that Yvon quoted from some seventy-two pages of the tenth and eleventh dissertations. The borrowings begin in the second paragraph of the article and continue for three pages.[13] Thus, the whole discussion of the opinions of the pagan philosophers concerning the multiplicity of the soul and of divine beings, of apocatastasis as a doctrine developed by oversubtle Greeks from the misunderstanding of an Egyptian idea, of the role of the Egyptians as originators of religious and philosophical ideas, and of the *primim vivere deinde philosophari* attitude of the Egyptians as compared to the Greeks, is drawn from Warburton.[14] There are, of course, some modifications. Yvon omits all footnotes, several supporting citations, and a short attack on Toland, while adding an attack on Spinoza, when Warburton mentions him, and some remarks on the corruption of religion in the contemporary Orient. Further on in the article, after a discussion of Leibnitz, Spinoza, Hobbes, Locke, and Wolf, Yvon returns to the *Dissertations*, and, with a few added transitions, quotes from twenty-two of its pages further opinions of the ancients concerning the soul and immortality.[15]

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[11] *Op. cit.*, pp. 140-141.

[12] "Le Spinozisme et l'*Encyclopédie*," *RHL*, LI (1951), 350.

[13] *Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts, et des métiers* (Paris, 1751-65), I, 327a-330b.

[14] *Diss.* II, 125-159.

[15] *E.*, I, 339a-340a; *Diss.*, II, 82-104.

This synthesis of erudition indicates to Hubert, who was unaware of its origin, that the Encyclopedists had, in spite of Ducros' denial, "le sens historique."[16] Hubert also points out that the article contains several ideas dear to the *philosophes*, such as the source in Egypt of the calculating use of religion as an agent of social stability, the use of one doctrine for the *vulgus* and another for the élite, and the tough-minded practicality of Egyptian philosophy in contrast to the metaphysical froth of the Greek.[17] He remarks: "L'abbé Yvon avait déjà dénoncé à l'article *Ame* les spéculations des sophistes grecs; Diderot s'en prend aux théologiens et métaphysiciens de tous les peuples."[18]

It should be noted that Yvon, with a *renvoi* to "Ame," speaks again of the simplicity of Egyptian philosophy in "Barbares,"[19] while the hypersubtility of the Greeks is mentioned in another passage quoted without acknowledgement from Warburton in the unsigned article "Providence."[20] In the same article, the reasons why some ancients could not believe in immortality and the opinions of the Greek philosophers concerning providence are also borrowed from Warburton.[21]

Another case in which the English bishop's knowledge of the ancients is utilized without acknowledgement is "Polythéisme." Beginning with the paragraph which opens, "Les athées prétendent que le culte religieux rendu à des hommes après leur mort est la première source de l'idolâtrie...," the editor borrows section after section of both volumes of the *Dissertations* wherein it is decided that, before heroes were worshipped, the stars, being influential natural phenomena, were the object of man's adoration.[22] Here the editor adds a few remarks on Zoroastrianism and the Church Fathers' ignorance of astronomy, and reproduces a long passage from a Greek philosopher to which Warburton only refers. He then copies Warburton's explanation of the manner in which the cult of heavenly bodies was combined with that of heroes in the evolution of religious thought.[23] The subsequent refutation of Pluche's theory, set forth in the *Histoire du ciel*, that the gods were only hieroglyphic symbols for agricultural lore is derived from an entirely different section of the translation.[24] Here is quoted Warburton's theory that the mysteries taught the initiates that the gods were only deified men. The supporting citations from Eusebius and Pope were also taken from Warburton, but the editor, presumably Diderot, has replaced Silhouette's prose paraphrase of Pope by

[16] *Les Sciences sociales*, p. 37.
[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51, 242.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 245.
[19] *E.*, II, 69a.
[20] *E.*, XIII, 512b; *Diss.*, II, 106.
[21] *E.*, XIII, 512b-513b; *Diss.*, II, 108, 110-111, 124-126.
[22] *E.*, XII, 955-956; *Diss.*, II, 201-209.
[23] *E.*, XII, 957; *Diss.*, II, 211-212.
[24] *E.*, XII, 957-958; *Diss.*, I, 237-258.

a verse translation. Then the editor departs from Warburton to discuss the corrupting effects of mythology on society, and Bayle's views on idolatry, but returns to the *Dissertations* for the idea that early legislators, who had supported polytheism to encourage veneration of the laws, were forced to evolve the mysteries, in which monotheism was actually taught to the initiates.[25] Again the double doctrine is stressed, along with the perspicacity of what Paul Hazard called the "Sage Egyptien"; and, although Toland is chided for wishing to undermine all revealed religion, his thesis that all religions have their ultimate roots in idolatry is indirectly supported.

Scholars have found these borrowings important elements in the Encyclopedists' theory. The refutation of Pluche is seen by Hubert as a reflection of their "théorie naturaliste," while the description of the corruption of religion under the Greeks is held to be an inevitable concomitant of the *philosophes*' systematic denial of the "miracle grec."[26] Hubert also feels that the statement that a belief in a first cause preceded any form of idolatry, another transcribed idea, is not a cautious concession to the theory of degenerescence. It fits, he thinks, into Diderot's philosophy, as does the refutation of the *deos fecit timor* argument. He takes the assertion that the worship of natural forces preceded the cult of heroes or allegorical gods as proof that Ducros was wrong in accusing the Encyclopedists of ignoring the role of this "naturalisme utilitaire." After discussing the many arguments taken from the *Dissertations* in favor of the utility of religion, he says that such a view "résulte manifestement de la façon dont les Encyclopédistes ont conçu la nature et la fonction de la religion."[27] Barker thinks the article important enough to merit a summary in his book, and Gaudin supposes that the reference to Toland is illustrative of Diderot's dislike for him. What has been overlooked, then, in the *Divine Legation* takes on significance when copied by the Encyclopedists.

Abbé Yvon, who, as we have seen, did not bother to mention Warburton in "Ame," seems anxious in "Athées" to acknowledge his debt; for in this article, one of the three involving the *Dissertations* which divulge their source, he mentions Warburton three times.[28] The borrowings begin with the consideration of Bayle's famous proposition that idolatry is more pernicious to society than atheism. In refutation, Yvon copies most of Warburton's second dissertation.[29] The bishop's three moral principles, "... le sentiment moral, la différence spécifique des actions humaines, et la volonté de Dieu ...," are discussed, and it is decided that atheists, bereft of the last principle, cannot be

[25] *E.*, XII, 963-964; *Diss.*, I, 188-191.
[26] *Les Sciences sociales*, pp. 49, 66-67, 265.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 232.
[28] *E.*, I, 802, 813, 815.
[29] *E.*, I, 804-813; *Diss.*, I, 62-112.

truly virtuous. This argument is also briefly summarized by Romilly *fils* in the article "Vertu," where Warburton is given credit. Yvon, who follows his source in discussing the strength of passion and the weakness of unsupported virtue, abridges the argument considerably, and adds some remarks of his own on false virtue. He then interpolates an attack on Shaftesbury from the eighth dissertation[30] and, to prove the universality of the doctrine of the afterlife, also uses examples from the fourth dissertation.[31] After mentioning Warburton's concept of the mysteries, he returns to the second dissertation for the argument that the virtuous nonbelievers mentioned by Bayle are not fair examples of atheistic types, being either savages unexposed to the corrupting influence of society or philosophers. Again he expresses the idea that the common man should not be allowed to speculate. This opinion, along with references to the double doctrine of ancient religion, seems to have been shared by the Encyclopedists, one of whom says at the end of the article "Christianisme": "La voie des raisonnements n'est pas faite pour le peuple."

In the unsigned article "Société," Diderot again uses Warburton to stress the utility of religion to society. After the statement that men originally banded together for their mutual good, and that this act necessitated the regulation of conduct, he mentions the efficacy of the fear of God in keeping the public peace. These views follow the general order of Warburton's argument in his first dissertation; and statements that society and its laws have tended to refine vice, that they have refused to punish certain lawless acts, and that they have actually created desires which are contrary to the public good are directly quoted from Warburton. The quotations continue for three pages.[32] Having argued that a coactive power such as that of religion is required to control society, Diderot turns to the problem of associating lay and religious authority in the most commodious way. Here he uses material from the fourteenth dissertation, which Silhouette adapted from Warburton's earlier *Alliance between Church and State.* The editor cuts many of the long passages, and a refutation of natural religion is omitted, but he faithfully transcribes Warburton's agreement with Locke that the civil society has no influence on intellectual and spiritual matters, and that the religious society should not interfere with the state, since the goals of the two societies are completely different. The conclusion is that the church has, and should have, no actual coactive power save excommunication. Similar reasoning about the desirable relation between church and state is advanced by Romilly *fils* in the article "Tolérance," and many analogies of exposition with the fourteenth dissertation may be noted.

[30] *Diss.*, II, 9-10. Gaudin quotes this section, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-195.
[31] *E.*, I, 812-813; *Diss.*, I, 127-129, 165-169, and II, 4-12.
[32] *E.*, XV, 255b-258; *Diss.*, I, 35-39, and II, 224-259.

Again, in connection with "Société," the opinions advanced by Warburton have been interpreted as Diderot's own. Barker says that Diderot's standard opinion of Christianity in the *Encyclopédie* is always based on "the usefulness of religion to society and the state."[33] Hubert gives as an example of Diderot's refusal to accept wholeheartedly the theory of moral progress the opinion copied from Warburton that society, with its creation of new problems, has complicated immensely the possibility of leading an ethical life.[34]

Warburton's long refutation of arguments in favor of natural religion, omitted from "Société," is found, not surprisingly, under "Religion naturelle." After a long discussion of the extent to which an inner religion fulfills our duties toward God, the editor gives two reasons why an organized religion is necessary. With the sentence, "Il est donc essentiel à l'exercice de la religion . . . ," he begins quoting from the fourteenth dissertation.[35] We must proclaim our faith publicly, Warburton had said, as an example of virtue, and thanks should be rendered in public for benefits received in common. The second reason for formal religion is also borrowed from the bishop; an inner cult would suffice if men were all spirit, but it is obvious that most men, especially the "commun du peuple," are slaves to temperament and the material side of their make-up, and therefore need the discipline of formal religion. Barker calls these "weak arguments," and says in a note: "This article is entirely foreign to the mind of Diderot, but I have not been able to discover its source."[36]

Another significant omission in "Société" is of one word. Silhouette had written, in connection with the weakness of purely civil law: "il n'y a point d'Etat grand et florissant où l'on puisse punir la fornication de la manière que le mériteroient les funestes influences de ce vice." Diderot substituted the word "incontinence" for "fornication." Under the heading "Fornication" in the *Encyclopédie* a short article by D'Alembert seems to excoriate the arguments concerning the utility of religion which were so often copied by other editors. He says:

> En général, on peut observer . . . que la religion n'est pas toujours un frein assez puissant contre les crimes que les lois ne punissent pas, ou même dont le gouvernement ne fait pas une recherche sévère . . . C'est donc avoir du christianisme une très-fausse idée . . . que de le regarder par une politique toute humaine comme uniquement destiné à être une digue aux forfaits.[37]

He goes on to remark that the lack of immediacy of punishment in the afterlife and the church's generosity with absolution render the utility of religion almost nil, in any case. This would seem to be a "philosophic"

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[33] *Op. cit.*, p. 105.
[34] *Les Sciences sociales*, pp. 282-283.
[35] *E.*, XIV, 82; *Diss.*, II, 242-245.
[36] *Op. cit.*, p. 30.
[37] *E.*, VII, 189; *Diss.*, I, 35-36.

attack, in a rather inconspicuous article, on even the instrumental value of religion.

Regardless of D'Alembert's views, however, the article "Christianisme" contains statements which indicate that Warburton's lengthy proof of the early recognition of the utility of religion has again been drawn from. Diderot's statement that the early legislators, who used the doctrine of divine punishment as a brake on society, were wrong in sacrificing the true to the useful, and that the really true and the really useful are identical, paraphrases closely observations made in the *Dissertations*[38] which had already been copied by Yvon for "Athée." Subsequent remarks that the legislators, appalled at the corruption of the old religions, tried to rectify their error by teaching monotheism in the mysteries, are also obvious borrowings. From the third dissertation Diderot then draws, with a few changes, part of the refutation of the typical atheistic remark that Christianity is harmful to the state in that it attacks wealth.[39] Warburton had remarked that prosperity "est la consommation de tout ce que l'art et la nature produisent qui est utile à la société; consommation qui peut avoir lieu sans luxe . . ." The church, then, opposes only the abuse of prosperity. Another stock stricture of the atheists that Warburton helps to refute is that the church is against all forms of pleasure and happiness; this is only the opinion of "cagots et fanatiques." Diderot simply uses the term "rigoristes."[40] Further on in the article, the statement that the highly touted tolerance of the pagans was due only to the falseness of pagan belief probably came from this observation in the *Dissertations*: "les bons effets de cette tolérance générale . . . ne provenoient que de la fausseté et de l'absurdité du Paganisme: qu'au contraire les mauvais effets de l'intolérance sous la religion Chrétienne proviennent de sa vérité et de sa perfection . . ."[41]

Finally, Warburton's views on the utilitarianism of the Egyptian religion, the real teaching of the mysteries, and the corruption of religion under the Greeks are again borrowed, this time with a specific reference to the eighth dissertation, by Formey in the article "Exotérique." Here a thought reminiscent of Vico is emphasized: "il est évident que l'ancienne Mythologie du Paganisme naquit de la corruption de l'ancienne tradition historique."[42]

Thus, in eleven articles of the *Encyclopédie*, only three of which indicate their sources, great blocks of the *Dissertations* have been borrowed. As a matter of fact, only Warburton's interpretation of the sixth book of the *Aeneid* as a representation of initiation into the

[38] *E.*, III, 382b; *Diss.*, I, 186, and II, 180-181.
[39] *E.*, III, 383b; *Diss.*, I, 123-125.
[40] *E.*, III, 384; *Diss.*, I, 119.
[41] *E.*, III, 384b; *Diss.*, II, 382.
[42] *E.*, VI, 274; *Diss.*, II, 24-25.

Eleusinian Mysteries has not been utilized.[43] That Warburton's opinions concerning the origin and evolution of religion, and its usefulness to society, were significant in eighteenth-century thought may be seen in the estimate of scholars, especially Hubert, that they hold a central place in the Encyclopedists' doctrine of history, religion, and morality, and in the fact that they are sometimes attributed to such thinkers as Diderot. This indirect tribute to Warburton need not imply a denigration of the originality of the *société de gens de lettres*, for it is generally conceded that the *philosophes*' favorite doctrines were not originated by them. Hubert says that the Encyclopedists must be credited with having approached religion from a point of view independent of formal Biblical tradition, but adds: "Mais en cela encore, leur originalité n'est pas absolue, et l'histoire de l'érudition démontrerait abondamment qu'ils avaient été devancés sur la plupart des points par de savants critiques des deux siècles précédents."[44] The possibility that Warburton was unthinkingly utilized as a convenient and inoffensive source is slight. Warburton the Christian apologist was probably not highly regarded by Diderot and his colleagues; but there is no reason to believe that his theories, some of them original, on society, philosophy, and religion were not adopted by them in good faith.

But Warburton played another role in the *Encyclopédie*—that of philologist. His influence in this field, although it has been mentioned, has never been fully treated. Hubert says of the editors: "*L'Essai sur les hiéroglyphes* leur a fourni à la fois une explication du langage et une théorie de l'écriture."[45] This is brought out by an examination of the articles drawn, in part, from the translation of the fourth book of the *Divine Legation*.

In "Ecriture,"[46] Jaucourt begins by saying: "Développons avec M. Warburthon l'origine de cet art admirable, ses différentes sortes, et ses changemens progressifs jusqu'a à l'invention d'un alphabet." He then summarizes, with the interpolation of some of Duclos' opinions, pages 5-190 of the *Essai*, describing the pictograph and the more complex symbolic representation that followed. He sets forth Warburton's theory, which tended to refute Kircher and others, that the hieroglyphics were evolved specifically as a means of communication, not to mystify or to conceal esoteric philosophy. He mentions the various types of hieroglyphics, and points out that later in their development their meaning was lost except to the priests and legislators. In Greece and Rome, however, they were once more used to convey information. While their meaning was unknown in Egypt, he adds, the hieroglyphics were the source of the worship of animals.

[43] *E.*, X, 436, seems to contain a reference by Jaucourt to Warburton's interpretation of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* in the ninth dissertation.

[44] *Les Sciences sociales*, p. 249.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 333.

[46] *E.*, V, 358 ff.

Jaucourt recommends several other articles on language to the reader, and especially lauds "... le parallèle ingénieux que fait Warburthon entre les figures et les métaphores d'un côté, et les différentes espèces d'écriture de l'autre ..." In the following article, "Ecriture chinoise," he cites the bishop's opinion that Chinese writing retains elements of the primitive pictograph stage of writing, while in the next article, "Ecriture des Egyptiens," he sets forth in detail the technical classifications of hieroglyphics which, he says, Warburton was the first to develop. The sole important point made here is that only one kind of hieroglyphic was secret, the others being used to satisfy the needs of written communication in society.

In "Hiéroglyphe,"[47] Jaucourt again gives credit to Warburton's work, "où l'érudition et la philosophie marchent d'un pas égal," for having refuted Kircher's theory of the hieroglyphics as a secret language. He quotes, in other sentences that remind one of Vico, the opinion that the emergence of this kind of writing in many countries "doit être considéré comme la voix uniforme de la nature, parlant aux conceptions grossières des humains."[48] Then he explains once more the various classifications of hieroglyphics and the way in which they became a secret language, emphasizing the fact that later priests attributed a divine origin to them. The worship of the symbols rather than the gods they represented, he repeats, gave rise to the cult of animals.[49]

Three of the arguments adduced by Warburton to support his theory of the primary use of the hieroglyphic in common civil affairs appear in separate sections of the *Encyclopédie*. In "Obélisque" Jaucourt copies without acknowledgement the quotation from Diodorus to the effect that the hieroglyphic inscriptions on obelisks report straightforward historical facts.[50] The subsequent references to Rameses' column and comments of the ancients on historical inscriptions also come from the *Dissertations*. The relation of these opinions to the main thesis of the *Divine Legation* is never mentioned.

The authoritative views of Warburton are again mentioned by Jaucourt in "Onéirocrite."[51] This short discussion of dream interpretation states that interpreters used the hieroglyphics' symbolism to explain dreams, on the grounds that the gods were the authors of both. This could have happened, it is concluded, only after the hieroglyphics were deemed sacred, which was already the case at the time of Joseph.

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[47] *E.*, VIII, 205-206.

[48] *Essai*, I, 46.

[49] Doolittle, *op. cit.*, pp. 389-391, has emphasized the way in which Jaucourt brought out the "... priestly fostering of superstition among the people" in the articles "Ecriture," "Ecriture des Egyptiens," and "Hiéroglyphe."

[50] *E.*, XI, 298b-299; *Essai*, I, 119-120.

[51] *E.*, XI, 477; *Essai*, I, 226-239.

No mention is made of the importance of this idea in the proof of the great antiquity of Egyptian thought.[52]

The article "Isiaque, table"[53] offers a general description of the table and an explanation of the clash between Shuckford and Warburton concerning its antiquity. Shuckford thought it very early, previous to the worship of an anthropomorphic god. Warburton, because of the mingling of types of hieroglyphics and the position of some of the figures, dates it much later. Jaucourt then hazards some remarks of his own on the "folie" of attempting to date such monuments and of trying to interpret the hieroglyphics. He does not tell the reader that Warburton's opinion here is part of another proof of the high antiquity of Egyptian learning.[54] Obviously, the main theses of the *Divine Legation* were of no interest to the Encyclopedists.

Two articles on the origin of language, a vital subject in the eighteenth century, reveal new dimensions of liberalism in Warburton's thought. In "Langage"[55] Jaucourt paraphrases the bishop's remark that, judging simply by the nature of things, one might agree with Diodorus Siculus that men lived like beasts, originally, and only slowly and painfully learned to communicate by sounds. Gregory of Nyssa and Richard Simon believed this, although revelation explicitly says that God gave men the gift of language. Still, it is probable, Jaucourt continues, omitting a cautious qualifying remark of Warburton's, that language at first "étoit nécessairement stérile et fort borné . . ."[56] The editor also echoes Warburton's statement that men first communicated by mingled sound and gestures, and then leaves the *Essai* to speak of the influences of climate on language.

As Warburton's insistence on the utility of religion was criticized by D'Alembert, his remarks on the sterility and imperfection of primitive language are righteously challenged by Beauzée in the article "Langage," under the heading "Origine de la langue primitive." The editor quotes, with a specific citation, the beginning of the remark concerning primitive language paraphrased by Jaucourt and says, logically: "Mais

[52] The other sources utilized in this article are indicated by Doolittle, *op. cit.*, p. 389.

[53] *E.*, VIII, 912; *Essai*, I, 292-300.

[54] Warburton reasons that all the people knew, at first, the meaning of the hieroglyphics, so that symbolized gods were recognized as such. Then, the meaning of the figures lost, the hieroglyphics themselves were worshipped, and the cult of plants and animals was born. Since the cult of animals is ancient, having been widespread at the time of Moses, the earlier forms of Egyptian religion, hence writing, hence knowledge in general, must be even more remote. The opinions of Shuckford, Pluche, Vossius, and others concerning the posteriority of anthropomorphic gods to the animal cult obviously opposed this thesis, and had to be refuted.

[55] *E.*, IX, 242; *Essai*, 48-51.

[56] Warburton said, according to Silhouette: "Le Langage, si l'on en juge par les monuments de l'Antiquité, et par la nature de la chose, a été d'abord extremement grossier, stérile, et équivoque . . ." (*Essai*, I, 48).

il est difficile de concevoir comment on peut admettre la révélation avec le degré de soumission qu'elle a droit d'exiger, et prétendre pourtant que la nature des choses insinue des principes opposés."[57] The "philosophic" value of such a confrontation of the evidence of nature and reason on the one hand and Biblical tradition on the other is obvious. Having made a thrust for the cause, Beauzée leaves the *Dissertations* to discuss Rousseau and "cette supposition humiliante de l'homme né sauvage."

The evolutionary naturalism embodied in Warburton's ideas on religion and the origin and development of language is illustrated under still other headings. In the article "Figure, Logiq. Métaph.," after discussing Aristotle's analysis of the trope's charm as novelty, the editor heralds some ideas much more philosophical than these, and makes again the statement that the written language was, originally, "nécessairement figuré, stérile, et grossier . . ."[58] Appeals, therefore, were necessarily made to all the senses in the act of communicating, resulting in tropical discourse, while the use of the hieroglyphic made style even more symbolic. He cites Warburton: "la nécessité, et non pas le choix de l'art, a produit les diverses espèces d'écritures hiéroglyphiques,"[59] and refers to the parallel made by him between the development of the written and the spoken language. Citing the same passage, he remarks that the spoken language was also limited in the beginning and destitute of abstractions, so that figures of all kinds were natural and essential to communication. Then what was at first a necessity became a mystery, and, in the course of time, contrived elegance.[60] This explains the pleonasm and the metaphor. "Les premiers hommes étant simples, grossiers, et plongés dans les sens, ne pouvoient exprimer leur conception des idées abstraites, et les opérations réfléchies de l'entendement, qu'à l'aide des images sensibles, qui . . . devenoient métaphores." Towards the end of the article he quotes Warburton's remark that, as in the case of clothing, language has become, in many cases, mere embellishment, and adds that excess in both matters makes for decadence.

One is not surprised to find under "Métaphore" a repetition of these views; but this editor, Beauzée, has Warburton, to whom he alludes directly, share the honors with Du Marsais. Again comments by Warburton are quoted on the need of primitive man, incapable of abstract thought, to express himself with the aid of tropes of all kinds.[61]

Again, in "Similitude," Jaucourt says: "Après avoir parlé de la similitude en rhéteur, il faut bien que j'en dise un mot comme philo-

[57] *E.*, IX, 250.
[58] *E.*, VI, 765; *Essai*, I, 48.
[59] *Essai*, I, 47-48.
[60] *E.*, VI, 765; *Essai*, I, 93-95, 184.
[61] *E.*, X, 436-437; *Essai*, 193-197.

logue," and goes on to paraphrase Warburton's theory that the simile is a sophisticated shortening of the apologue and is parallel in sophistication to Chinese writing. The metaphor is described, following Warburton, as a natural refinement of the simile.[62]

The article "Enigme" also contains elements of this primitivistic theory of figurative expression, although Warburton is not named therein. The editor says, for example: "Dans la première origine des langues, les hommes furent obligés de joindre le langage d'action à celui des sons articulés, et de ne parler qu'avec images sensibles." The statements that the enigma later became esoteric and that the Bible and Oriental languages abound in "sentences obscures" also come from the *Essai*.[63]

Hubert has mentioned Warburton's role in the articles concerning language and the essential congruence of his opinions with the Encyclopedists' philosophic vision of the past. For them too, language, being a social phenomenon, must have had a natural origin and evolution. Again, for them as well as for Warburton, priority would have to go, in the consideration of this "langue primitive universelle, production spontanée de la nature humaine," to the languages of the oldest civilizations.[64] Having ignored, however, such articles as "Métaphore," "Similitude," and "Figure," Hubert does not point out Warburton's full influence in these matters. In his reference to the attempts of the Encyclopedists to establish the principles of the filiation and "l'analogue des génies des langues,"[65] he might have mentioned Warburton's ideas of the relationships of languages on the basis of their figurative elements or their use of abstractions,[66] and of ways in which various civilizations have refined earlier forms of stylistic expression.[67]

Also ignored, in connection with the dissemination of Warburton's theories in the *Encyclopédie*, are those elements of his thought which parallel ideas considered of the greatest importance in Vico. Numerous interesting *rapprochements* can be made with the *Scienza nuova*. For example, Vico says of the Egyptians that they were particularly concerned with "sapienza civile," and adds: "Tanto gli egizi, nel tempo ch'arricchivan il mondo de' ritruovati o necessari o utili al gener umano, furon essi filosofi e s'intendevano di universali."[68] The contrast between the metaphysics of such Greeks as Plato and the "sapienza volgare degli egizi" is made elsewhere in the *Scienza*

[62] *E.*, XV, 202; *Essai*, I, 85-86.
[63] *E.*, V, 690; *Essai*, I, 188, 190-191.
[64] *Les Sciences sociales*, pp. 329-330.
[65] *Ibid.*, pp. 339-340.
[66] E.g., the Oriental languages reveal their relatively primitive level by their reliance on tropes.
[67] E.g., the way in which the apologue, as used in the Bible, becomes a metaphor in classical literature.
[68] *Scienza nuova*, ed. F. Nicolini (Bari, 1928), I, 91.

nuova.[69] On primitive language we find many statements similar to Warburton's, such as the following: "Per ciò si è dimostro che tutti i tropi . . . i quali si sono finora creduti ingegnosi ritruovati degli scrittori, son stati necessari modi de spiegarsi di tutte le prime nazioni poetiche."[70] Many other similarities of opinion and expression concerning the hieroglyphics and primitivism could be cited.[71] Such similarities reopen the problem of currents of "Vichian" thought in France in the eighteenth century.[72]

Watson, in his biography, says of Warburton: "As a scholar, he has secured for himself no reverence from scholars, nor as a critic, from critics, nor as a divine, from divines; yet he cannot but command from all classes of readers and thinkers some share of attention and regard."[73] A share of attention and regard was certainly accorded him by the Encyclopedists; for, as we have seen, they drew some of the contents of twenty-three articles from two translations of his works. That this influence has done little to increase the reverence that Warburton failed to gain in the past is due in part to the vicissitudes of literary history and to the casual documentation of the Encyclopedists, who were, after all, compilers and purveyers of ideas, not press agents. They were manifestly interested in Warburton's erudition and naturalistic theories, not in an assertion of the divinity of the Mosaic dispensation. It was the quality of his thought that concerned them, not his reputation.

Diderot writes in the article "Encyclopédie": "Il y a des ouvrages si importants, si bien médités, si précis, en petit nombre, à la vérité, qu'une encyclopédie doit les engloutir en entier. Ce sont ceux dont l'objet général est traité d'une manière méthodique et profonde." Such a work, evidently, was the *Divine Legation* in translation, even though its "objet général" was disregarded.

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[69] E.g., *S.N.*, I, 169.

[70] *S.N.*, I, 167.

[71] *S.N.*, I, 146, 181, for example.

[72] Several scholars, such as Fisch in his introduction to *The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico* (Ithaca, 1944), p. 82, and Nicolini, in *Aretusa*, II, 21, have referred to the Vichian flavor of many of Warburton's ideas, but have not pursued the matter. I intend to discuss related ideas in a study I am preparing of the influence of Warburton's writings on other French writers of the eighteenth century.

[73] J. S. Watson, *The Life of Wm. Warburton, D.D.* (London, 1863), p. 637.

EDITH SITWELL AND THE SYMBOLIST TRADITION

IHAB H. HASSAN

THE indebtedness of contemporary English poetry to certain modes of the French symbolist movement has become part of the literary history of our time.[1] But the nature of that indebtedness has varied from writer to writer, each serving to throw on symbolism a new light. A close view of Miss Sitwell's poetry, in its relation to the symbolist tradition, has a dual interest. It can prove as helpful in defining the viable character of that tradition as in clarifying the achievement of a poet who has participated with verve and audacity in the development of modern British verse.

But the relationship need not come upon us couched in the ambiguous terms of an "influence." One needs, instead, to take romanticism into account, to take, perhaps, that willful and radical aspect of it which Maritain called creative subjectivity as the background shared by Edith Sitwell and the symbolist poets.[2] One also needs to recall certain parallels between the situation of poetry in 1880 and in 1920, different as these years may appear to be—what Marcel Raymond perceived in symbolism as "une volonté nouvelle de saisir la poésie en son essence" may also be what Miss Sitwell is after when she says: "The primary needs in poetry today are a greater expressiveness, a greater formality, and a return to rhetoric (good rhetoric, be it understood)."[3] And one needs to know that Edith Sitwell has read the French poets, whose idiom she has found so congenial and so helpful in countering the bromidic vision of Georgian verse with the kind of extravagance, obliqueness, and virtuosity to which her poetry has been dedicated since the first *Wheels* anthology. The introductory essay she wrote for Helen Rootham's adaptation of Rimbaud's *Les Illuminations* and the numerous observations, recorded in *A Poet's Notebook*, on Baude-

[1] See Arthur Symons, *The Symbolist Movement in Literature* (New York, 1919); René Taupin, *L'Influence du symbolisme français sur la poésie américaine* (Paris, 1929); Edmund Wilson, *Axel's Castle* (New York, 1931); Warren Ramsey, *Jules Laforgue and the Ironic Inheritance* (New York, 1953), Ch. XII; and such particular references as are to be found in Cecil Day Lewis, *A Hope for Poetry* (London, 1939), Ch. IX; Babette Deutsch, *This Modern Poetry* (New York, 1935), Ch. V; and T. S. Eliot, *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture* (London, 1948), p. 112.

[2] Jacques Maritain, *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry* (New York, 1953), pp. 29 f.

[3] Marcel Raymond, *De Baudelaire au surréalisme* (Paris, 1940), p. 53; Edith Sitwell in *Tradition and Experiment in Present-Day Literature* (London, 1929), p. 83.

laire, Rimbaud, Verlaine, Mallarmé, Wagner, and Cocteau betoken her intimacy with the works of symbolism.

When the poetry of Miss Sitwell is held against the tradition which it presupposes—the tradition of Mallarmé, Rimbaud, Laforgue, and Corbière—a number of telling comparisons force themselves upon our attention.[4] The most striking of these fall inevitably within the domain of imagery. Several types of images, used by both symbolist and modern poets, may be distinguished.

The first type of image is one that effects a dislocation of the structure of appearance, recreating the world on its own terms and according to its own needs, and compelling us to accept unconditionally the violent synthesis it has made. Such an image is often characterized by the excessive license it takes with reason and reality. But fantastic as it may seem, its affinities are with Plato's manic and passionate muse rather than with the automatic incubus of the surrealists.[5] Unlike pathological expression, the image remains within the boundaries of art, still operating on Coleridge's principle of the "willing suspension of disbelief," and relying heavily on the coherence of its context and the tension of its components. Rimbaud has been acknowledged as its master: "Le pavillon en viande saignante sur la soie des mers et des fleurs arctiques; (elle n'existent pas)" ("Barbare," *Les Illuminations*). Deranging his senses methodically, he could finally say: "Puis j'expliquai mes sophismes magiques avec l'hallucination des mots!"[6] The effect of the image, as Elizabeth Sewell recognizes of Rimbaud's language in general, is to multiply reference while abolishing order, to pull language in the direction of nightmare, which is chaos, rather than in the direction of number, which is pure order.[7] Edith Sitwell also recognized that effect when she said, with Rimbaud's *Illuminations* in mind: "This hallucination consists . . . not so much in transforming actualities into other actualities, as in making all things as one, in abolishing time and place, in making all times as one, all places as one."[8] But the "phantasmic" image is not only relevant to Rimbaud's "Bateau Ivre" and *Illuminations*. It occurs, perhaps less often and less violently, in the poetry of other symbolists as well as in the poetry of Edith Sitwell. Mallarmé wrote lines like "Et ce squelette nain, coiffé d'un feutre à plume / Et botté, dont l'aisselle a pour poil

[4] These poets seem to represent jointly both the "serious-aesthetic" and "conversational ironic" veins which Wilson observed in French symbolism. See *Axel's Castle*, Ch. I; also John Crowe Ransom, *The World's Body* (New York, 1938), pp. 90 f.

[5] "This element of madness Plato had seen before the surrealists, and forcefully brought to light. They invoke him on this score, though in reality he is at the opposite pole from them." Maritain, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

[6] Arthur Rimbaud, "Nuit de l'enfer," *Une Saison en Enfer*, in *Œuvres complètes* (Paris, 1946), p. 233.

[7] Elizabeth Sewell, *The Structure of Poetry* (London, 1951), pp. 82, 84, 102-130.

[8] Quoted by Elizabeth Sewell, *ibid.*, p. 131.

vrai des vers" ("Le Guignon"); and Miss Sitwell, we know, has shown a talent for such images as "... a Gold Man like a terrible Sun, / A Mummy with a Lion's mane" ("The Song of the Cold"), and "The lynx-furred and lynx-purring plain of snow where branches of red coral / Hum of the spring..." ("The Wind of Early Morning").[9]

The same principle which underlies the phantasmic image, when restricted to a special kind of dislocation, also underlies synaesthesia, a figure which presents an alogical transposition of the senses intended to create or weld impressions, to differentiate between the real and the superfluous, the fresh and the banal, in the world of appearance, and to centralize perception. "The modernist poet's brain," Miss Sitwell observes, "is becoming a central sense, interpreting and controlling the other five senses..."[10] And of her own verse she says: "Where the language of one sense was insufficient to cover the meaning, the sensation, I used the language of another, and by this means attempted to pierce down to the essence of the thing seen..."[11] As it was practiced by the symbolists, and by some early romantics like Novalis, the "synaesthetic" image achieved a certain solidity of specification, the kind of density which surrounds an object not simply named but created. Baudelaire's "Correspondances," Rimbaud's *audition colorée*, Ghil's theory of instrumentalism, all reflect the general preoccupation with this type of image, a preoccupation no less evident in the earlier verse of Edith Sitwell. Thus, when Rimbaud writes, "... il sonne une cloche de feu rose dans les nuages" ("Phrases"), and Mallarmé says, "Et du métal vivant sort en bleus angelus!" ("L'Azur"), they are both giving currency to a rather specialized kind of idiom which we recognize immediately in such expressions of Miss Sitwell as "... sounds I heard through the begonia-yellow music" ("Butterfly-Weather"), or "Ribbons of noisy heat" ("Switchback").

The two kinds of images just discussed share a common disregard for logical experience as it is known in the business of living. But the similarity between the two figures is perhaps even more fundamental. They share an assumption of the preconscious and the subhuman, which coexist, in the symbolist and modern traditions, with the artful and the sophisticated;[12] they show, in fact, the romantic myth of

[9] Poems by Edith Sitwell are cited from the two collections, *The Canticle of the Rose* (New York, 1949) and *Gardeners and Astronomers* (London, 1953). The examples given from all poets under discussion are selective; they presuppose a greater frequency of occurrence than is here represented.

[10] Edith Sitwell, *Poetry and Criticism* (London 1925), p. 18.

[11] Edith Sitwell, "Some Notes On My Poetry," *The Canticle of the Rose*, p. xvi.

[12] The "primitive" aspects of symbolism are well explored by Emile Cailliet and J. A. Bédé, "Le Symbolisme et l'âme primitive," *RLC*, II (1932); see also Albert Béguin, *L'Ame romantique et le rêve* (Paris, 1946), pp. 398 f.

the unconscious that permitted Laforgue to cry: "... Moi, ma trève, confiant / Je la veux cuver au sein de l' Inconscient." Synaesthesia, which according to Empson "throws back the reader upon the undifferentiated affective states which are all that such sensations have in common ...,"[13] is but one example of the primitive, and private, associationism Miss Sitwell develops so archly. The "stridency" of cold, the "hairiness" of sky, the "whining" of grass, the "Emily" and "Martha" colors of things, are partially explained by the poet in her introduction to *The Canticle of the Rose*; but the issue they raise, beyond synaesthesia or impressionism, calls forth that unappeased controversy of obscurity and objective correlatives in modern poetry. For the present, however, it is sufficient to observe that Edith Sitwell, like the symbolists, often starts with the physical impression an object creates, and that she brings to it those elements which "exist below the threshold of consciousness, like a sun below the horizon." When the image is felicitous, when it receives the full consent of its context, a plangent effect is created which is much like the effect of myth characterized by Régnier: "Un Mythe est sur la grève du temps comme une de ces coquilles où l'on entend le bruit de la mer humaine. Un Mythe est la conque sonore d'une idée."[14]

But it would be invidious to conclude that logic has no place in the imagery of symbolist or modern poets, that their way of seeing things is wholly unconditional and their challenge to reality blind. A third type of image that may reward our attention testifies to the contrary. The type—it is the image of "conceit"—found extensive application in the verse of Donne and has been, since Eliot, reclaimed by the modernist poet. The image, we all know, draws upon sudden and farfetched analogies, yokes dissonant elements, elaborates a relationship to the limits of its possibilities, and elicits both wit and irony from the anomalies and paradoxes it creates. But in the conceit the fiber of analogy, however elastic, always exerts a cohesive pull that controls the many strands of associations—the logical structure in it is real. Its character in symbolist poetry becomes more clear when we recall, among other instances, Laforgue's "J'asperge les couchants de tragiques rougeurs, / Je palpite d'exil dans le cœur des étoiles" ("Hypertrophie"), or Corbière's "Tes cils, barreaux de fer!" ("Liberta"); though Mallarmé could also turn out a conceit like "Des crépuscules blancs tiédissent sous mon crâne" ("Renouveau"). And so could Rimbaud: "Mon triste cœur bave à la poupe" ("Le Cœur volé"), or "Madame * * * établit un piano dans les Alpes" ("Après le déluge," *Les Illuminations*). It is essentially the same orientation in sensibility that Edith Sitwell betrays in such figures as: "Our sun, our love, will leave us more alone / Than the black moldering rags about the bone!"

[13] William Empson, *Seven Types of Ambiguity* (London, 1953), p. 13.
[14] Henri de Régnier, *Poètes d'aujourd'hui* (Paris, 1900), p. 336.

("Metamorphosis"); "And to me the jarring atoms are parted lovers!" ("A Simpleton"); "A butterfly poised on a pigtailed ocean" ("En Famille"); "Devoid of root like the planets, (those bright bees / That move in heaven about their honeycomb of light,) / And are forms of Time that imitate the eternal..." ("Out of School"). And perhaps it is not entirely a matter of accident that Miss Sitwell's image, "... the black moldering rags about the bone!" should suggest to us another image which Eliot has singled out from Donne, "A bracelet of bright hair about the bone." For in some respects Edith Sitwell, like a number of symbolists, partakes of the Donne tradition. No doubt, a measure of caution ought to be exercised in discovering parallels between symbolist and metaphysical verse, and attention ought to be given to the differences between these two schools of poetry.[15] Yet one cannot disallow the notion that, at least where the image of conceit is concerned, Edith Sitwell reaches out to both the symbolist and metaphysical traditions, and that at the heart of the image lies Mallarmé's "demon of analogy" as well as Eliot's "sensuous apprehension of thought."

Another type of image, familiar to readers of symbolist and modern verse, complements the image of conceit and combines with it to give the language of poetry its limits of contraction and expansion. That type, of course, is the "symbolic" image. For the discussion of its function, a distinction both useful and provisional will be drawn between what may be called the "intrinsic" and the "extrinsic" symbol. The intrinsic symbol is one in which the suggestive powers are largely inherent; it carries them wherever it goes, and derives them from popular traditions, myths, history, from the very roots of language. Such symbols possess a circle of common associations, no matter how these associations may be modified by the context. On the other hand, the extrinsic symbol, which may be a word otherwise neutral, is activated by the pressure of its context, is almost wholly created by it. What the poem invests in such a symbol is returned in kind; the associations, the power to resolve and evoke, if the poem be successful, are released internally. The situation is well described by Mark Van Doren in relation to *The Tempest*: "Any set of symbols, moved close to this play, lights up as in an electric field."[16] The French symbolists were par-

[15] A legitimate distinction may be drawn between symbolist and metaphysical poetry in that the latter possesses a logical structure often more rugged and more explicit. See Rosemond Tuve, *Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery* (Chicago, 1943), p. 132. It may be added that the tendency of symbolism was, in general, towards concentration, that of metaphysical poetry towards elaboration. Nor can the "modern revolution of sensibility begun by Diderot," as Ramsey (*op. cit.*, p. 203) put it, be left out of any comparison between symbolist and metaphysical poets.

[16] Mark Van Doren, *Shakespeare* (New York, 1953), p. 281. Maritain's notion of "the implicit undetermined signification" (*op. cit.*, pp. 265-267) further clarifies this method of symbolism.

ticularly adept in their use of this kind of symbol, though their skill did not always prevent them from lapsing into excesses of privacy and obscurity. But, when it does succeed, the symbolic image achieves a certain expansion which transcends the literal context. Johansen describes that symbolic action correctly when he says:

> L'image apparait la première, c'est là que réside la similitude de fonction. Mais l'image peut conduire à une pensée. Le résultat obtenu dépend de la sensibilité de la pensée par rapport au dynamisme de l'image symbolique. Il doit y avoir un état d'équilibre très stable entre ces deux termes pour que la pensée ne dégrade pas l'image et n'en fasse pas une illustration.[17]

It is essentially the same idea of symbolic processes that we encounter in Mallarmé's hyperbolic statement on a flower, "... idée même et suave, l'absente de tous bouquets";[18] or in Georges Vanor's remark: "L'œuvre du poète symboliste serait donc de découvrir l'idée à travers sa représentation figurée..."[19] And Miss Sitwell herself is in no disagreement with this conception of symbolism when she says that all expression is welded into an image, and that the theme of consciousness in her poetry is "the very cry of that waiting, watching world where everything we see is a symbol of something beyond, to the consciousness that is yet buried in this earth-sleep..."[20]

The operation of extrinsic symbolic images can be followed in Mallarmé's superb sonnet, "Le vierge, le vivace et le bel aujourd'hui," in which the creation of the swan symbol, in its relation to the ideal, to poetry, to inspiration, to spiritual freedom—"la région où vivre"—is carried through mainly by images of the type under discussion. The same transcendence of literality may be observed in Rimbaud's "Les Chercheuses de poux"; or in Corbière's "Rondel," which begins with "Il fair noir, enfant, voleur d'étincelles!"; or again in Laforgue's typical mood of "Dimanches":

> Oh! se piano, ce cher piano
> Qui jamais, jamais ne s'arrête,
> Oh! ce piano qui geint là-haut

The symbols of Edith Sitwell lend themselves to the same provisional classification. There are some, intrinsic symbols, that bring with them their own range of reference: ape, cold, rose, worm, sun, burning bush, Cain, Lazarus, dust. Others, extrinsic symbols, she creates in a particular context and invests with special meanings: lion, mind, claw, amber-blood, bone. While it is undeniable that even extrinsic symbols awaken some general associations, Miss Sitwell puts them to so personal and concrete a use as to warrant the distinction. Thus we are told in the preface to *The Canticle of the Rose* that claw symbolizes in "The Shadow of Cain" the idea of struggle. And in the notes affixed

[17] Svend Johansen, *Le Symbolisme* (Copenhagen, 1945), p. 78.
[18] Stéphane Mallarmé, *Divagations* (Paris, 1897), p. 250.
[19] Georges Vanor, *L'Art symboliste* (Paris, 1889), p. 37.
[20] *The Canticle of the Rose*, pp. xxvii f.

to the same collection, Miss Sitwell clarifies the symbolism of "amber-blood" by quoting William Harvey, who says of the blood that it has "the innate heat, the sun of the microcosm, the fire of Plato," a spirit that "corresponds to the essence of the stars," while further on she gives her symbol additional meaning by recording Rimbaud's phrase, "her heart is of amber and musk."[21]

Such notational clarification of symbols seems to be the privilege of our age. The practice, though it does not find any important precedent among French symbolists, is implied in their method and anticipated by their occasional failure to make the symbol autonomous at the same time that it is coherent. The notational practice appears to be an effort to bridge the gap between intrinsic and extrinsic methods of symbolism through an artificial medium of common associations, outside of the poem, and in default of a natural community of knowledge or feeling. But, severe as this default may appear in certain respects, it has yet allowed the language of poetry, since the time of the French symbolists, to meet the modern crisis of sensibility by discovering new methods and adapting old techniques of communication. The symbolic image is precisely such a technique. Judging from poems like "The Song of the Cold," "Anne Boleyn's Song," or "The Shadow of Cain," it is not too much to say that Miss Sitwell can make the symbols and images on a page conjure a world from which no willing reader is excluded. This indeed may be felt of the following lines, severed as they are from their rightful context:

> Born of the primal Cause
> That keeps the hearts and blood of men and beasts
> ever in motion,
> The amber blood of the smooth-weeping tree
> Rising towards the life-giving heat of the Sun...
> ("An Old Woman")

The symbolist poets, who were always more intent on a very personal kind of expression, did little, in general, to make the symbols of different poems come into a meaningful contact with one another (Mallarmé's *Azur* and Laforgue's *Lune* are, in symbolist poetry, two exceptions that come readily to mind; with Yeats, Eliot, Rilke, and Valéry the interaction of symbols is no longer an exception). Miss Sitwell, like other modern poets, takes a step nearer to the elucidation of her symbolism when she permits the symbol in one poem to reinforce and develop itself in another poem, creating a pattern of meaning and a frame of reference that may be considered equivalent to a "personal mythology."

It is interesting to observe how two such symbols, the lion and the sun, are objectified in a series of images taken from related poems; how they interact with one another and how they derive part of their

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 283, 285.

force from comments Miss Sitwell has made outside of her poetry; and how the symbols make use both of the extrinsic and the intrinsic processes of association. Here, first, are the external clues which Edith Sitwell gives in *A Poet's Notebook*. She quotes Cocteau: "Warning: The 'raw elegance of the lion is dangerous' "; and she quotes Leonardo da Vinci: " 'The eyes in the Lion Tribe have a larger part of the head for their sockets, and the optic nerves communicate at once with the brain; but the contrary is to be seen in Man . . . ,' " to which she adds her own comment: "We must have the eyes, the nose, of the Lion, the Lion's acuity of sense, and with these the Sun of Man's reason . . . Remember the 'animal full of genius,' of whom Baudelaire wrote."[22] Elsewhere she records from Burton's *The Anatomy of Melancholy* the question: "When shall you see a lion hide gold in the ground?"[23] Concerning the sun symbol one remark will be sufficient: "Before the time came for 'The Shadow of Cain' to be written, various of my poems spoke of the change from the worship of the holy, living, life-giving gold of the wheat to the destructive gold of Dives . . . But as yet the Sun itself had not been harnessed to a war machine and used against us . . . In 'The Shadow of Cain,' however, we moved still farther from the Sun that is Christ and the Sun of the heart."[24] My purpose in quoting these excerpts is twofold. It is first to show that both symbols are sufficiently personal and complex to demand a measure of alertness on the reader's part—the sun is not simply radiance or energy, nor is the lion simply courage, strength, or nobility. And second, it is to establish, about the two symbols, a certain area of reference that might lead, in the absence of the full context, to some appreciation of the method utilized in symbolic images like these:

> As the earth is heavy with the lion-strong Sun
> When he has fallen, with his hot days and rays
> We are heavy with Death . . .
> ("Eurydice")

> I saw great things mirrored in littleness,
> Who now see only that great Venus wears Time's filthy dress—
> A toothless crone who once had the Lion's mouth . . .
> ("The Poet Laments the Coming of Old Age")

> But in bud and branch the nature of Fate begins
> —And love with the Lion's claws and the Lion's hunger
> Hides in the brakes in the nihilistic Spring . . .
> ("Invocation")

> [Of the miser Foscue] . . . —or fertilize
> His flesh, that continent of dryness? . . . Yellow, cold,
> And crumbling as his gold,
> Deserted by the god of this world, a Gold Man like a terrible Sun,
> A Mummy with a Lion's mane . . .
> ("The Song of the Cold")

[22] Edith Sitwell, *A Poet's Notebook* (London, 1944), pp. 14, 19.
[23] *The Canticle of the Rose*, p. 287.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. xxxiii f.

What these lines reveal is a symbolic method that relies as much on the total power of the image as it does on the intrinsic suggestiveness of the symbol, as much on created as on natural associations. There is in them what Tate called the balance of intention and extension, a balance of the kind French symbolists predicted without wholly achieving.[25] And in their pattern the whole meaning seems larger than the sum of the individual symbolic references.

But the possibilities of an affinity between Edith Sitwell and the poets of the symbolist tradition are not exhausted by the devices of image and metaphor; diction, syntax, and versification adduce further evidence in its favor.

The impressions of avid eclecticism and exacting selectivity that we are likely to take from the diction of modern poetry can also be derived from Laforgue's jazzy diction and Mallarmé's awed use of "le verbe," his Promethean struggle to cancel "le hasard." On the one hand, strange and exotic words, scientific or specialized terms, slang, colloquialisms, puns, neologisms, in short, all types of verbal conceits, drawn like the imagistic conceit from many areas of knowledge, can be seen to have entered into poetry through the symbolists. Rimbaud could say, "Ithyphalliques et pioupiesques, / Leur quolibets l'ont dépravé / ... O flots abracadabrantesques" ("Le Cœur volé"); Laforgue, "Étangs aveugles, lacs ophtalmiques, fontaines / ... Oasis, solfatares, cratères éteints, / Arctiques sierras, cataractes l'air en zinc" ("Climat, faune et flore"); and Corbière, "Je dors sous ma calotte, / La calotte des cieux / Et l'étoile pâlotte / Clignotte entre mes yeux" ("Bohême de chic"). This, while Mallarmé applied his rigorous talent in another direction, that of "donner un sens plus pur aux mots de la tribu." Incantation, words of strange weight and independent life, evoked by "un mirage interne des mots mêmes," was his aim: "Le vers qui de plusieurs vocables refait un mot total, neuf, étranger à la langue et comme incantatoire, achève cet isolement de la parole ...":[26]

> Hyperbole! de ma mémoire
> Triomphalement ne sais-tu
> Te lever, aujourd'hui grimoire ...

Both verbal conceit and incantation are to be found extensively in Miss Sitwell's verse. It would be cumbersome to list here all the jewels, stones, musical terms, raiments, flowers, birds, trees, herbs, and various creatures, real and mythical, that populate her world.[27] Even the proper names she uses reflect this taste for variousness and

[25] Allen Tate, *On the Limits of Poetry* (New York, 1948), pp. 75-86.

[26] "Avant-Dire," quoted by Henri Michaud, *La Doctrine symboliste* (Paris, 1947), p. 26.

[27] Ramsey isolates an essential trait of symbolism when he writes (*op. cit.*, p. 6): "From Baudelaire onward, poets gave a prominent place to jewels, metals, stony, treeless landscapes, and such 'dehumanized' imagery."

eccentricity: Myrhalline, Justice Mompesson, Mrs. Behemoth, Bohea, Pomona, Malinn, Don Pasquito, Manuccia, Peregrine, Eupompe, Pistillarine, and many others. More apropos, perhaps, are the following instances: "Dives of the paleocrystic heart" ("The Song of the Cold"); "... the Megatherium Mylodon / Lies buried under Mastodon—trumpetings of leprous Suns" ("The Shadow of Cain"); "Pelongs, bulchauls, pallampores" ("The Sleeping Beauty"); "The wind's bastinado / Whipt on the calico / Skin of the Macaroon / And the black Picaroon" ("The Wind's Bastinado"). And side by side with these verbal conceits there are passages of remarkable purity and sonority, passages in which Mallarmé's advice of ceding the initiative to words is carried out, though perhaps short of the limit he sometimes dangerously exceeded:

> "After the terrible rain, the Annunciation"—
> The bird blood in the veins that has changed to emeralds
> Answered the bird-call ...
> Men said I was the primal Fall,
> That I gave him the world of spring and of youth like an apple
> And the orchards' emerald lore—
> And sin lay at the core.
>
> ("Anne Boleyn's Song")

The passage raises questions of versification. Informed as the symbolist tradition is by the spirit of experimentation,[28] it was to be expected that the desire to work out a language more organic and complex should lead to the use of free or freed verse, slant rhymes, auditory conceits, conversational rhythms, and highly intricate sound patterns. Mallarmé, as usual, formulates the question aptly:

> ... ce qui explique les récentes innovations, c'est qu'on a compris que l'ancienne forme du vers était non pas la forme absolue, unique est immuable ... Le vers est partout dans la langue où il y a rythme ... Mais, en vérité, il n'y a pas de prose: il y a l'alphabet, et puis des vers plus ou moins serrés, plus ou moin diffus.[29]

Baudelaire's *Petits poèmes en prose*, Rimbaud's *Illuminations*, Mallarmé's "L'Après-midi d'un faune" and "Un Coup de dés," Laforgue's *Derniers vers*, open a new way in metrics which the imagists used and abused, and which the best of modern poets have richly exploited. But it is well to keep in mind that both Mallarmé and Edith Sitwell, the one in his letters to Gustave Kahn and Cazalis, the other in such critical works as *Poetry and Criticism* and "Experiment in Poetry," do not accept free verse without qualifications and are only prepared to defend the best of it—the "best" Miss Sitwell characterizes as having "just as much organic form (form arising from the properties of the

[28] Lehman has astutely observed that symbolist aesthetic has established "a positive link with our day," mainly through its "critical preoccupation with language as such in the widest sense—the artist's peculiar field." See A. G. Lehman, *The Symbolist Aesthetic in France, 1885-1895* (Oxford, 1950), p. 14.

[29] Jules Huret, *Enquête sur l'évolution littéraire* (Paris, 1913), p. 57.

material) as any other verse."[30] The passage cited from "Anne Boleyn's Song" evinces, in its pliant beauty, that quality of free verse which Miss Sitwell has described as having a "strong and lovely movement." So conceived, free verse introduces the idea of a rhythmic unit and of a strophe regulated by a self-sufficient movement of thought. Enjambment and cæsura can no longer be accepted as awkward necessities, but rather as elective devices intended for special effects to be witnessed in such early free-verse poems as Rimbaud's "Marine" and "Mouvement," Laforgue's "L'Hiver qui vient" and "Légende des trois cors." To this idea of meaning and rhythm, of a "strong and lovely movement" both functional and adaptable, the syntax of verse must submit without recourse to mawkish poetic inversions or jarring transpositions necessitated by rhymes. What liberties the poet takes with syntax—the example of Mallarmé is signal—he takes with the unique requirements of each poem in mind. Syntax becomes more nearly a criticism of content, a principle of imaginative rather than logical organization; it can absorb the stream of consciousness or it can modulate the presentational effect of lines like:

> The ice, weeping, breaks.
> But my heart is underground.
> And the ice of its dead tears melts never. Wakes
> No sigh, no sound...
> ("The Ghost Whose Lips Were Warm")

Symbolist experiments with the auditory appeal of verse were further carried to rhyme itself. What we now call slant rhymes, consonantal and assonantal rhymes, were considered by the French poets as a means of suggesting relationships within the poem that a more direct and emphatic rhyme might obscure. Hence Laforgue's "rime à la diable": "âme" and "femme," "personne" and "automne," "falotte" and "stoppe," and the flippancy of "Ah, la belle pleine Lune, / Grosse comme une fortune." "S'il n'est pas très strict sur le chapitre de la rime," Ruchon remarks, "c'est qu'il reconnaît en elle un élément de 'déviation' de la pensée, et il essaie d'y échapper, car la vérité de son émotion lui importe plus que tout."[31] And so with Rimbaud: "sentinelle" and "nulle," "élans" and "selon," "feuilles" and "volaille"; and with Edith Sitwell: "bear" and "purr," "chain" and "men," "gone" and "bone," "fall" and "apple," "red" and "blood," etc. Banter, whimsy, innuendo, acerbity, humor, can be evoked by rhyme no less than by metaphor. Assonance and dissonance and alliteration are in the service of the same cause. Miss Sitwell's experiments in *Façade* provide conspicuous examples. It is not necessary to enter into a detailed examination of her notions on texture and tempo, the "weight" of syllables

[30] Edith Sitwell, "Experiment in Poetry" in *Tradition and Experiment*, p. 93.
[31] François Ruchon, *Jules Laforgue* (Geneva, 1924), p. 194. See also Ramsey, *op. cit.*, pp. 97 f.

and the "color" of vowels and the "thickness" of consonants, to realize that her preoccupation with sounds and rhythms, and with the influence of various musical instruments on poetry, harks back to the symbolists (Mallarmé's *La Musique et les lettres* and *Divagations* are rich in insights on the subject).

One feature of modern verse which is the product of such experimentation with sound and texture is the auditory conceit. It is a feature that we like to attribute to the influence of Hopkins rather than the French symbolists. But, whoever may have the original claim to it, the technique, which attempts to do for sounds what the verbal conceit does for reference, has fixed itself firmly in the symbolist tradition. The play on dissonance and alliteration, the implausible orchestration of notes, is obvious in Laforgue's "A voir vos noces de sexes livrés à la grosse, / Courir en valsant vers la fosse / Commune! . . . Pauvre race!" ("Pétition"); or in Corbière's "Tourne: nous sommes soûls! Et plats: Fais la cruelle! / Cravache ton pacha, ton humble serviteur!" ("Feminin singulier"); or in Mallarmé's "Abolit bibelot d'inanité sonore" ("Ses purs ongles très haut . . ."). And Miss Sitwell is not to be outdone: "That hobnailed goblin, the bobtailed Hob, / Said, 'It is time I began to rob'" ("Country Dance"); "Among the pheasant-feathered corn the unicorn has torn, forlorn . . ." ("Fox Trot"); "the azoic azure / Calls to the sphinxes of the silence . . ." ("The Road to Thebes," II).

The preceding analysis of modes of poetic expression in the symbolist tradition, while it does not claim such modes to be its exclusive property, points to the specific nature of the relationship between a modern poet, who is neither Pound nor Eliot, and the French symbolists. Possibly we have grown too accustomed to the qualities of modern poetry, which appeared radical enough three decades ago, to realize the full individuality of the poetic orientation at work in the neosymbolist tradition. And possibly we are making too much of the identity of such a tradition, considering that Shakespeare and Racine do not entirely remain aloof from it. The fact remains that in particular techniques, in recognizable attitudes, in the very conception of poetry as a highly complex, organic, experimental, and *formal* medium calling for active reader participation, the poets of our time have advertised their interest in certain poets of the past. The rationale of the symbolist tradition is no more than the concretion in language of that peculiar interest. And what I have tried to show of Miss Sitwell's situation with respect to French symbolism is no more than a partial definition of Eliot's historical notion that literature continually renews itself by going back to its sources, and by assimilating influences from abroad.[32]

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[32] *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture*, p. 113.

BENEDETTO CROCE AND THE RECENT POETICS OF ORGANICISM

MURRAY KRIEGER

IT IS PERHAPS surprising that the name of Benedetto Croce is rarely mentioned in connection with the most influential group of American literary critics in the past several decades, the so-called "new critics," either by the critics themselves or by their commentators. On the other hand, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who is an earlier and somewhat less articulate organicist and idealist, is frequently cited in relation to them. It is not my intention here,[1] however, to reveal hitherto undisclosed evidences of the indebtedness of these critics to Croce;[2] it is rather to claim that certain tendencies in the work of many of them were anticipated by Croce and that the theoretical atmosphere was cleared for them by his daring, if not reckless, pronouncements as aesthetician. To the student of modern critical theory the establishment of such a relationship should be helpful, since in Croce he can find a systematic thinker who does not shrink from the consequences of his sometimes startling claims. Thus the student may focus with some clarity upon a pure strain unmixed with the random eclecticism which seems to make much of current theory extremely elusive.

While it is true that in some areas Croce's views have been far from constant, as René Wellek has carefully pointed out in his rich farewell tribute to Croce,[3] I do not intend to follow these views on their divergent and frequently baffling paths. Rather I shall assume Croce's to be a unitary position, capable of systematic extension—the position continually and justly ascribed to him by his defenders and attackers alike. It reveals itself in his theoretical work spaced as widely as the first edition of the *Estetica* of 1902 and *La poesia* of 1936. It is the position which insists on the integrity and untranslatability of the artistic intuition, and which defends this intuition against any violation by what Croce refers to as intellectualist errors.[4]

[1] In a slightly altered form this essay was read before the General Topics 1 (Poetics and Literary Theory) Group of the Modern Language Association on Dec. 27, 1954.

[2] One might, for example, point out the influence of Croce's American follower, J. E. Spingarn, in his *Creative Criticism* (New York, 1917).

[3] "Benedetto Croce: Literary Critic and Historian," *Comparative Literature*, V (1953), 75-82.

[4] For a concise general statement of this position, see Croce, "The Breviary of Aesthetic," *Rice Institute Pamphlets*, II (1915), 223-310. For a statement more specifically on intellectualism, see his *Aesthetic*, tr. Douglas Ainslie (London, 1922), pp. 32-38.

Nor do I intend to raise as a central issue the fundamental criticism of Croce's position—that his idealism necessarily fails to regard the medium of art as a sufficiently formative element in artistic creation, and thus as a sufficiently significant element in aesthetic analysis. Admittedly Croce insists that we do not have intuitions unless we can express them, that we are not all of us potential Raphaels who happen not to be blessed with his dexterity with paint and brush. But he insists also that the embodiment of the intuition is not a necessary part of its expression. We "externalize" only to communicate, or to prove—to ourselves, if not to others—that we have successfully managed our prior intuition.[5] From this, the spiritual and mental locus of the work of art, stems his indifference as critic to the observable relationships among its parts, since these parts constitute only its material reflection but not the intuition itself. If he were to regard the work as inhering in them, Croce believed, he would be converted from his idealism to the materialism he scorns. But we need not press this by now common objection[6] to his insistence on the inward essence of the aesthetic object, since it is precisely in this insistence that he is farthest from our recent organic theorists. The latter—and I am thinking of writers like Eliot, Tate, Brooks, many of those we loosely term as "new critics"[7]—do see the primacy of the medium; in fact they maintain their organicism only to be able to talk, often in intensely analytic detail, about the discoverable mutual interrelationships which make up the objective entity they think of as the poetic organism. Thus these critics must have transformed Croce's ideas considerably if they ever had been influenced by him. But, despite this central difference between them, it is what they have in common with Croce that characterizes the unique orientation of their work.

It is true, after all, that Coleridge himself, an admittedly crucial

[5] See, for example, *Aesthetic*, pp. 111-114.

[6] See, for example, S. Alexander, *Beauty and Other Forms of Value* (London, 1933), p. 57; and René Wellek and Austin Warren, *Theory of Literature* (New York, 1949), p. 80.

[7] As just a few typical examples of the organicism displayed by these critics, see T. S. Eliot, *The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1933), pp. 21-22; Allen Tate, "Tension in Poetry" and "Three Types of Poetry" in *On the Limits of Poetry* (New York, 1948), pp. 75-90, 91-114; Cleanth Brooks, "The Heresy of Paraphrase" in *The Well Wrought Urn* (New York, 1947), pp. 176-196. As one can readily point out in Eliot, some of these critics are at times anything but organic in their approach. But even John Crowe Ransom, who usually opposes explicitly the kind of integrity which organicism would impose on the poem, reveals himself as rather in accord with it at a few crucial points in his work. See "Poetry: a Note on Ontology" in *The World's Body* (New York, 1938), pp. 111-142; "Wanted: an Ontological Critic" in *The New Criticism* (Norfolk, Conn., 1941), pp. 314-316. As I have suggested, it is perhaps just the insight he provides into this wavering in their attitude which makes as unshakeably consistent a theorist as Croce so valuable to the student of contemporary poetics.

influence, in his all-important concept of imagination saw poetry more as an inner vision than as a skillfully formed objective structure.[8] Yet, while his idealism may have necessitated certain changes to be worked upon his theory by the new critics, it hardly prevented its being used. And Croce is more consistently and more self-consciously, if more self-defeatingly, an organicist than was Coleridge, in that he more steadfastly guards the integrity of the poem, its inviolability. We constantly see Coleridge's famous, if not altogether transparent, definitions of *imagination* and *fancy* quoted or at least referred to. Yet these, after all, reflect only terms of a rather primitive psychology. We hear much less frequently of Croce's definitions of *symbol* and *allegory*, which immediately strike us as much more precise, much more directly involved with the task of literary criticism, and, by this day, much more familiar in their theoretical orientation. Indeed they would seem to constitute an epigraph to much of what passes for the new criticism.

> ... the *symbol* has sometimes been given as the essence of art. Now, if the symbol be conceived as inseparable from the artistic intuition, it is a synonym for the intuition itself, which always has an ideal character. There is no double bottom to art, but one only; in art all is symbolical, because all is ideal. But if the symbol be conceived as separable—if the symbol can be on one side, and on the other the thing symbolized, we fall back again into the intellectualist error: the so-called symbol is the exposition of an abstract concept, an *allegory*; it is science, or art aping science.[9]

It is this fundamental claim that every poem is utterly unique or *sui generis* that Croce holds in common with much of our recent literary theory. We can, for example, observe many modern critics using terms quite similar to Croce's symbol and allegory in their analysis (derived with certain modifications from I. A. Richards) of tenor-vehicle relationships in the metaphor. Of course, as we have seen, in Croce it is the indissoluble intuition of the inner vision that gives to the poem its unique status, its inviolable quality which renders it unapproachable by any language other than that created by the irrepeatable intuition. For our recent theorists, on the other hand, with their intense concern for the poetic behavior of language (for Croce, merely the material aspect of the work), it is the controlled and controlling poetic context which creates the poem and fashions it into an untranslatable entity. Thus the poem somehow becomes an activated organism which generates itself; the self-contained system of language that comes to be the realized poem is created in response to the demands of

[8] Much the same point can be made about Henri Bergson, another extreme organicist, who, by way of his follower, T. E. Hulme, is also commonly said to be an important philosophical influence on these critics. As it is for Croce, the crucial term for Bergson is *intuition*, although, of course, the two use the term somewhat differently. See my essay, "The Ambiguous Anti-Romanticism of T. E. Hulme," *ELH*, XX (1953), 300-314.

[9] *Aesthetic*, p. 34.

its immanent *telos*. It seals itself off from the worlds of other contexts through the mutually inhibiting complexities of language which prevent any of its individual terms from reaching out beyond it.

In their firm differentiation between poetry and other modes of discourse these critics are at one with Croce. Like him they resist the betrayal of the individual poem which they feel must result if its unique features are made more general—that is, if it is adapted to fit an ideological interest, an interest in the history of literary development, or an interest in a theory of classes. They might very well stand with him in approval of E. F. Carritt's terse and paradoxical summary of the Crocean position: "Beauty is a universal which contains individuals but no species."[10] It is in accordance with this predisposing view that, like Croce, they would reject such recent critical tendencies as the neohumanists with their moralistic interest, the literary historicists with their interest in the common features of historically related works, and the Neo-Aristotelians with their interest—stemming from a theory of classes—in the common features of structurally related works. To some of the so-called new critics, and to Croce, these tendencies necessarily appear as various forms of intellectualist error, all of which work violence upon the unique properties of the poetic context and upon the unique mode of discourse which poetry constitutes—or ought I to say more nominalistically, the unique modes of discourse which poems constitute?

Now it is perhaps true that, in the interest of establishing their consistency, I have pushed the claims of our recent contextual theorists farther than they themselves commonly do. Most of them do not urge their case as strongly or as consistently as does Croce, or in his extreme and uncompromising fashion. But this is perhaps part of Croce's value for the student of modern poetics—that he is an organicist who unflinchingly accepts the consequences to which his organic claims commit him. It may be tempting to argue that our recent contextual theorists do not mean to maintain so unqualified an organicism. But it is difficult to see how they can at once qualify it and insist on the autonomy of the poem, charging any translation, however cautious, of the terms in the poetic context with "the heresy of paraphrase."

The Crocean critic, it is true, can, by an act of intuition similar to that of the poet if not spiritually identical with it, "reproduce" the work in himself.[11] To the extent, however, that he is a judge considering the aesthetic efficacy with which the parts contribute to the work's totality, the critic, if he is to be consistently Crocean, can only stand in speechless admiration before the completely successful poem—one in which there is no nonpoetry to be separated from the poetry. For he knows

[10] *The Theory of Beauty* (London, 1928), p. 256.
[11] *Aesthetic*, pp. 118-121.

that in using any words of his own he risks abusing the poem by misrepresenting the language of its context. Yet this dead end of practical criticism seems hardly to be the aim of the more contextual of modern critics, whose work has been distinguished by its painstaking detail of scrupulous verbal analysis. In contrast to their impressionistic predecessors, they have insisted that literary greatness is something to be talked about and to be demonstrated objectively.[12]

There are, of course, those among them who are more conscious of the critical limitations imposed by their position. These critics may claim that they always maintain a special alertness to the difference between the work of art and the work of criticism, so that the latter can never be taken to be an easy substitute for the former. Rather the work of criticism is to be offered tentatively and with humility as a well-meaning guide through the well-plotted maze to which it points. It is merely to indicate rewarding configurations among the poem's internal relations, since it dares do little more about them. If they are told that this is not a very satisfying objective for criticism, these critics can only insist meekly that it is the best they can do without violating the art which is in their keeping. In practice, however, even the more modest seem to go considerably beyond the severe boundaries of critical discourse to which their contextual theory ought to restrict them.

The contextual critic, then, is confronted by a serious dilemma. On the one hand, there is the need to maintain the context as self-contained, that is, the need to keep out any meaning not necessitated by the organic and closed system of mutual interrelations among the terms which make up the context. If the terms have a simple referential responsibility, then the context has been infringed upon by dictates which do not grow from within but are imposed from without, from a general world of meanings which existed prior to—and still exists independently of—the growth of this unique system. The context can no longer prevent even the submissive reader from wrenching out parts of it and treating them atomistically by referring them to standards of other realms. The object of its allegiance now transcendent rather than immanent, the context can no longer control the reader by containment. Thus it is that the context, if it is to maintain the organic quality which brings it into existence, cannot contract any obligation which is not intramural. Otherwise at best the poem is not, as Yvor Winters, following Mallarmé, puts it, "a new word"[13] but merely a pretty synonym for old ones.

On the other hand, however, there is the difficulty—indeed, if we see language primarily as referential, the impossibility—of consistently

[12] One is tempted immediately to ask, however, what literary greatness might consist in, when ideally every poem must work for a greatness of a different kind—of its own kind.

[13] *In Defense of Reason* (New York, 1947), pp. 18-19.

maintaining an unqualified organicism. Our literary history continually reveals the enabling power which a vital literary tradition works upon the individual poet; our great critics, with their once-removed discourse about poems, have surely managed now and then to illuminate them for the rest of us; yet, in spite of all the evidence, the organicist must claim that the completely autonomous poetic context, one whose meaning is unique, *sui generis*, is also one which is utterly cut off from literary history as well as from literary criticism.[14] That is, it declares itself to be beyond comparison with all other poetic contexts and invulnerable to the commentary of the critic. If the critic is to do more than merely repeat the words of the poem, he must be forced into a language which is necessarily derived from a system of meanings other than that of the poetic context. Indeed "the heresy of paraphrase," with which contextual critics have commonly charged their less new-critical colleagues, may seem justly applicable to anyone—even a self-styled contextual critic—who tries to analyze a context, using as he must a language drawn from outside this context.

However, if we overlook evidences to the contrary, the outlawing of essential historical relationships in literature and of effective literary criticism, while surely posing some serious inconveniences, is not itself sufficient warrant for the rejection of an aesthetic which so legislates. Is it not, however, also likely that an utterly self-contained poetic context is cut off even from its potential reader? For he comes to this unique system, to the "new word," armed only with old words which can hardly be expected to pierce through to its untranslatable, incomparable meaning. How, with his old meanings, is he successfully to explore the new world of meanings which the poetic context supposedly encloses? And, if a theory cannot allow us our full experience of the poem, then indeed it would seem to be in serious difficulty.[15]

[14] We have seen that recent contextual theorists are, paradoxically, those who place great faith in the rigorous critical act. So too—and again despite the limitations imposed by their contextualism—it is they who are especially concerned about the place of tradition in poetry. This concern is reflected in the very titles of such works as Eliot's "Tradition and the Individual Talent" in *Selected Essays*, new ed. (New York, 1950), pp. 3-11, and Brooks's *Modern Poetry and the Tradition* (Chapel Hill, 1939).

[15] It would seem possible for the organicist to say that his theory—in setting ideal requirements for the perfect poem, one which can never exist really—does not frown on the chances for aesthetic experience or even on the prospects for criticism. For in dealing with an actual poem we could be allowed entry via those imperfections which, in restoring to language its normal duality, break open the closed contextual system that might have been. But a Croce never takes this way out. Within the terms of his Coleridgean distinction between the poetry and the nonpoetry in the poem, he does not permit the duality of the latter to offer a way into the integrity of the former. The critical task ends when the nonpoetry is revealed for what it is and the poetry is left in the glory of its untouchable purity. Recent contextualists are equally disdainful of imperfections and would hardly tolerate them to be indispensable to critical discourse or to aesthetic experience. And thus the problem of even experiencing the poetry remains.

The contextual theory, then, though felt by many modern critics to be utterly indispensable if they are adequately to explain their experience of poetry, would seem to carry with it many weighty burdens. Not the least of these, if one with the courage of Croce is willing to follow where his theory leads, is that it denies him the right to engage in the one activity for whose sake he bothers about theorizing—the detailed and effective criticism of specific works. Indeed, it makes it difficult for him to see how he can even experience these works fully. But the only alternative would be to break open the context; and this, we have seen, would be at least as costly, since it would end even more obviously in destroying the possibility of an aesthetic experience at the hands of the poem. Once open, the poetic context would be prey to an indiscriminate host of arbitrary meanings derived from other contexts. Poetry could not longer hold itself aloof from paraphrase; and thus, no longer free of the ordinary demands of reference, it would lose the one characteristic which could set it off from other modes of discourse.

Throughout the history of literary criticism, however, the theoretical approaches which have been pretty much in control have been those which would refer the language of poetry immediately to the world outside the work. Most of them have been clearly marked by a rigid dichotomy dividing the form of the work from its content. There has been something salutary in having our attention turned to the internal operations of poems considered as unique systems, even if this view should be equally extreme and equally partial. And for creating the atmosphere in which this approach could flourish and in which it could be extended in many and detailed ways by recent English and American theorists, probably no aesthetician has been more responsible than Croce. The critics who have most revolutionized our ways of looking upon poetry are those whose theoretical relations to Croce are most clearly discernible. Perhaps, through his obligations to systematic philosophy, Croce clung to his insight too tenaciously. But by so doing he dared occupy an extreme position, one which affords an instructive vantage point from which we may perceive the inadequacies of less clear-sighted theorists who share with Croce his aesthetic disposition.

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THE COMPOSITION OF GEORGE MOORE'S *A MODERN LOVER*

MILTON CHAIKIN

GEORGE MOORE'S first novel, *A Modern Lover* (1883), is of some significance in the history of English fiction. It was the first published English novel directly affected by the traditions of French realism. It marked the beginning of the fashion in England toward the end of the last century (and particularly in the 1890s) of looking to France for inspiration and guidance in the writing of narrative. It was the first considered departure from Victorian modes of fiction and the starting point of the transformation that has taken place in the English novel in the last sixty or seventy years.

An examination of the French influences upon *A Modern Lover,* therefore, should cast some light, not only on Moore's intentions, habits of writing, and achievements, but also indirectly on the nature of the change in English fiction that began at the end of the last century. Such an examination is made in the following pages.

Moore himself wrote of his novel: "'A Modern Lover' was the book of a young man who, in a moment of inspiration, hit upon an excellent anecdote, and being without the literary skill to unfold it, devised a strange text out of his memories of Balzac, Zola, and Goncourt."[1] Critics have been circumspect about this admission, for not all of Moore's statements about his sources and borrowings are reliable. But, though the appropriateness of the word "memories" may be brought into question, he was telling the truth this time. It is possible to trace many of the elements of *A Modern Lover* to their origins in Balzac's *Les Illusions perdues* (1839-42), the Goncourts' *Manette Salomon* (1867), and Zola's *La Curée* (1872).[2]

Moore announced his dependence upon the first of these novels (actually a trilogy) in the 1917 edition of *Confessions of a Young Man.* The statement occurs in a colloquy between "self" and "conscience": "*I*: 'But it is nonsense to suggest that Lewis Seymour is myself;... you know that my original notion was to do the side of Lucien de Rubempré that—' *Conscience*: 'That Balzac had the genius to leave

[1] Preface, *Lewis Seymour and Some Women* (New York, 1917), p. v.

[2] Moore referred to *Les Illusions perdues* three times in the third edition of *Confessions of a Young Man* (1917) and several times in other books. He wrote the preface to the first English translation of *La Curée,* entitled *The Rush for the Spoil* (1886), in which he called Zola's novel "a gorgeous, a golden poem" (p. vii). In *Avowals* (1919) he said of Edmond de Goncourt: "...for this last one I still have a leaning, and despite his foolish trivialities we remember Manette Salomon!" (New York, 1926, p. 257).

out.' "[3] The resemblance between Lewis Seymour, the hero of *A Modern Lover*, and Rubempré, the hero of *Les Illusions perdues*, is immediately apparent. Both characters are exceedingly handsome, hate poverty, love luxuries. Both are irresistibly attractive to the opposite sex. Each is an artist, Lucien a poet, Lewis a painter. Both are sponsored by wealthy and discontented older women; both attempt to seduce their respective patronesses.[4] In the second place, the themes of both novels are fundamentally alike—in each we have the betrayal of artistic ideals and the pursuit of unprincipled commercial success. And, finally, the framework of both novels is substantially the same—in each the hero progresses from obscure poverty to wealth and notoriety, and has a succession of associations with more or less devoted and helpful women.

Moore borrowed not only characters, theme, and framework from Balzac's novel. He borrowed numerous details as well; of these only two need be cited here. On first meeting the women who are to become their patronesses, both Lewis and Lucien are attractively timorous: "Lewis was more than timid . . . But Mrs. Bentham thought he looked divinely handsome . . ." "L'excessive beauté de Lucien, la timidité de ses manières, sa voix, tout en lui saisit madame de Bargeton." Both women become enamored of their handsome young protégés, but attempt to disguise their feelings. Lucy Bentham "hid her heart in a vague maternal sentiment. . ." In Balzac's story, "Pendant deux mois, il vit en elle une bienfaitrice qui allait s'occuper de lui maternellement."[5]

If Lewis is more odious than Lucien, it is because attributes were borrowed for him from two other characters in French fiction. Lewis' opportunism in his relationship with women was modeled upon that of the painter Garnotelle in *Manette Salomon*. Garnotelle owes his high position as a portrait painter to his social relationships with women of the upper class. Like him, Lewis "succeeded through women." "It dawned upon him . . . that perhaps some part of the success in his life was owing to the assistance he had received from women" (*AML*, pp. 260, 270).

Lewis' femininity is also more exaggerated than Lucien's; Lewis

[3] New York, 1917, p. 249. Subsequent references are to this edition.

[4] The resemblance explains the otherwise puzzling similarity of Lewis Seymour and Georges Duroy, the hero of Maupassant's *Bel-Ami* (1885). Balzac's work was the source of both Maupassant's novel and Moore's. See Olin H. Moore, "Literary Relationships of Guy de Maupassant," *MP*, XV (1918), 141-158. It is of course likely that there was a living, as well as a literary, model for Lewis Seymour, one who may have stimulated Moore to conceive the novel and its chief character. Marshall, of the *Confessions*, is the most frequently mentioned person in this connection. Both Marshall and Lewis Seymour were mediocre artists, successful lovers, and unscrupulous opportunists.

[5] *A Modern Lover* (New York, n.d.), pp. 60, 73; *Les Illusions perdues* (Paris, 1879), pp. 174-175, 178. Subsequent references to Moore's novel are to the edition cited here, and the abbreviation *AML* is used instead of the full title.

has a touch of the "tempérament neutre" characteristic of Maxime Saccard, one of the leading figures of *La Curée*. The following parallels illustrate this resemblance:

A great deal of money was also spent in scent, powder, nail polishers.

... there was nothing this young man loved like looking after his body. Then he dried, powdered, and scented himself with care...

... he could lace the body of her dress far better than her maid, and, as if by instinct, his fingers divined the use of the pins and the hooks and eyes [*AML*, pp. 47, 59, 240].

Cet étrange avorton, qui, pendant les classes d'anglais, lisait les prospectus que son parfumeur lui addressait tous les vendredis... Il se soignait beaucoup les mains, qu'il avait minces et longues...

Ce fut Maxime qui déshabilla Renée. Il s'entendait à ces choses, et ses mains agiles devinaient les épingles, couraient autour de sa taille avec une science native.[6]

Moore attenuated the overheated quality of *La Curée* considerably in writing *A Modern Lover,* but enough warmth remains to warrant Arnold Bennett's description of the novel as "somewhat rank in its luxuriance."[7] Zolaesque voluptuousness is evident particularly in the use of odors to convey a rich atmosphere of love:

... and the quick movement of the fans wafted forward an odor of shoulders and sachet-scented pocket handkerchiefs [*AML*, p. 174].

Des éventails battaient lentement, comme des ailes, jetant à chaque souffle, dans l'air alangui, les parfums musqués des corsages [*LC*, p. 41].[8]

But Moore learned more than eroticism and lushness from Zola. He learned from him also a narrative technique he was to use in several of his early novels. In *Confessions of a Young Man* he made special mention of certain features of Zola's art:

I... had been much impressed... also by the immense harmonic development of the idea; and the fugal treatment of the different scenes had seemed to me astonishingly new—the washhouse, for example; the fight motive is indicated, then follows the development of side issues, then comes the fight motive explained; it is broken off short, it flutters through a web of progressive detail, the fight motive is again taken up, and now it is worked out in all its fulness; it is worked up to *crescendo*, another side issue is introduced, and again the theme is given forth [pp. 95-96].

This musical mode of development, involving repetition and variation of motifs, Moore applied to several of the sequences in *A Modern Lover*. One is that of the carriage drive in Paris before Mrs. Bentham submits to Lewis, concocted out of a number of passages in *La Curée*. Moore not

[6] *La Curée* (Paris, 1927), pp. 103, 181. All subsequent references to this novel are to this edition, and the abbreviation *LC* is used instead of the full title.

[7] *Fame and Fiction* (London, 1901), p. 245.

[8] For further examples of this device, see *AML*, pp. 12, 58, 64, 65, 184, 234, and *LC*, pp. 108, 143, 170.

only borrowed the method, but he did not hesitate to translate some of the details and language from the source into his own book:

The tepid aid was as soft and luxurious silk on their faces, and the swing of the swiftly rolling carriage treacherously rocked to quietude all uneasy thoughts... The swaying of the carriage had rocked their bodies as their thoughts to one sweet glowing sensation . . . their thoughts and bodies swayed by the motion of the carriage, they watched deliciously the flashing and gleaming of the thousand lights that moved around them, seeing nothing distinctly but the round back of the coachman as he sat, his shoulders set... Mrs. Bentham looked despairingly at the round shoulders, which remained as impassive as an obelisk. The two buttons in the middle of the maroon-colored coat glistened in the light of a gas-lamy... [*AML*, pp. 116, 123, 118, 125].

La caléche... eut une oscillation qui pénétra Maxime d'une volupté vague ... Le bercement souple de la calèche etait une hésitation de plus qui l'empêchait de formuler son envie. Et une tentation immense montait de ce vague, de ces taillis que l'ombre endormait aux deux bords de l'allée, de ce bruit de roues et de cette oscillation molle qui l'emplissait d'une torpeur délicieuse... tandis qu'elle regardait fixement le dos rond du valet de pied assis sur le siège... Et, plus haut, en plein dans la clarté rousse qui les éclairait par derrière, et qui faisait luire les boutons de cuivre de leurs capotes à demi pliées... le cocher et le valet de pied... se tenaient raides... [*LC*, pp. 14, 17, 7].

Moore also applied the "fugal" treatment to his description of a ball in *A Modern Lover*. The theme of the ball is announced; then the reader's attention is directed away to specific characters and specific incidents; then the ensemble effect is brought forward again; and so on back and forth until a crescendo is reached—in a passage which is a rather faithful translation from the French:

The different couples rocked a little as they advanced up and down. The different costumes came and went in a confusion of bright stuffs; the rhythm, after having mixed and carried away the colors, suddenly brought back on certain notes the same rose satin skirt, the same blue velvet bodice, next the same black coats. Then, like a shower of fireworks, they all disappeared up the room, and so on, hour after hour [*AML*, pp. 182-183].

Le large balancement des couples allait et venait, emplissait la longue galerie, sautant sous le fouet des cuivres, se balançant au bercement des violons, Les costumes, ce flot de femmes... roulaient, avec un fourmillement, une bigarrure d'étoffes vives. Le rhythme, après avoir mêlé et emporté les couleurs, dans un tohu-bohu cadencé, ramenait brusquement, à certains coups d'archet, la même tunique de satin rose, le même corsage de velours bleu, à côté du même habit noir [*LC*, p. 264].

Moore's faithfulness to his source is attested to by other striking translations from the original:

As Lady Helen walked up the long carpet of the stairs voluptuously soft beneath her feet, she saw herself rising out of the glass. She looked at her arms and shoulders, and wondered whether any of the beauties she had heard so much of were whiter than she.

Renée montait, et, à chaque marche, elle grandissait dans la glace; elle se demandait, avec ce doute des actrices les plus applaudies, si elle était vraiment délicieuse, comme on le lui disait.

She was really divine. Upon a white tulle skirt garnished behind with a flow of flounces, she wore a body of green satin bordered with English lace; a single flounce completed the front of her dress, which was trimmed with bunches and garlands of ivy. The body was cut low, and showed her immaculately white shoulders, now entirely developed and full of exquisite plenitudes and undulating lines [*AML*, pp. 172, 172-173].

Elle était vraiment divine. Sur une première jupe de tulle, garnie, derrière, d'un flot de volants, elle portait une tunique de satin vert tendre, bordée d'une haute dentelle d'Angleterre, relevée et attachée par de grosses touffes de violettes; un seul volant garnissait le devant de la jupe, où des bouquets de violettes, reliés par des guirlandes de lierre, fixaient une légère draperie de mousseline [*LC*, pp. 22-23, 25].[9]

These passages are only a few of the many that could be presented to demonstrate Moore's debt to Zola. However, *A Modern Lover* is not a naturalistic novel. Zola's influence is confined to the texture of the prose and to the atmosphere of the story; but it is considerable. As a consequence, Moore's novel manifests the richest effects of language and the subtlest observation of scene and mood. From the beginning, Moore strove for intensity of expression, for the "very ozmazome of art," to use his own phrase.[10] He had studied the styles of Flaubert and the Goncourts; but he was particularly impressed with that of Zola. And from Zola particularly he learned to look upon a scene with the eye of an artist, to discriminate patterns of color, the quality of daylight, the texture of the sky, and variegated effects of light and shadow. From him he learned to perceive the savor of atmosphere, subtle fragrances, nuances of feeling, all that is rare in the world apprehensible to the senses. And he learned to record these observations in the characteristically luxuriant descriptive language of the "master."[11]

A Modern Lover, on the whole, is a synthetic product, which gives evidence of ingenuity in joinery work and of an unblushing derivative-

[9] For further parallels, see *AML*, p. 186, and *LC*, p. 278; *AML*, p. 188, and *LC*, p. 275; *AML*, p. 190, and *LC*, pp. 287-288; *AML*, p. 244, and *LC*, pp. 141, 142; *AML*, p. 58, and *LC*, p. 187; *AML*, p. 181, and *LC*, pp. 264-265; *AML*, p. 236 and *LC*, p. 14. This is not an exhaustive catalogue, by any means, but it does include some of the more obvious imitations.

[10] *Confessions*, p. 225.

[11] Of course, Zola himself had studied the styles of Flaubert and the Goncourts with great profit, as Moore realized in a few years. See *Confessions*, p. 96.

ness.[12] It will not stand up under scrutiny. But it does have historical importance, in the fact that it introduced French methods of fiction to England: minute examination of detail, brilliant evocation of scene, contrived methods of development, attention to pattern, consciousness of language, psychological realism, and exposure of the obscure corners of man's being.

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[12] The reader may remember what Yeats wrote about another book by Moore: "I found that certain of our enemies were passing round some article in a monthly review, pointing out the plagiarisms in his *Modern Painting*, and I, not knowing how well-founded the attack was, had suggested a reply. 'The man I object to,' said Moore, 'is the man who plagiarizes without knowing it; I always know; I took ten pages.' To Lady Gregory he said, 'We both quote well, but you always put inverted commas, I never do.'" *The Autobiography of William Butler Yeats* (New York, 1938), p. 383.

BOOK REVIEWS

JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU ET LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE DE SON TEMPS. By Robert Derathé. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950. xiv, 463 p.

One of the few matters on which most Rousseau scholars would be likely to agree is that his eminent literary reputation has depended not only upon evident magic of rhetoric and apparent righteousness of cause but also upon enduring subtlety of meaning which has thus far successfully resisted all attempts at definitive formulation. The eighteenth century conceded to Jean-Jacques the eloquence of his rhetoric; the Revolution and the early nineteenth, the justice of his cause; and it has fallen to the twentieth to attest to the ambiguity of his intellectual intentions. Even the critics who have agreed with him that, despite his verbal confusions, his meaning was integral have disagreed sharply among themselves as to precisely what he did mean. To be sure, it has been a general convention of method since Lanson's classic essay to assume Rousseau's unity and then to seek it, but it has been a matter of equally general practice, as Cassirer indicated in the great debate of 1932, to seek it in different places. The result has been that Everyman has become his own historian of Rousseau and has made of him either patron saint or devil's advocate of controversial causes according to the lights and the idols of the historian. There is scarcely wisdom or folly so extreme that it has not at one time or other been accounted with textual justification to the citizen of Geneva by renowned authority. And, despite the new idols which the ismic spirit will unfailingly conjure up for the future, it can be said for the present that most of the possible interpretations of Jean-Jacques have long since been proposed and that the problem now is largely a problem of choice.

Fully cognizant of its long tradition of disagreement, Rousseau scholarship since World War II has been marked most conspicuously by the absence of direct and formal confrontations of the great questions of debate. Intellectual and psychological portraits have been lengthened and backgrounds more carefully filled in, not with the intention of avoiding the larger issues but rather of presenting them in hitherto unexamined or only partially examined contexts. Such a major contribution to the interpretation of Rousseau is Professor Robert Derathé's monumental study of Rousseau and the political thought of his time, challenging as it does the fundamental view of Rousseau's place in the history of political thought which has been generally accorded to him since the publication of Charles E. Vaughan's two volumes of *The Political Writings* in 1915.

While comparative scholarship on Rousseau is in itself not new, it has not been systematic, and it is the distinction of Derathé's study that it constitutes the largest as well as the most meticulous synthesis which we have on the subject. The charge is neither uncommon nor wholly unjustified that the comparative scholar in the past has sometimes been strong of imagination and weak of judgment, keen to remark similarities but slow to perceive differences. Furthermore, he has sometimes made irrelevant comparisons. He has interpreted Rousseau in the light of Kantianism, Hegelianism, Socialism, or Nazism, as if Rousseau were responsible for all that had been read into him as well as out of him. Professor Derathé's study scrupulously avoids all such comparisons of doubtful propriety. He is concerned with Rousseau's ascertainable intellectual ancestors, not with his questionable progeny, and he sees him as the scholarly son of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century jurisprudence rather than as the prodigal father of innumerable nineteenth- and twentieth-century ideologies. His approach is

that of the semanticist. He examines systematically the meanings attributed to the crucial terms of the eighteenth-century political vocabulary by the authorities of the time, with whose works Rousseau was demonstrably acquainted. And, having established the respective views of Grotius, Pufendorf, Barbeyrac, Burlamaqui, Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu on such matters as the state of nature, natural law, social contract, and political sovereignty, he then examines Rousseau's views of the doctrines of his teachers. The result of this inquiry constitutes a *dictionaire raisonné* of Rousseau's political system which will remain indispensable to all who are curious of the meaning of Rousseau's social and political ideas.

To those who may suspect that the craft of the *sourcier* is a device for belittling great thinkers, it should perhaps be made clear at the outset that Professor Derathé has complete respect for Rousseau's own conception of his relation to his sources. In the account given of his early education in the *Confessions*, Rousseau tells us that, even though much of his reading went into his storehouse of memory unexamined, no one had ever come forth to accuse him of marketing stolen goods. The results of Professor Derathé's study in no way detract from Rousseau's originality but, on the contrary, fully confirm Rousseau's claim that the terms of his dictionary, though compiled from the public domain, rarely have the publicly accepted meanings. His views on the basis of sovereignty, for example, were common to most of the natural law school of thinkers before him, but Rousseau's great contribution to eighteenth-century political thinking lay precisely in his refusal to follow his schoolmasters in transferring forthwith the exercise of sovereignty to sovereigns responsible only to God and the unwritten laws of Heaven. Similarly his formulae for the state of nature, the law of nature, the basis of obligation and of political authority, though poured into the old bottles, were new concoctions. Rousseau, as he himself well knew, had the reformer's *fureur de se distinguer*, and when he wrote in defense of truth, as Derathé has astutely observed, he almost always defended it knowingly against someone else.

Derathé, like Rousseau himself, finds his way discriminatingly among the authorities of previous disputes. He follows Beaulavon against Masson in his general conception of Rousseau's rationalism. He follows Spink against Rousseau on the latter's claim that Geneva had been the source of his *Contrat social*. He seconds Hubert's nomination of Pufendorf as the most frequent direct source of Rousseau's political thought. And, in the elaboration of the most important of his interpretations, he follows Haymann against Vaughan on the question of Rousseau's view of natural law. Few scholars are likely to dispute the merit of his presentation of most of these issues, for their elaboration has been known for some time. His disagreement with Vaughan, however, poses indirectly the central question of the meaning of Rousseau as a political thinker. It is of such importance that Professor Alfred Cobban, who shared Vaughan's basic interpretation in his *Rousseau and the Modern State*, has announced that he has been convinced by Derathé's evidence of the untenability of his former position.[1] The proposition is now conclusively demonstrated, Cobban believes, "that in spite of everything Rousseau's political theory belongs to the rationalist, individualist, liberal and utilitarian eighteenth century." Since it is mainly Derathé's resolution of the natural law question in its relation to Rousseau's conception of sovereignty which prompts this revision of opinion, his analysis would seem to merit more attention than it has so far received.

In the *Inégalité*, as Derathé shows, Rousseau went to considerable trouble to refute all the currently accepted definitions of natural law. Locke and the

[1] "New Light on the Political Thought of Rousseau," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXVI (1951), 284.

classical thinkers, he continued, had erred in supposing man by nature to be a moral philosopher. Hobbes, on the other hand, who had seen this defect of most modern definitions of the concept, had been equally wrong in attributing to natural man the psychology of the wolf, which according to Rousseau had been born not of the forest but of the city. Hobbes was a sophist and a blasphemer, and Rousseau clearly regarded him at this point as a defender of civilization against nature. The state of nature, Rousseau held, was not a state of war such as Hobbes had pictured it, precisely because natural man was not the monster of civilization. His needs were simple, and his psychology devoid of the aggressiveness of the city. Natural inequalities of wit, strength, and cunning were of no great effect, and, in any case, men seldom met. The state of nature according to Rousseau's definition—and herein lay the arbitrary transformation of the argument which permitted him his triumphant flourishes of irony and rhetoric—was a state of isolation. On the rare occasions when men did meet, it was conceivable that they quarreled, but this was of little importance. If a man were chased from one tree, he could always go climb another; for after all nature had been bountiful. But from a juridical point of view, as Derathé properly points out (p. 108), Rousseau's state of nature was as anarchic as Hobbes's. Its peace was circumstantial and precarious because all men had an equal right to all they could get. Rousseau had indeed answered the second part of the Academy's question; but his answer, instead of being inspired by the texts of the School, had been learned from the heresies of Hobbes and Spinoza. "L'inégalité morale . . .," he concluded, "est contraire au droit naturel toutes les fois qu'elle ne concourt pas en même proportion avec l'inégalité physique." And, although Rousseau implied that there might be other definitions of natural law, Montaigne's three cannibals, whom he then cites, were obviously not appealing to eternal verities of right reason.

Against Vaughan's claim that Rousseau "sweeps away the idea of Natural Law, root and branch" and that "it is conspicuously absent from the *Discours sur l'inégalité*," Derathé and Haymann rightly insist that the term occurs repeatedly throughout the discourse. They are further justified in citing Rousseau's principle of pity, which, together with the principle of self-preservation, constituted what Rousseau called the "instinctive natural law" of the state of nature. But we know too that Rousseau subjected his "principle of pity" to serious criticism in the *Essai sur l'origine des langues* (Ch. IX), as he did in the *Lettre à D'Alembert*, and that in any case it in no way nullified his basic conception of the state of nature as the peaceful anarchy of a wild-animal preserve. His arbitrary redefinition changed the whole basis of the argument; and, if the term natural law remained at all in his dictionary, it is of the utmost importance to realize that it no longer meant the same thing it meant in the dictionaries of the School. Hobbes and Spinoza were scarcely regarded as authorities to swear by in defining the classical tradition of natural law; and, if it was Rousseau's natural right to pour new wine into old bottles, it is also the natural law of semantic self-preservation for the buyer to beware and to ignore the label. The *Discours*, as the Academy of Dijon saw without reading, was "de mauvaise tradition. etc."

With this elaboration of Vaughan's general view of the discourse, Derathé does not seem to have any quarrel, although the conclusions he draws from it are at complete variance with Vaughan's. "Cette argumentation," he says, "ne tend aucunement à ruiner l'idée traditionnelle de loi naturelle" (p. 164). It proves only that the traditional idea of natural law does not apply to the state of nature. Despite Rousseau's belief, in other words, that natural law is not natural to natural man, he still held that it was accessible to civilized man and that it was independent of and superior to the positive law of the state in its authority. Herein then lies the concise difference between Vaughan's interpretation of the *Contrat*

social and Derathé's view that Rousseau had preserved the higher law intact. Derathé rightly observes that Vaughan omitted any consideration of Rousseau's important theory of conscience, the Daedalian wings on which all men could soar directly to the realm of moral imperatives with a minimum of intellectual ballast. And, because of the incompatibility of so important an article of Rousseau's faith with the construction Vaughan placed on the *Contrat social*, Derathé finds Vaughan's view untenable.

In addition to this basic reason, however, there are *obiter dicta* which Derathé believes to be decisive evidence. Although a fair consideration of the interpretation to be accorded them would require a more extensive examination of text than space here permits, two of the more important must at least be mentioned. The first is from a letter Rousseau wrote in 1758, in which he declared flatly that he admitted not one but three authorities independent of and superior to the authority of the state: the authority of God, the authority of natural law, and finally the authority of honor. If ever there should be conflict between any of these and civil sovereignty, it is the latter which should yield, and the blasphemer Hobbes stood condemned for having said the contrary. The passage is indeed forthright and clear, but Derathé himself admits that by itself it would not suffice to prove the case, probably because at least part of it is difficult to reconcile with the *Contrat social* itself (II, 6: "Toute justice vient de Dieu... mais si nous savions la recevoir de si haut, nous n'aurions besoin ni de gouvernement ni de lois."). The second passage cited is from the sixth of the *Lettres de la Montagne*, which states that not even the social contract itself can infringe the natural laws. But here interpretation becomes delicate. Appeals to natural law, as Aristotle remarked in the *Rhetoric*, are particularly appropriate to the lawyer who finds no support for his case in the positive law. If the law of Creon was oppressive, it was understandable that its victims should appeal to the eternal laws of the gods. By the same token, it would seem an equally natural position for the reformer who set about the formulation of the ideal state to proclaim that the eternal justice of natural law had been incorporated into the very machinery of the positive law. In this manner and in this manner alone is it possible to render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's without conflicting with higher authority. Under Caesar's law, natural law has always been a dissident voice, and it is proof of Rousseau's great astuteness that he, like Hobbes, saw the danger of divided authority and took precautions to prevent it. The contract of society embodied the natural law and no longer left it sitting apart in watchful judgment of the positive law. Viewed in this light, Rousseau's statement that the social contract itself could not violate natural law proves less than it appears to. If it reaffirms with the School that the legitimate state is founded upon antecedent requirements of right reason, it does not vindicate the enduring authority of these higher laws against the legitimate state.

Derathé's reference to the doctrine of conscience, however, poses a special problem. It is almost inescapable practice to judge difficult matters by their relationship to the more or less fixed stars of Rousseau's philosophical firmament, and the doctrine of conscience is unquestionably one of the brightest. Scholars quite naturally have had misgivings about any interpretation such as Vaughan's which either ignores or contradicts this apparently fundamental idea. Yet the aprioristic system has its difficulties; for along with the doctrine of conscience there is another equally blazing star in the firmament, equally constant and equally unmistakable—namely, the doctrine of the depravity of civilized man. Elaborated early, the theme was repeated in work after work that men are wicked and that a sad and continual experience make further proof unnecessary. And Rousseau made it clear that to his mind this realism was the only solid

foundation upon which political philosophy could build. The lawgiver must not attribute to men a perfection which they do not have. He must not aspire to build a society of Christians, for political society would be unnecessary to true Christians. He must not agree with Mirabeau and the physiocrats that men are governed by the natural laws of reason, which though excellent for citizens of Utopia are worthless for the children of Adam. By the time these natural laws of reason had begun to develop, the passions were already so noisy that civilized man could no longer hear, much less heed, the still small voice. The Candle of the Lord had all but gone out, and only the legitimate state could restore it to its brightness.

The first function of the lawgiver, then, is to take men not as they ought to be but as they are, and from Rousseau's version of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's project for perpetual peace we learn more precisely what he meant: "Nous n'avons point supposé les hommes tels qu'ils devraient être, bons, généreux, désintéressés et aimant le bien public par humanité, mais tels qu'ils sont: injustes, avides, et préférant leur intérêt à tout." If justice was to be realized, men would have to be made fit for society, and this duty devolved upon the state itself. It would change human nature, transform each individual, alter and mutilate the human condition. Natural man would be denatured; he would be given a relative civil existence in exchange for his absolute natural existence. The individual will would be rooted out, and the general will would become the measure of justice and injustice. If indeed, as Derathé believes, Rousseau managed to keep the natural law aloft, it must be obvious at least that he resorted to more than metaphysical artifice to preserve it from an Icarian fate. In the *Pologne* he prescribed that the child from the time it first saw the light of day should see *la patrie* and nothing else. Not one instant of its life would it be allowed a private existence dissociated from the state. *Ubi patria, ibi bene.* Once the civil education had completed the denaturation process, the censorship would preserve public opinion from corruption. And finally the civil religion would be the policeman of actions, threatening with immediate dispatch to the authorities of the next world anyone who acted as if he doubted their existence.

To be sure, Rousseau assures us, the citizens are not obliged to answer for their opinions to the sovereign except "autant que ces opinions importent à la communauté" (*C.S.*, IV, 8), but he had said this before with respect to the original alienation of natural rights. There too it was a question only of "la partie de tout cela dont l'usage importe à la communauté" (II, 4), but he helpfully added that this meant the alienation was total. It is true, as Derathé and others have shown, that Rousseau later explained that is was in reality no alienation at all but only an advantageous exchange. Yet his juggling with the words liberty and independence, whatever else it may prove, scarcely constitutes a vindication of the eternal law of nature, independent of and superior to the law of the state. If he rejected the theory of fundamental laws, as Derathé indicates, on the Hobbesian ground that a constitution represented an infringement of the absolute freedom of sovereignty, it is difficult to perceive with what consistency he could retain the School's traditional insistence upon the limitations of sovereign power. In the end we have the uneasy impression again that Rousseau's words do not mean the same thing. The sovereign power must never violate the original terms of the contract, nor must it exceed the limits of "l'utilité publique" (*C.S.*, IV, 8). These are the ultimate court of appeal and, as Derathé himself observes, Rousseau unfortunately neglected to make clear the machinery which would assure that these limitations would be respected. If the question should arise over what rights are of importance to the community, the sovereign alone is competent to judge.

For all Rousseau's Platonic qualifications of his ideal general will, his contractual justice is in essence the justice of Hobbes' gamesters. What they all agree to (unless it be slavery) is injustice to none. The natural law is indeed immutable and eternal, but it is the sovereign who decides how it should be interpreted. Fallible or not, the will of all is the supreme order and rule, and, if the ideal general will fails to turn up in an election, it is still preferable that a people be miserable through its own ignorance than guided by the wisdom of a monarch against its will. And it is preferable, too, to the rigorism of natural law doctrine which Rousseau had advocated in the "Economie politique," where he had declared the civil state to be automatically dissolved if ever it should permit a single miscarriage of justice. Rousseau's city had indeed relighted the Candle of the Lord, but it had also placed its operation under municipal jurisdiction. In this respect probably more than in any other, his *Contract social* revolutionized the city of eighteenth-century lights.

Although continuous agreement on the meaning of Rousseau is no more to be expected in the future than it has been realized in the past, Professor Derathé has presented to the postwar generation an aspect of Rousseau's political thought which, if not forgotten, has at least been neglected. It must be said in fairness to Professor Vaughan that his interpretation of Rousseau was not arrived at either in ignorance of texts or from inadequate philosophical background. He was unquestionably one of the keenest minds of a generation of outstanding Rousseau scholars, and most of the passages which appear to be at variance with his interpretation of Rousseau are to be found in his edition of *The Political Writings*. By no means unaware of the Platonic and natural law implications of the general will, Vaughan was undoubtedly influenced by the logical antinomy between what he recognized as two divergent lines in Rousseau's political thinking, individual liberty and state sovereignty. If he was right in believing that they were not so much reconciled in Rousseau's mind as left in ill-veiled hostility to each other, it was at least Rousseau's great distinction that he was aware of the intellectual legacies of his time and that he sought to unite them. If he did not succeed, it was less the fault of Jean-Jacques than of his age, which had received not only the classical and Christian tradition of immutable morality and justice, but also the relatively newer ideas of political contractualism.

By way of conclusion I may be permitted to wonder whether Professor Derathé intended his new light on Rousseau's political thought to constitute so complete a revision of Vaughan as Cobban apparently thought. In the end Professor Derathé recognizes the difficulty of reconciling Rousseau's ethics with his politics and expresses open dissatisfaction at Rousseau's failure to resolve the problem of the relationship of individual conscience to the civil law (p. 343). He has performed an invaluable service to Rousseau scholarship both of the present and of the future by his skillful analysis of the Rousseau texts and their contexts. If it be objected that not even this synthesis is sufficiently broad, and that political thought is not always derived from books devoted to politics, at least it must be said that no scholar of the present generation has shown himself so well qualified to lead us through the labyrinth of Rousseau's political principles as Professor Derathé.

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THE POEMS OF SIR ARTHUR GORGES. Edited by Helen Estabrook Sandison. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953. lviii, 254 p., 4 plates.

The figure of Sir Arthur Gorges, as it appears in the photograph of the brass in the More Chapel, Chelsea Old Church, which is reproduced as the frontispiece of this volume, is dimly outlined against a dark background, so dimly and tenuously indeed, as to be hardly distinguishable from it. A reading of Gorges' poems, admirably edited by Miss Sandison, confirms us in the impression gathered from the frontispiece. Sir Arthur Gorges does not stand out from his age with a well-defined personality. The outlines of his figure do not lack a certain elegance, but they are very faint, the main bulk of his verse consisting of translations and imitations from French poets, Desportes, Du Bellay, Ronsard, Marot, Tessier's *Premier livre d'airs*, etc.; his style is sometimes modelled on that of minor English poets, such as George Turbervile, but, first of all, as Miss Sandison remarks, "there is a touch of Ralegh in all that Gorges did, or wrote."

Before the present edition Gorges was known to literary historians through Spenser's mention of him as Alcyon "fit to frame an everlasting dittie" in the catalogue of recent or contemporary poets and wits in *Colin Clout's Come Home Again*, and through his appearing as the mourning husband in *Daphnaida*, the rather unsatisfactory elegy Spenser wrote on his wife. In the most recent survey of the period, C. S. Lewis's *English Literature in the Sixteenth Century* (Oxford, 1954), he is named in this double connection, but is not judged on his own merits. In fact, only a few of his poems existed in print, in leading anthologies of his earlier years, and it was only the purchase in 1940 by the British Museum of the manuscript of the *Vannetyes and Toyes* that provided a basis for an appreciation of the poet. Will the present edition persuade future literary historians to be more considerate? Miss Sandison writes:

"As my work on MS. Egerton began, satisfaction came in the quick realization that the lost, when found, was worth the finding, that here was no mere poetaster, but an accomplished and likeable, if minor, poet, not unworthy of Spenser's praises. This edition establishes him as author of several songs continuously popular since the 1590's, which have remained anonymous or been ascribed, on wavering premises, to Sidney, Ralegh, or Dyer."

And she sums up her opinion at the beginning of her introductory study: "His high place, under the name of Alcyon, in Colin Clout's roll of shepherds, was won by his genuine poetic touch, if also in some degree by his then shining promise as patron to poets. Talented as writer of verse and of prose, and as translator into French as well as into his own tongue, courtier, and gentleman-mariner, he holds his place, modestly rearward, in the rank led by the great figures, with all of whom he was associated, Spenser, Ralegh, Bacon..."

This opinion is confirmed towards the end of the Introduction (p. xliii): "The poetic personality that emerges deserves a place in Colin Clout's roll of singing shepherds, even if one not quite so high as he took there, thanks probably to Ralegh's friendship and to his promise as a patron of poets. He has reality and gentleness of sentiment and thought though without any pioneering."

This last phrase is a kind way of expressing the fact that, like most minor poets, Gorges rehearses the commonplaces of his period, though with a "sure rhythmic beat." We find in him all the hackneyed similes of the Petrarchan school, the blind archer, the wounded deer, the adamant, the rock, the ice and fire, the orient pearl and Indian gold, the falcon and the lure, the swan's song, the angel face, the heart more hard than stone, the living death, the dying life, the dream apparition, etc.; and his name could be quoted for nearly every type of conventional idea and simile listed by Miss Lisle Cecil John in her *Elizabethan*

Sonnet Sequences (New York, 1938). As collectors of conceits, we may rejoice to see our collection increased, but what will we have gained as lovers of poetry, even if, as Miss Sandison points out in one case (p. 203), "considerable feeling is discernible... through all the commonplaces"? Gorges' most ambitious effort, the long classical-chivalric narrative offered as a memorial to Prince Henry, *The Olympian Catastrophe*, is permeated by the influence of Spenser, and, written as late as 1612, harks back to themes and conventions of the 1590s. If Spenser, in a way, was a peripheral echo of Italian and French Renaissance poetry, Gorges in his turn was a peripheral echo at a further remove: "Untouched by the reflective and epigrammatic subtleties of the elegists of the newer mode, like Tourneur, Herbert of Cherbury, or Donne..."

It is enough to compare the little poem imitated from Desportes's "Songe" ("She whome I holde so deare...") with Donne's "Dream" to realize the difference. And it is curious to see how occasionally the same motif occurs in both poets. A passage from Georges' long elegy, "Since that the date drawes on," runs:

"What god with pittye movede
will lysten to my mone
And nowe vouchsafe me to transforme
into some Rocke or stone
Not that I would want sence,
so to bee free from payne
Butt that I might contynuallye
in her sweete syght remayne."

We are reminded of "Twicknam Garden":

"Love let mee
Some senslesse peece of this place bee;
Make me a mandrake, so I may groane here,
Or a stone fountaine weeping out my yeare."

Miss Sandison does not quote a source for Gorges' passage; indeed she makes no claim to completeness as to the identification of the French sources. But her critical apparatus is impressive enough as it is, notwithstanding this confession of modesty; and, once Gorges' habitual dependence upon other poets is accepted as a foregone conclusion, to pursue the research would hardly be worth the trouble.

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THE SPANISH BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN LITERATURE. By Stanley T. Williams. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955. 2 vols. xxvii, 433; viii, 441 p.

The scope of Professor Stanley T. Williams' encyclopedic survey of the Spanish background of American literature is even greater than the title suggests, inasmuch as he includes not only Spain but Spanish-America and not only literature but general culture. "I have omitted," he says, "chapters on science, economics, government and other subjects less directly connected with the creation of literature," but he includes the influence of, and interest in, things Hispanic in American magazines, the theater, music, the graphic arts, sculpture, architecture, and education. He aims at a "complete record of one of the great Continental influences upon our literature," and the enormous mass of material read and digested leads one to believe that Professor Williams will long remain the authority in the field. Something of the range and depth of his scholarship can be gleaned from the fact that, of 874 pages of material, 187 are devoted to

notes and 72 to an index of 144 double columns. Professor Williams has evidently produced a magisterial work, justifying the labors of the generation of scholars to which he belongs.

In referring to both the Spanish and the Spanish-American backgrounds taken together I shall use the word "Hispanism."

In grappling with his problem Professor Williams faced special difficulties which he has tried to solve in two ways. The first is the basic organization of his volumes. They are divided into an Introduction and four parts, one devoted to the period 1607-1800, one to the years 1800-1950, a third to "Major Interpreters in American Literature of Spanish and Spanish-American Culture," and a Conclusion of twenty pages. But Part III differs radically from Parts I and II, and here is his second solution. Part III retraverses Part II but from another point of view. Since Professor Williams feels that an analysis of the impact of Hispanism upon this nation must not ignore " a sustained distinction between the intellectual and the popular levels of influence," and since the great bulk of his materials pertains to these two planes of history, Parts I and II offer an historical survey in chronological order. But the "major interpreters" are something else—authors of permanent worth who have displayed an interest in Hispanism: Irving, Ticknor, Prescott, Bryant, Longfellow, Lowell, Bret Harte, and William Dean Howells.

Greatly as I admire Professor Williams' impressive performance and much as I respect his judgment, I confess to some doubt about this crisscross of methods. Part III involves repetitions, as the author honestly admits, and the question is whether the repetition is justified. The repetition is of two kinds. A considerable fraction of the material in Part III has already appeared piecemeal in Parts I and II. Moreover, in retracing these familiar lives, Professor Williams retreads familiar ground. His sketch of Washington Irving adds little to his own massive biography of that author, and little to what has been said earlier in the present study. What he tells us about Ticknor, Prescott, Lowell, and Longfellow is, on the whole, scarcely novel. His essays on Bret Harte and Howells are fresher, so that, if Professor Williams wishes to retort that his discussion of Howells shows how excellent his method can be, he has a strong case. But if the essay on Howells is fresh, this does not necessarily make the other essays equally fresh.

The case of Irving seems to have been, in the main, settled. Professor Williams adds nothing important to our knowledge of Ticknor, though one amusing inconsistency appears: In Vol. I we read of Ticknor's *History* that "not six persons in the United States" were capable of reviewing it, whereas in Vol. II the right form appears: "there were not six men in Europe capable of reviewing it." On Prescott Professor Williams has something fresh to say, but nothing that could not have appeared equally well, I think, in Part II. As for Bryant it is scarcely remarkable to discover that "he remained a careful workman and also a meticulous student of the Spanish language, the only one of the group ever to visit a South-American country." Nor is it remarkable to find that Longfellow linked translation from the Spanish to "universality," or that Lowell's "single essay on Spanish literature dealt with Cervantes" and that his letters from Madrid are graphic. I am a bit puzzled by the treatment of Harte, since our author tells us in one place that Harte's "early acquaintance with Spanish authors hardly went beyond Cervantes" and in another that his acquaintance with Spanish culture was "oblique." Is Harte's "sustained interest in the surfaces of the heterogeneous civilization of California, both of the present and of the past" the same as a genuine influence from Hispanism?

All this sounds captious on my part. But my uneasiness develops out of other considerations. One is that these eight biographical sketches, coming after the

middle of the book, diffuse rather than concentrate the record of Hispanism, whereas, if the material had been ensconced in proper niches in Part II, it would have re-enforced the argument. The second is that undue space is given to familiar figures where I should have wished to learn more of unfamiliar ones. Who or what was that Obadiah Rich whose book and manuscript collections haunt this study and who furnished the basis for the work of Irving, Ticknor, and Prescott? If it be true that Professor J. D. M. Ford made a "remarkable contribution to the teaching of Spanish" in the United States, and if more people proportionately are interested in Hispanism then ever before, I should like to know more about this contribution. I can see Professor Williams' difficulty and sympathize with his aim, but I am not persuaded the eight biographical cases inevitably strengthen the book.

So far as Part I is concerned, Professor Williams has examined all the evidence, but he is forever straining to go beyond it. Part I, it will be recalled, concerns American interest in Hispanism before 1800 and divides into two chapters, the first covering the years 1607 to 1700 and the second covering the eighteenth century. In the first of these chapters Professor Williams seems hypnotized by the argument from silence. He admits that in the colonial period cultural intercourse with Spain hardly existed (I, 7), but goes on to infer all sorts of wonderful things. We read that "Spanish literature may have been better known than we have believed" (I, 9); that "minds which developed beautiful crafts in pewter, silver, and wood carving would be capable of appreciating the arts of Spanish fiction and poetry" (I, 11); that "it is possible that the language was studied more generally than had been supposed" (I, 13); that it is "tempting to conjecture that a curiosity about history and geography ... would lure ... bolder intellects to the original Spanish" of translations it is "almost unthinkable" "these expatriate Elizabethans never read" (I, 14); and that "we are tempted to believe that this slender knowledge of Spain and its culture bore fruit in our early writing" (I, 16), this last because Moses Coit Tyler noted the phenomenon of Gongorism. None of these conjectures is inherently improbable. But where is the evidence for any one of them?

As Professor Williams approaches the nineteenth century his grasp upon evidence becomes firmer, and in Part II he is magnificently himself. He notes that by 1800 four standard attitudes towards things Hispanic had developed—intense curiosity, the romanticization of the Spanish theme, an imaginative interest in the voyages of Columbus, and the identification of the pre-Columbian Indians with a kind of Golden Age. Part II is as unshakable as a public monument. The author is excellent on the travel books, rescuing writers like Carolyn Cushing and Alexander Slidell Mackenzie from undeserved oblivion, besides arguing cogently "that the deep European roots in our culture were strengthened ... by these myriad accounts, oral and written, of foreign lands." He is equally excellent on the historians; and his survey of teachers, scholars, and translators is so good, I wish there were more of it. On novelists, poets, and dramatists interested in things Spanish he is orderly, and on Spanish painting, music, and architecture so suggestive I could spare much of Part III for more discussion of these themes in Part II. When Professor Williams has noted so much, I hesitate to add that the vogue of "Spanish" and "Moorish" architecture for vaudeville houses, amusement parks, some kinds of fraternal orders, and eventually large moving-picture houses, beginning as early as the 1870s, could be developed as a theme.

Professor Williams' style is diffuse. For example: "Thus Spanish history enthralled us by its romance, and it enriched the annals of our country by its new facts concerning the discovery. In addition, it illumined the spectacular events in three continents. It described the scramble for independence in Mexico, Cuba, and the South American nations or at the close of the century our in-

auspicious war with the mother country." It takes a moment of thinking to realize that "our inauspicious war with the mother country" is not the American Revolution. Such prose is loose and inaccurate. But Professor Williams can of course do better, as when he says that "The true nature of Spanish nationalism, with its conflicting aims of the traditional and individualistic (sometimes the anarchistic) we have never really understood." I quote this philosophic truth as an introduction to his modest summing up.

He finds that the increasing American interest in Hispanism, particularly of the Spanish sort, was a symptom of a growing cosmopolitanism in the United States—that is, of an American consciousness that we are a province of West European culture. He notes the attraction of antiquarian Spain for both professionals and amateurs, and how this attraction slides easily into the identification of Hispanism with romance ("stars and steel guitars and luscious lips as red as wine"!). But he notes also, in the era of Howells, the reverse valuation in the use of Spanish fiction to further American realism. Deeper than any of these components, however, is a paradox; albeit the political and social rationale of American literature is mystifying to the Spanish (I suspect Professor Williams means American "thought" in general), to Americans Spanish "personalism" is equally mystifying. He writes:

"This Spanish passion for the separate man (which might be contrasted profitably with the American Whitman's doctrine of 'the knit of identity') creates individuals, each inviolate, each in himself a walled city, yet each a part of Spain. This passion breathing fire and ice unto [into?] the Spanish character and Spanish literature, is not to be lifted lightly by an Irving or a Longfellow into the pretty pastures of American literature. This extreme belief in the untrammeled development of the individual, of all his physical, intellectual, aesthetic, and spiritual impulses, still confuses us, especially when we see this idea thriving in a country in which ordinary freedoms, in our naive sense of the word, hardly exist. This dream of honor, of beggars as kings, this *personalismo*, triumphant in the midst of oppression, of political inequalities, and even of anarchy—this we have been able neither to absorb into our thinking nor transfer to our literature... there is a point beyond which most American writers do not go. Instead, falling back upon the cliché that in the end the Spanish mind must remain incomprehensible, they embrace beautiful fragments."

This is well said; and, though *The Spanish Background of American Literature* is diffuse and uneven, it is a philosophic study of a magnitude to shame our little articles and lesser monographs.

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DEUTSCHLAND-FRANKREICH. Ludwigsburger Beiträge zum Problem der deutsch-französischen Beziehungen. Stuttgart: Verlag des Deutsch-Französischen Instituts in Ludwigsburg, 1954. 378 p.

Never before has there been any such deliberate, consistent, serious, and calm effort, on both sides of the Rhine, to understand the neighbor country as we have witnessed since the end of World War II. This new trend in Franco-German relations is not now the privilege of a small, insignificant group, as was the case after World War I, or of loud-voiced extremists. Rather, we find today an acute awareness of the necessity for a reasonable though guarded understanding. This cautious yet outspoken and conscious effort is becoming more and more the concern of men of moderate feelings.

The book here reviewed is a symposium of French and German contributors

coming from a diversity of fields. Their viewpoint is far from being harmonious on all issues. But their disagreements make the book lively and valuable. Here we have an earnest and straightforward approach to a thorny problem. The book represents a mosaic of opinions and interests; the editors make no claim to completeness. The division into four parts is somewhat arbitrary, since three of these parts (which together make up the text of the book) cannot be kept from overlapping at times.

Part I presents the political problem. Carlo Schmid's article, "Germany and France," stresses the curious coincidence of political and military conflict with a flourishing cultural and intellectual exchange. This had been pointed out before, most completely by Jean-Marie Carré in his *Les Écrivains français et le mirage allemand* (1947). In "The New Face of the World, After Two Wars," André Siegfried deals with anthropological changes; his conclusions call for ethical progress as over against purely technological advances. Raymond Aron gives a political sketch "On the German Problem" with brief hints at mutual cultural interests.

Part II, "The Revision of the Historical View in France and Germany," is a courageous attempt to eradicate some of the age-old prejudices that have poisoned the atmosphere between the two countries—a problem which is of concern to other countries as well. Included, in both languages, is the text of an agreement reached by German and French historians, as a result of several meetings since 1945. In these Franco-German conventions on disputed questions in the field of history, historians of both nations agree to revise the historical picture which each country has of the other. Part II also contains a study by Robert Minder on "The Alemannic Element—as Seen within the European Framework," dealing with the role of Alemannic leaders in literature, science, art, politics, and military affairs within the framework of Franco-German relations.

Part III, "Cultural and Intellectual Exchange," offers a number of substantial studies, some of them comparative. However, it is here that the limitations of the book become most striking. There are a number of topics that might well have been covered in an overall picture of Franco-German literary relations. It is not clear what criteria determined the choice. It is to be hoped that an eventual sequel may complete this worthwhile pioneering endeavor.

Wilhelm Hausenstein writes on "Cultural Relations between France and Germany." He reminds the reader of the Western community which was felt so strongly by the Crusaders, and points out common bonds between French and German monks throughout the Middle Ages. The example of Albertus Magnus bears witness to the intellectual unity between France and Germany in the thirteenth century. The influence of troubadours and trouvères on the Minnesang is exemplified by the Tristan theme. Omitting any reference to either the Renaissance or the Reformation, Hausenstein goes on into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, where he deals exclusively with architecture. In the later period, he touches upon literature only marginally and without very precise documentation. His notes on Stendhal and Germany, as well as his remarks on Balzac, seem somewhat disputable.

Gerhard Hess discusses "Literature through Changing Opinions," surveying some of the oversimplifications and generalizations to be found in each country with respect to its neighbor. Hess points out that the national characterization of literary heroes, totally unknown to the Middle Ages, began at a fairly recent date; he cautions against taking extreme caricatures, like Voltaire's Candide and Lessing's Riccaut, to be even conceptually representative, or against seeking a literary incarnation of a foreign people in symbolized figures, such as Faust.

He finds that, unlike the situation during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we now have a widespread reciprocal reception of essential and representative literature in both countries. He indicates the relative importance of mediocre French classicist drama for Lessing's criticism, the more immediate influence of Rousseau on Kant. He notes the interchange during the romantic era, and considers "the last strong impact of French literature on Germany" to be the realistic and naturalistic novel, and symbolist lyricism. Less convincing because less accurate is Hess's treatment of the reciprocal flow of existentialism between the two countries; he correctly points to the philosophical inspiration which French writers and thinkers find in German philosophy, but he includes in existentialism such figures as Camus, which is debatable, and Anouilh, which is erroneous. He states that Maupassant and Zola are still the most widely read French authors in France. It would seem likely that these authors find a greater number of readers in Germany, nowadays, than in France. In conclusion, he contends that at the present time there are no strong, overpowering effects of one literature upon the other.

Friedrich Beissner offers an essay on "Hölderlin in France," focusing on Hölderlin's travels through France and his enthusiasm for the French Revolution, Rousseau, and Napoleon.

Edmond Vermeil, in "The Problem of Decadence and of Regeneration (Goethe and Rousseau, R. Wagner and Nietzsche)," scores the superficial contrasting of *Kultur* and *civilisation*. He shows that there is a common evolution, at certain times; a case in point is the rise of sensibility during the last third of the eighteenth century. Vermeil touches upon similarities of theme in Rousseau's *Nouvelle Héloïse* and Goethe's *Iphigenia* and novels. "The women in Goethe's as in Rousseau's novels combine clarity of mind with exuberance of feeling, while the men, in the works of both authors, have a predominance of one or the other element." He further points out that Goethe, like Rousseau, remains faithful to cosmopolitanism. Vermeil clarifies the international intellectual horizon, dispelling some of the traditional prejudices that have befogged the judgment of generations of critics. It has seemed, indeed, that the whole evolution of European intellectual conflicts was based on the dichotomy between French rationalism and German irrationalism. Vermeil shows the subtly interwoven streams of thought in both countries. His demonstration is less happy in his emphasis on the importance, not only of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, but of Wagner, for the general formation of German thought during the second half of the nineteenth century. He sees (as in his earlier fundamental work on Germany) a deep polarity between Goethe and Nietzsche on the one hand and Rousseau and Wagner on the other.

Kurt Wais's essay, "The Impact of the French Naturalistic Novel on Germany," is possibly the most original and outstanding feature of the whole book. Wais stresses the fact that, whereas in France even minor writers have been chosen as subjects for monographs, in Germany nearly all research interest in authors after Storm and Keller was paralyzed and brought to a stop by the circumstances of the last forty years.

Wais challenges the narrowing of the term "naturalistic" to apply to Zola only, and perhaps to Maupassant. He sees an intimate relationship between Zola's *Thérèse Raquin*, Hardy's *Jude the Obscure*, D. H. Lawrence's *Sons and Lovers*, Remarque's early novels, Van Der Meersch, and Sartre's *Roads to Freedom*. Certain direct influences, like that of Zola on Hauptmann, are elaborated. "A new courage to practice psychology is the main gift that comes from France." Wais gives us a solid summarization of influences, motifs, and themes through many literatures, thus making a contribution of a truly comparative nature. He claims as the most surprising result of his study the discovery of the marked effect the

Goncourt brothers had on German novelists, as evidenced, e.g., by Thomas Mann's use of *Renée Mauperin* as a model for *Buddenbrooks*.

Wais's research seems to point to the existence of "two distinct groups within naturalism, a proletarian and a bourgeois group. Germany's naturalistic drama sides with the former, its novels with the latter. Zola fostered the former, the Goncourts the latter."

The notes on stylistic mannerisms, frequent in the bourgeois branch of French naturalism, and on the adoption of such patterns by German novelists, are quite plausible. However, in trying to apply standards of foreign influence to certain types of German regionalistic novels, the author fails to make his arguments convincing. The truncated conclusion is the least homogeneous part of his otherwise very lucid and thought-provoking study.

Julius Wilhelm, treating "Nietzsche's Effect upon Contemporary France," starts out rather impressionistically. His purpose is to "show at least an outline" of French comprehension for, and reception of, Nietzsche. There is a good characterization of Nietzschean traits in writers like Montherlant and Malraux. However, in trying to demonstrate Sartre's indebtedness to Nietzsche, Wilhelm is on somewhat unsure ground. Sartre can hardly be claimed as an illustration of Nietzscheism. Perhaps the author senses this, for he admits that, in many contemporary French authors, the measurable influence exerted by Nietzsche is questionable. Nevertheless he suggests that there are "many latent Nietzscheisms," direct or indirect.

Jean Schlumberger writes on "André Gide, Personality and Work." Gide strove long and hard to prove the continuity of his thought against critics who called him inconsistent. Only when he chose to make sincerity the very earmark of his work did he overcome the suspicion of artificiality, raised on all sides against him. Although Gide carefully stated the influences of various foreign authors upon him, he never acknowledged the influence of French writers. Young Gide read and liked Heine and Novalis; he was vastly impressed by Fichte and Schopenhauer. The influence of both Nietzsche and Goethe came when Gide the writer had already matured.

Joseph Breitbach treats "Jean Schlumberger, Personality and Work." In his fiction, Schlumberger does not deal with current issues, but in his essays and journalistic articles he discusses them courageously.

Maurice Colleville was called upon to write on "Herman Hesse and France." Very candidly, he relates how he consulted Hesse, in order to get a statement on the subject. Hesse wrote him on a postcard, "Better drop the topic!" At the outset there seemed to be no direct French influences upon the writer. But, surprisingly enough, certain definite obligations do exist. According to rather recent pronouncements by Hesse, it appears that a definite literary debt is acknowledged to old French literature, to Rabelais, to Stendhal, to Flaubert and Baudelaire, particularly to Racine and Balzac, and above all to Maurice de Guérin. In our time, everyone knows of the friendship of Hesse and Romain Rolland. They met on the grounds of their pacifist ideals; both were attracted by India. Their main difference lay in temperament, Hesse always tending toward solitude, Rolland toward action.

Karl Rauch presents "The Message of Antoine de Saint-Exupéry and its Effect upon Germany." Rauch brands as shortsighted the attempts by certain German literary critics (e.g., Hofmiller) to deny universality to French literature. He denounces Hofmiller's claim to having given France the equivalent of the *Wunderhorn* through his edition of *Chansons d'amour*, published without source index or any mention of composers' or poets' names. Rauch hails the straightforwardness of the twenty- and thirty-year-old Germans who start out, after 1945,

to discover France and its culture. Amazingly enough, one of Saint-Exupéry's books, *Wind, Sand, and Stars,* was read and appreciated widely in Germany, even during the war. Over 120,000 copies of the book, with its undeniable plea for understanding and fraternity, were found in submarine and air-force libraries, despite censorship and secret police. Today, Saint-Exupéry is probably the foreign author most popular in Germany. Rauch proposes to evaluate Saint-Exupéry first and foremost as a representative of humanity, a truly human and deeply humane creator.

Maurice Boucher, in "German Post-War Literature, as Seen from France," gives just a sample of his wide readings in contemporary German letters. Boucher has a regular column in the French review *Hommes et Mondes,* in which he presents German writers to the French public. In contrast to German literature of the early 1920s, there is now no chaos, he insists, no ethical nihilism; rather there is in Germany today a regrouping of old cultural values, a rebirth of idealistic essence.

Karl Hermann Weinert gives a very limited "Picture of the German in French Post-War Literature." He concerns himself merely with *Thematik,* with themes, not with ethics. He considers *engagement* an obstacle to unprejudiced treatment of German characters in poetry and fiction and at the same time gives an account of the intellectual situation in France which should not go unchallenged. Weinert overstresses French liberation trials and excesses, as compared with the denazification process in Germany. Moreover, where in the world could French writers have seen the German soldier "intellectualized" in 1940, if we except the testimony of traitors or collaborationists? Nazi contempt for, and systematic hostility to, the intellect was not only notorious; it was obvious from the behavior of the occupants. One cannot help feeling that such a misleading picture as Weinert's may be an unconscious attempt at whitewashing the occupants. It must not be forgotten that it was the fascist French writers who described the Germans as "correct," an epithet that never fails, retrospectively, to make Frenchmen shudder. Weinert again overstates what he calls fraternization between Germans and French, in Germany, during the war. The notion of German "hospitality," extended to French workers doing forced labor, must sound strange to millions of displaced persons who certainly did not enjoy any such privileges. The choice of French writers whom Weinert examines is, on the whole, a good one. He names representative authors, and tries to convey as complex a picture as the brevity of his essay permits.

Alfred Grosser writes on "Emmanuel Mounier and the Comité Français d'Échanges avec l'Allemagne Nouvelle." He emphasizes Mounier's determination to create a platform for a genuine exchange between the two countries. This exchange was to be free from sentimentalism, and it was also to refuse the participation of extremists.

As a complement to this sober but conservative program, Fritz Schenk traces the history of the Franco-German Institute in Ludwigsburg, of which he is the director. His "Aims and Work of the Deutsch-Französische Institut" shows how numerous lectures and courses at university level serve as a stimulating and informative basis for understanding. The institute now functions as a clearing-house for exchange lectureships in the two countries.

The final section of the book, offers a systematic bibliography of over 1,700 items. The first part of this bibliography is devoted to German studies on France, the second to French studies on Germany. While great care has been used to organize the bibliography, it is to be deplored that some parts of it are not too methodically assembled—for instance, the section dealing with the literary aspect of the Franco-German problem. There are titles whose inclusion is not

warranted, and many essential works published well before this book came out are not to be found. The bibliography is deficient especially in the field of literature, and particularly in the section devoted to the picture of the German as seen through French eyes. It has nevertheless great positive value, especially for its listing, for the first time, of political and historical works, as well as significant articles, both by Frenchmen on Germany and by Germans on France.

Among the few typographical errors that require correction is the mention by Vermeil (p. 134) of *H. Hettner's* (not Heltner's) history of *French* literature (not German) in the eighteenth century. Telescoping of lines seems to be responsible for another error on p. 177; R. M. Albérès is the author of *L'Aventure intellectuelle au XX^e siècle*, not G. Picon.

Despite its shortcomings, this symposium is an encouraging start in a field that will doubtless yield more such constructive contributions to knowledge and to understanding.

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HISTORY OF HUMANISM. By Giuseppe Toffanin. English translation, foreword and augmented bibliography by Elio Gianturco. New York: Las Americas Publishing Co., 1954. 356 p.

Those of our colleagues who do not read Italian with ease, and even those who do, may welcome this translation, which has about 360 titles added by the translator to the 500 titles of the bibliography of the latest Italian edition (1950). If there is still anyone left who does not know the viewpoint of Toffanin, which in 1933 surprised the scholars accustomed to share the concept of Jakob Burckhardt, it may be repeated here: Humanism is the uninterrupted Latin thought from Cicero through Boethius, St. Augustine, and the Scholastics to the Renaissance scholars, thought in which pagan and Christian thinking harmoniously merged into a particular *sapientia*. Averroism, Greek "Orientalism," and the rising natural sciences tried to destroy it and its *Romanità*.

It is visible from every line of the introduction that Professor Gianturco does not share this idea at all, and we have here the unusual situation of a translator attempting to make a point for a translation while unable to accept its philosophical tenets. This critical nonbelief, however, after the splendidly enriched bibliography, may be considered the second asset of this well-printed translation. The third is that the translation itself reads very well, as far as I can judge. Comparisons with the original prove that the idiomatic syntax of English is well applied to render the Italian text.

Toffanin sets out with a topic sentence not readily imitable in English: "Che una storia della cultura in cui l'umanesimo effonda le sue radici ci riconduca a ritroso di tutto il Medio Evo fino alla decadenza latina, è giudizio accettato dal comune buon senso."

Gianturco translates: "It is a judgment ratified by common sense that a history of that culture into which Humanism plunges its roots leads us all the way back through the Middle Ages to the period of Latin decline."

The translation is a free and therefore a readable one. Sometimes, however, it is so free that one is aware that the philosophy of life of the translator does not exactly coincide with that of the author.

Toffanin: "Sapienza e latino restarono inscindibili per due secoli, anche se fra i sapienti e i men dotti, qualcuno offerse, a intermediario, il volgare, come per un'opera di pietà."

Gianturco: "Wisdom and Latin were rendered inseparable for two centuries, even though some men offered the vernacular as an intermediary between the

scholars and the unlearned. The offer was made almost in a spirit of piety." (Should it not read: as was usual with works of piety?)

The nonspecialist may well read the translator's introduction as an important guide to the bibliography, which thus becomes a critical bibliography. Because of his bibliographical achievement, Gianturco's translation paradoxically has become more important than the Italian original.

H. H.

ITALIAN SCHOLARSHIP IN RENAISSANCE ENGLAND. By R. C. Simonini, Jr. Chapel Hill, 1952. 125 p. (University of North Carolina Studies in Comparative Literature, No. 3.)

Dr. Simonini's study of the history of the teaching of the Italian language in Renaissance England sets out the facts in a convenient form. He introduces it with a general discussion of Renaissance humanism and language scholarship. His second chapter points out the demand for knowledge of Italian in England, because of the supreme importance of Italian Renaissance culture in the period, indicates the significance of the foreign Protestant refugees as language teachers, and analyzes the attitude of the universities to modern-language teaching. His third chapter gives accounts of the lives and works of the main Italian teachers of the period—William Thomas, Henry Grantham, Claudius Hollyband, John Florio, John Sanford, and Giovanni Torriano, and suggests that the achievements of these "scholars of Italian in England were more comprehensive and more thorough than is generally known." His last chapter argues, with many quotations, that the modern-language teachers, particularly Florio, and their language-teaching dialogues were known to Shakespeare and Ben Jonson. And he gives in an appendix "A Check-List of Grammars, Language Manuals, and Dictionaries for the Study of Italian Published in England during the Renaissance."

Since publishing this book, Dr. Simonini has made a further contribution to its subject by providing a facsimile edition of John Florio's *Second Frutes* (Gainesville, Fla., 1953), which is unquestionably the most interesting and important of the Italian textbooks of the period. Florio's *First Fruites* was published by Dr. Arundell del Re in 1936 at Taihoku Imperial University, Formosa. Thus reprints of both these very rare books are now available, and scholars can study for themselves Florio's lively conversational teaching methods, rich in literary and topical allusions, and reflect on their possible echoes in the works of Shakespeare and other writers of the time. It should also be pointed out that the *Regole de la lingua thoscana* of John Florio's father, Michelangelo Florio, have recently been printed for the first time from the manuscripts, with an introduction (Giuliano Pellegrini, "Michelangelo Florio e le sue 'Regole de la lingua thoscana,'" *Studi di Filologia italiana*, XII, 1954, 77-204). All the material for the study of the teaching of the Florios, father and son, is therefore now available.

Dr. Simonini rightly stresses the strong Protestant background of modern-language teaching in Renaissance England, and the predominant refugee element among the teachers. Michelangelo Florio, whom Dr. Simonini calls "the first known public teacher of a modern foreign language in England," was minister to the Italian Protestant church in London under Edward VI, and at the same time teacher of his native tongue, his most famous pupil being Lady Jane Grey. Though, so far as I know, there is no evidence of his having been a "public teacher," there is no doubt that Michelangelo Florio started the teaching tradition which his son John was to carry on so brilliantly in the next generation. Michelangelo Florio was very strongly identified with the extreme left-wing Protestant party in England, with which he went into exile on the accession of Catholic Mary. In her study of *The Marian Exiles* (Cambridge, 1938) Miss C. H. Garrett suggested that

the English Protestant exiles modelled their communities abroad on the foreign refugee congregations under Edward VI, one of which had been under the ministry of Michelangelo Florio (about whom Miss Garrett gives new documentary evidence, pp. 155, 363). It should not be forgotten that the political and religious ideas of an Italian minority—the Italian Protestants—may have found diffusion through the teaching activities of refugees in England. Dr. Simonini notes as an "interesting connection between the religious motif and the learning of Italian" that Lady Ann Coke translated the twenty-five sermons of Bernardino Ochino. Ascham, as Dr. Simonini recalls, complained that people went to the Italian Protestant church merely to learn Italian and not for its doctrine. This remark in itself shows how strongly tinged with Italian Protestantism were the opportunities of learning Italian in Elizabethan England, which led to the curious phenomenon of Italianate Puritanism, of which Milton is the supreme example.

To the known pupils of John Florio, Dr. Simonini adds one more name, that of Lady Elizabeth Barkley; he prints from the copy of the 1598 edition of Florio's dictionary in the Folger Shakespeare Library a dedication in Florio's hand to that lady. Otherwise his account of Florio, whom he calls (perhaps rather exaggeratedly) the "first modern humanist," follows known lines.

Among the interesting minor points, bearing indirectly on modern-language study, to which Dr. Simonini draws attention, is the observation that Castiglione's *Cortegiano* was published by John Wolfe in 1588 with Italian, French, and English versions printed in parallel columns, suggesting that this work was much studied as a text from which to learn Italian. He even finds that a parallel translation for teaching purposes of Castiglione's famous book was published in London as late as 1727. Perhaps no student of Italian in England for hundreds of years failed to pore over that finest distillation of the spirit of the Italian Renaissance.

I find it hard to agree with Dr. Simonini's dismissal of the fascinating Italian-English language-teaching dialogues of Giovanni Torriano as inferior to the Elizabethan dialogues of which they are a seventeenth-century descendant. They seem to me in one sense superior, for they have an awareness of art and architecture (to which I drew attention in a note, "An Italian in Restoration England," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, VI, 1943, 216-220), which is totally absent from the purely literary teaching of Florio. They reflect the more all-round Italianate culture of the seventeenth-century "virtuoso," as distinct from the almost entirely literary interests of the Elizabethans.

The phenomenon which Dr. Simonini discusses in this book is an interesting one. As he says, "Tradition and innovation fortuitously combined during the English Renaissance to produce new methods and materials which became the genesis of modern foreign language teaching." The immense demand for knowledge of the modern tongues among the stirring population was met by a supply of able teachers, who produced grammars and conversation manuals from which people could teach themselves, thus initiating a vast class of products of our modern presses. These books, and the teaching methods behind them, owed much to the tradition of Latin teaching, particularly to Vives' *Colloquia*. Dr. Simonini suggests in his section on the French refugee teacher, Hollyband, that another contributing tradition is that of the French *Manières de langage*. Towering above this busy world of utilitarian language teachers, is the figure of John Florio, who set out, not only to teach a modern tongue but to acquaint his students with its literature—in short, to make a "modern" subject a discipline almost comparable with the classics. In Florio we see emerging the figure of a professor of the modern humanities, and the future is suddenly big with visions of chairs of English, French, Italian literature, and so on, in the universities of the modern world.

Dr. Simonini does not succeed very well in relating this phenomenon to a

larger context. His introductory chapter is somewhat confused, and omits any reference to the movement to which one should look for the sources of the development. As is well known, when the Italian humanists had done their work on the recovery of the classical texts and the refashioning and debarbarizing of spoken and written Latin, they turned their attention to the *volgare*, and applied humanistic methods of language study, developed in the classical phase, to the examination and purification of the Italian tongue. This was accompanied by the taking up of Italian, rather than Latin, by writers as the medium of expression; Bembo, for example, a pioneer in the linguistic study of the *volgare*, revived and imitated the Italian poetry of Petrarch (at a time when Petrarch as a classical scholar had long been outdistanced by the achievements of his humanist successors). This movement towards the vernacular spread to the other countries of Europe; and in the late Renaissance a humanistic, or scholarly, treatment of the modern tongues was pursued at the same time as classical humanism. All this is very obvious, but Dr. Simonini does not mention it, perhaps because he takes it for granted. Yet the Italian scholarship in England which he studies was, of course, a derivation of Italian Italian scholarship (Dr. Pellegrini in his introduction to Michelangelo Florio's grammar shows that it is modelled on the *Prose della volgar lingua* of Bembo), and one would have thought that this might have been discussed.

The first phase of the English Renaissance in the early sixteenth century was contemporary with Bembo and the movement towards the vernacular in Italy. England, which had played little part in the development of classical humanism, began to receive the full impact of the Italian Renaissance at the time when the vernacular literatures were coming to the fore.

The rise of modern-language teaching in England belongs to the second phase of the English sixteenth-century Renaissance, not to the abortive first, or pre-Reformation, phase. The demand for it seems to have arisen in the new society formed by the Reformation changes—and the supply of teachers was also a product of the Reformation, for the most influential and important of them were foreign Protestant refugees. Was this movement, then, a development of the humanistic treatment of, and respect for, the vernaculars which took a practical educational form in the peculiar social circumstances of post-Reformation England? Though he omits to pose it clearly, Dr. Simonini would perhaps answer this question in the affirmative; for he says of Florio that "In him merge the many long traditions of Italian humanism and the peculiar patriotic and practical character of English humanism."

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THE ITALIAN INFLUENCE IN ENGLISH POETRY FROM CHAUCER TO SOUTHWELL. By A. Lytton Sells. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955. 346 p.

Professor Sells has essayed a large and important task. Of monographs and articles on particular aspects of Italian influence there are plenty, but, as he says, "what is now needed is a work of collation in a form accessible to the student and cultured reader and not so detailed (or so heavily documented) as to prevent his embracing the whole subject at a glance." This his substantial volume enables us to do; and we are glad to learn that a sequel will carry the story through the metaphysical poets. The main subjects of the present book—which does not include drama—are: Chaucer, Wyatt and Surrey, Sidney, Spenser, Shakespeare, the sonneteers, songs and madrigals, Drayton, Greville, and Southwell. Interspersed sections and chapters deal with lesser figures, with Italians in England (notably the visitor Bruno and the citizen Florio) and Englishmen in Italy, and with the influence of Italian thought and culture (e.g., Machiavelli, Casti-

glione, and *novelle*). The volume is enriched by eight reproductions of portraits and other paintings.

Mr. Sells remarks (p. 12) that his pages, "which do not pretend to be exhaustive, are an essay in literary criticism rather than literary history." This intention is perhaps not fully borne out in the text; there is much criticism, but there is still more literary history; and, in a broad pioneer survey, the historical background that gives coherence and continuity is quite welcome. In this as in other ways the author rarely forgets that he is addressing the cultured reader as well as the student (doubtless there is such a dichotomy, if "the cultured reader" still exists). His book is not made gritty by the historical scholar's determination to tell all. The recurrence of such names as Mackail and Legouis suggests the gentlemanly or academic impressionism of an earlier generation; and some readers may wish that Mr. Sells's criticism came nearer to the analytical precision of the modern school, though the author of a comprehensive survey, whatever his own instincts may be, cannot give ten or twenty pages to disemboweling a lyric. In any case Mr. Sells allows himself an unhurried and agreeable amplitude of historical and biographical and local color, and his "amateur" urbanity and gusto make him attractively readable.

One finishes the book with the feeling that the varied contours of the extensive landscape have been pretty well mapped (although one may think Chapman more deserving of a chapter than Drayton or perhaps Greville). The picture as a whole seems right in outline and shading, and many of the critical estimates and *aperçus* are, within their limits, judicious and discriminating. Mr. Sells is good on Chaucer—though he gives almost the same space to the *Knight's Tale* and to *Troilus*. At the other end of the book and of the poetical spectrum, he is good on Southwell, whom—with Janelle's aid—he makes properly important. He is good on a number of other writers and on such central topics as Petrarchism, Neoplatonism, and pastoralism. The book does in the main succeed in what it sets out to do.

At the same time one may have more queries than one could wish to have in regard to a "standard" book. This is not said with reference to matters of taste, in which—to mix metaphors—a critic stands on his own feet (and Mr. Sells stands firmly enough on his to consider the Spenserian stanza a regrettable invention). On the factual level, a list of erroneous or dubious details would be rather long—longer than the ample list of misprints. One would prefer not to meet again those stubborn myths about a literary club called the Areopagus (pp. 134, 150) and about popular prejudice against Machiavelli dating from Patericke's translation (1602) of Gentillet (pp. 151-152); and a cluster of biographical inaccuracies concerning Spenser might have been avoided. Such items are usually not very important in themselves; but, along with the positive and negative evidence of the notes, they seem to imply something less than full acquaintance with modern scholarship.

Professor Sells being a professional expert in French and Italian, it is natural that his occasional shortcomings should be mainly on the English side. For example, the discussion of Wyatt's sonnet forms and prosody—his great lyrics do not come in here—would have gained a good deal from criticism apparently not utilized. The chapter on songs and madrigals gives on the whole a satisfactory short view of a complex subject, but "the authority in these matters" is said (pp. 251, 263) to be Thomas Oliphant, whose *Musa Madrigalesca* appeared in 1837; there is a shelf of modern and important writings on Italian and Elizabethan music and song. A too large share of the chapter on Shakespeare is devoted to the "problems" of the sonnets and to the propositions that *Venus and Adonis* started from Titian's painting, that the passage on Troy in *Lucrece* was founded

on Giulio Romano's pictures, and that Shakespeare had visited Italy. If these ideas can be entertained, it seems a bit summary to dismiss as unproved (p. 188) the influence of the Italian Ovidian genre; at any rate we might wish in this connection for more than incidental comment on the "Italianate" style, which was one large factor in the difference between what C. S. Lewis has chosen to call "drab" and "golden" in Elizabethan writing. In another area Professor Sells's Italian point of view leads him to approach *The Faerie Queene* as the work of a partial or inferior Ariosto misled by a love of allegory, an approach that may serve for what may be termed Spenser's middle level but misses most of his greatness, the far deeper and higher vision that links him—as Josephine Bennett observed a while ago—rather with Dante than with the romancers. The serious themes and thought of Sidney's *Arcadia* are likewise passed by, though Mr. Sells is perceptive, if brief, on *Astrophel and Stella*. It is a little odd, by the way, especially in such a book as this, that Spenser's *Epithalamion* should be related to the remote Pindar and not to the *canzone*.

In noting such flaws one does not forget the author's prevailing virtues, and one may ask how many other scholars in French and Italian could have even contemplated such a book, much less produced one of such a high degree of competence. One only wishes that Professor Sells, having done so much so well, had done a little more and made all the book as good as its best parts. Perhaps one may be allowed a final reflection which has nothing to do with the quality of this book but concerns the subject in itself; during a long period Italian influence obviously provided dynamic stimuli and models in almost every kind of writing, and yet the story, any story, of that influence inevitably misses the best qualities or the best work of all or most of the major English poets from Chaucer or Wyatt to Spenser and Shakespeare. But doubtless that is what the story of any foreign influence on any country both is and ought to be.

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POEMS, 1943-1952: POESIE, 1943-1952. By Robert Lowell. A cura di Rolando Anzilotti. Florence: Sansoni, 1955. 99 p.

In a twelve-page introduction to this selection from Lowell's work Rolando Anzillotti has discriminatingly repaid his debt to the poet as his teacher in the seminar in American studies near Schloss Leopoldskron in the summer of 1952. The survey of the poet's development up to that year is sympathetic and true to the qualities of his mind and art. In the poems before 1945 Anzilotti finds "qualcosa di troppo violento, di incontrollato, di esagerato. È la voce di un cattolico che ritiene ancora la severa intransigenza del protestante." But in the fusion of traditional and modern elements in Lowell's style and still more in his challenge of the problems of life and death in later poems Anzilotti finds hope that he may at least attempt "la grande epica di questo secolo."

Among the thirteen poems selected for translation only "The Quaker Graveyard in Nantucket" is among the longer ones that are discussed in the introduction. The translator more than achieves his modest ambition not to do violence to the rhythms and images of the originals. Though an occasional phrase like "out-Herods Herod" in "The Holy Innocents" loses its secondary historical echo in the rendering "fa più da Erode di Erode," the rhythms of "The Quaker Graveyard" are not weakened, nor are its "immagini ribollenti e accavallantisi" dimmed or distorted in the translation.

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PROVERBS FOR PLEASURE: UNCOMMON SAYINGS COLLECTED, ARRANGED & ANNOTATED. By H. Pullar-Strecker. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. xviii, 202 p.

The compiler of this pleasing volume is a physician who has made proverbs his hobby and who desires to encourage the use of proverbs by the general public, or at least by a segment of the general public. For, he says, "there are two kinds of people: those who can tell a story against themselves, and those who cannot. Those who cannot have no use for proverbs." As the title indicates, the book is not intended for scholars, as such.

The collection is made up of "uncommon" sayings, by which the compiler seems to mean not only the less common, but also the more pungent. "The uncommon, downright, virile *Sweat makes good mortar*, and its fellows, are found in this book rather than the insipid *No gains without pains*, etc." The sources from which the proverbs were drawn are not indicated, but presumably standard collections were used; the introduction mentions incidentally the *Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs*. The proverbs are skillfully arranged in groups each containing half a dozen or more proverbs bearing upon a single "leading idea," under a heading which is generally itself a proverb. Numerous cross-references to other groups of related or contrasting proverbs are indicated by handy "signposts." Interlinear annotations indicate probable national sources or explain dialect and archaic words. The author is careful to point out in his introduction that only the form of a proverb is Scotch of French, the thought is universal; "proverbial wisdom is wholly international."

All in all, this book makes enjoyable reading; the proverbs are selected and presented with relish and understanding. The volume is handsomely made up and well printed.

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VARIA

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ANNOUNCEMENT

The International Association of Comparative Literature will hold a meeting in Venice from September 25 to 30. The central theme of the papers will be "Venise dans les littératures modernes." Further information may be had by writing to Professor Carlo Pellegrini of the University of Florence.